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Abstract
This thesis investigates the behaviour of politicians and voters in local elections. The first
paper studies the effects of campaigning when public funding covers a sizeable share of spend-
ing. It develops a probabilistic voting model and a causal, instrumental variable, empirical
analysis using a novel database of political campaigns from the Portuguese Constitutional
Court. The second paper is a field experiment that evaluates the impact of the information
conveyed by the media to the voters on their political perceptions and voting behaviour. In
the last, I use the fact that mayors increase spending in election years to estimate the local
economic impacts of increased expenditure.
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Introduction
Politicians play a pivotal role in our version of society, in at least three ways. They de-
fine the overall priorities and goals of the Government, establish the general guidelines and
policies to attain such goals and lastly, they create the rules that regulate the behaviour of
the social actors. No other society member has such a broad influence in social and eco-
nomical developments. Political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and economists have
devoted much of their attention to studying and analysing politicians and the several layers
of government where they act.
Nowadays, the rise of populism, even in countries which are generally considered mature
democracies, has reignited the debate about the relevance of political agents and institutions
in the maintenance of a free, prosperous and developed society. The recent cases of the
Swedish and Italian general elections illustrate how political polarisation has increased, both
as a result and a symptom of a society that is increasingly divided. This is also clear
when we look at the ideological positions and the policy platforms proposed in some of the
recent elections, e.g., in Brazil in 2018 or the United States in 2016. More generally, across
Europe, for instance, candidates closer to the extremes of the political spectrum (mainly
from nationalist or far-right parties) or from outside the traditional party system altogether
have gained more visibility and gathered more votes in almost all countries (Bartoszewicz,
2015, Hutter, Kriesi, and Vidal, 2018, Somer and McCoy, 2018).
Political economy is the branch of Economics that studies the relationship between politics
and the society. The meaning of “political economy" is now substantially different from the
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seminal definition of Adam Smith. According to Weingast and Wittman (2008), “political
economy is the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behaviour and
institutions. As such, it is not a unified approach, but a family of approaches".
Citizens choose politicians to represent them in large scale elections, which are thus the
mechanism that links the will of the citizens to the decision makers. Elections are held
under asymmetric information between the voters and the candidates. The informed party
(the politician) sends a message to the uninformed one (the voter), to gather his vote in
hope of being elected. In this context, a micro level analysis of elections can provide very
important insights.
Local elections provide a good laboratory to perform research in the context of political
economy. Although the scope of action of local governments throughout the world is diverse,
these are the government bodies where the link between decision maker and voter is closer.
Generally, local governments aim at improving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting
social and economic development, managing territorial planning and providing local public
goods. Thus, the actual impact of local politician decisions is very clear to the electorate.
In this thesis, I study the behaviour of politicians and voters and its relation with economic
activity in a series of three essays. The first two evaluate two dimensions that can affect
electoral outcomes: campaigning by politicians in elections and the impact of information
conveyed by the media on voting decisions. In the last, I evaluate the local economic impacts
of increases in local expenditure in election years.
In Chapter 1, I propose a theoretical model that aims at finding whether local campaign
spending affects local electoral outcomes, in a context where it is mostly publicly funded.
I then test the theoretical findings and modelling assumptions empirically. Research on
the effects of campaign spending is broad, both in theoretical and empirical contributions.
However, the results found are often mixed, as some studies argue that campaign spending
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has no effects of election outcomes, like Levitt (1994), while others argue that it matters, as
Gerber (1998).
Most studies, are based on the US context, where private donations play a pivotal role in
campaign financing. Donations increase the resources of candidates and sustain very high
levels of campaign spending. The latest figures suggest that campaign spending amounted
to around $ 6.5b in the 2016 Presidential and Congressional US elections. At the same time,
as shown by a PEW research survey from 2018, two-thirds of Americans believe that laws
should be written to limit the role of money in politics. In Europe, on the contrary, most
countries have tight regulations about private donations for political campaigns and almost
all of them provide some kind of direct or indirect public support to pay for campaigning
in elections. Surprisingly, there is very little information about how public funding affects
campaign spending decisions and how in turn that spending affects election outcomes.
I propose an approach centred on the role of public funding for local elections. I start by
formulating a probabilistic voting model with two candidates and two periods, which includes
campaign spending decisions. Campaign spending is assumed to boost the popularity of
candidates, by increasing their exposure, which in turn positively affects their probability of
being elected. Campaign spending is financed through (costly) private contributions and a
statutory allowance provided by the central government, which is only determined after the
election and depends on electoral results.
In the model, candidates differ in terms of ideology, which cannot be credibly changed for the
election, in terms of ex-ante popularity and in terms of their access to party contributions
to finance campaigning. We show that, depending on the volatility of the voters’ ideolog-
ical bias and the total amount of statutory allowance available to be distributed between
the candidates in the local election, these candidate differences entail different equilibrium
behaviours. Consequently, the most disadvantaged candidate may or not be able to use
Bruno Carvalho 3
campaign spending to overcome his disadvantage and increase the probability of winning
the election.
I then conduct an empirical study using a rich database of campaign revenue and spending
compiled from the reports that candidates must submit to the Portuguese Constitutional
Court, since 2005. The database includes detailed information about campaign spending
and funding sources covering 308 Portuguese municipalities and all the 12 parties/candidates
that ran for local office in the 2005, 2009 and 2013 local elections.
To address the simultaneity issues of estimating the effects of campaign spending on election
outcomes, I use an instrumental variable approach that is nested in the theoretical modelling
assumptions and on the legal rules in place in Portugal. I compute the expected statutory
allowance that candidates might receive after the election based on the rules in place at the
moment of the election and on the best proxy available to measure their electoral success in
the forthcoming election. Results show that the expected statutory allowance has a strong
positive correlation with campaign spending and that campaign spending indeed matters for
election results.
From the perspective of the top contenders for office, the winner and the runner-up of the
election, I find that the campaign spending of the runner-up provides a significant boost to
his vote share while reducing the vote share of the winner. For the average challenger, own
campaign spending accounts for around 8% of the vote share. The spending of the winner,
on the other hand, seems to have little effect. This can be explained, as discussed in our
theoretical model, by a very high ex-ante popularity advantage (provided by incumbency
advantage), which provides direct benefit in terms of the probability of being elected. Even
so, as the model suggests, winners still spend on average more than the runner-ups.
An analysis focused on the four biggest parties running for local elections in Portugal (PS,
PSD, CDS and PCP), on the other hand, unveils that the campaign spending of the two
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biggest national parties (PS and PSD) affects their vote shares in the election. For the
average candidate of these two parties, estimates show that campaign spending accounts for
6 to 9% of their vote share. As suggested by our theoretical model, smaller parties, who
might face higher restrictions in the access to party contributions to fund the campaign tend
to spend less and that spending has virtually no effects on the vote share.
Although these results show that the actions of politicians prior to the election can affect
local election outcomes, they focus only on the amount of money spent in campaigning
and ignore the impact that the specific information provided entails. I explore the role of
information conveyed by the media in election outcomes in the following Chapter.
In Chapter 2, we implement a randomised experiment to check whether positive and negative
information conveyed by mass-media outlets can affect local election results. Specifically, we
answer to two questions. First, does positive and negative (truthful) information about the
central government affect (in the same way) the perception about the performance of the
central government in the proximity of local elections? Second, does that updated perception
affect local voting behaviour?
We exposed 1800 students of two business schools in Lisbon to a bundle of positive or
negative information about the central government in power at the time of the 2017 local
Portuguese election, held on October 1st. The experiment was implemented in two phases.
First, in the weeks before the local election, we collected a set of socio-demographic and
political information about respondents and implemented the treatment. Second, in the
week after the local election, where we gathered information about actual voting behaviour
in the election.
The treatment included 12 different surveys, half of which conveyed positive information
and the other half negative information. Each survey included two news articles, in different
fields, adapted from credible media outlets, as well as a graph and a picture associated with
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the subject of the news. The news selected encompassed several policy areas, namely: public
finance, pensions, youth employment, national health service, road safety and education.
The selection was done so that for each area comparable positive and negative articles where
available, from the same news outlet. Therefore, each positive information bundle, of the
six created, had a comparable negative bundle. The control group was assigned to a 13th
survey, with information related to a Portuguese, not endangered, dog breed.
With respect to our first question, we find that although positive and negative information
affect (in the expected direction) the perception of respondents in the specific policy areas
of the information they received, only negative information has a significant effect on the
general perception of government performance post-treatment. These findings are in accor-
dance with other research showing that negative information is more impactful than positive
information, which is commonly known as negativity-bias. Such findings are observed not
only in the field of psychology (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001), but
also in experimental economics contexts, like in James and John (2007) or Olsen (2015).
Our findings are robust to several specifications and controls.
The rational for our second question, i.e., the impact of the updated performance about the
central government performance on local election behaviour is related with the interplay of
voting behaviour in different government bodies in multilayered governance regimes. The
connection between central performance and local voting can occur due to at least three
reasons. First, voters can see the party system as a selection mechanism for candidates
running in local elections, as discussed by Geys and Vermeir (2014). Second, voters may
expect increasing benefits from a mayor closely related with the central government (Fiva
and Halse, 2016). Finally, local elections can also be seen as second order elections, through
which voters send a message to the central government (Marien, Dassonneville, and Hooghe,
2015). We find no average treatment effect in terms of changes in the propensity to vote
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in the local elections, for candidates aligned with the party that is in power at the central
government when the local election occurs. This may indicate that, on average, information
about central government perception does not affect local voting decisions, or that we are
facing a treatment dilution problem.
The strong findings related with our first question support the idea that news, and potentially
fake news can affect voter perception, as discussed in Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) and
King, Schneer, and White (2017). Our results also suggest that exploring the effect of
negative versus positive information in multilayered governance regimes could improve our
understanding about voting behaviour.
In the last chapter, my co-authors and I conduct an empirical study to evaluate the local
economic effects of increases in local government spending. Our work is nested in a branch
of literature that takes advantage of micro-level data to compute local fiscal multipliers and
measure the economic impact of subnational fiscal policy (Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli,
2014, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014, Serrato and Wingender, 2016). Our main contribution
is that we propose a new identification strategy, based on an extensive literature about
political business cycles. It is well established that political candidates spend more (or at
least differently) just before the elections in an attempt to increase their electoral success.
Local governments in Portugal are no exception, as shown in Coelho, Veiga, and Veiga (2006)
and Veiga and Veiga (2007).
We use the fact that local elections in Portugal are held in fixed four-year intervals to isolate
exogenous spikes in local current and investment expenditure. As we discuss, these spikes
are not a response to local economic activity but instead a feature of the political business
cycles. Therefore, they can be used to compute the causal impact of local public spending
on private economic activity that we measured by the wage bill of full-time workers in
private firms in the municipality. We also report the impacts on the mean wage and the
Bruno Carvalho 7
number of workers in the municipality. Lastly, we also contribute to the expanding literature
about state-dependent local fiscal multipliers. We analyse the influence of the size of the
municipality and the political cycle on the fiscal transmission mechanism.
Our comprehensive database covers expenditure and revenue of 278 Portuguese mainland
municipalities, between 1986 and 2014. We start by documenting that in election years
incumbent mayors boost local current expenditure and particularly investment expenditure.
Investment expenditure increases almost 38e per capita on average, which corresponds to a
spike of almost 13% when compared to non-election years. Investment expenditures include
spending in Land, Housing and Constructions (including buildings and roads). We then show
that municipal spending spikes lead to a positive change in the local wage bill. This effect,
albeit statistically robust, is small in magnitude. Increasing spending per capita by 1% leads
to a boost between 0.09 and 0.14% of the contemporaneous wage bill. We decompose it in
the effect on the mean wage and on the number of workers in the municipality and find that
the effect is driven by local employment, which increases between 1.5 and 1.7%, on average,
in response to investment and current expenditure, respectively. Our estimates imply a cost
per job created between $24 875 to $28 358, which is in line with other estimates found
in the literature (Chodorow-Reich, 2018). We also show that this effect is influenced by
contextual factors. Multipliers are substantially higher in bigger municipalities and lower in
municipalities where the mayor has been in power for more than 3 terms.
The empirical approach we propose has multiple advantages, as it is easy to understand
and interpret and possible to replicate for other countries. Contrary to other studies done
in this field, our identification strategy is not as context specific and could, in principle,
be used in any country where local governments have some degree of autonomy in setting
local fiscal policy, provided that local election episodes are exogenously defined. Moreover,
using similar identification strategies in different countries would enable a better comparative
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analysis, which would increase our understanding of the fiscal transmission mechanism at
the local level.
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Chapter 1
Campaign Spending in Local Elections:
The more the merrier?
1.1 Introduction
The practice of campaigning to inform the voters and hopefully gather their votes is as
old as the Roman empire, as discussed in Morstein-Marx (2012). Pompei conserves many
wall paintings – the so-called dipinti, nothing less than the ancestors of modern political
outdoors – of the elections held one month before the Vesuvius erupted, with plenty of
messages about the honour of the candidates and electoral promises of “good bread”. In
those days candidates had to be wealthy, not least because political office did not entail any
wage and usually funded their own campaingns, which mostly included rallies and dipinti.
However, private money in politics may come with strings attached (Chamon and Kaplan,
2013, Kalla and Broockman, 2016, Stratmann, 1991), or limit competitiveness in elections
(Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning, 2006, Jacobson, 1978), as stressed by Kofi Annan.1
In fact, recent figures suggest that in the 2016 Presidential and Congressional US elections,
1Kofi Annan’s foreword in Falguera, Jones, and Ohman (2014), who conduct a comparative analysis of
political finance mechanisms across countries. Morton (1992) and Stratmann (2005) also provide discussions
about the role of private money in politics and discuss the real world (and research) implications.
Bruno Carvalho 11
campaign spending amounted to around $ 6.5b. Simultaneously, as shown by a PEW research
survey from 2018, two-thirds of Americans believe that laws should be written to limit the
role of money in politics. In this context, public financing for political activities has been
amply debated, for instance by Theodore Roosevelt, who stated: “the need for collecting
large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and
legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to
meet the necessity".2
Modern democracies vary in the extent to which public funding is used by political can-
didates. In Europe, according to a European Parliament (2015) report all the 28 member
states of the European Union, except Malta and recently Italy, provide some kind of direct
public funding to parties.3 The vast majority also provides some sort of direct or indirect
funding to elections. In the United States, by contrast, currently only 14 states provide (op-
tional) public funding for political parties.4 Opting for public funding restricts the amount
of donations candidates can collect and generally establishes campaign spending limits. Sur-
prisingly, there is very little theoretical and empirical evidence about campaign spending
when part of the funding comes from public sources, with the notable exceptions of Jones
(1981) and Malhotra (2008) for the U.S case.
We contribute to this literature by explicitly modelling candidates’ strategic campaign deci-
sions when partly funded from public sources. We set up a model where candidates strategi-
cally use campaign spending to influence their popularity level and thus affect the probability
of being elected. We then test the model with a new dataset constructed for the purposes of
this research, based on reports of campaign spending (and funding sources) of candidates in
2Theodore Roosevelt’s Seventh State of the Union Address, December 3rd 1907.
3Malta is implementing measures towards providing public funds, while Italy is moving towards a com-
pletely private system.
4According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, an NGO that represents local and state
government in the US.
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local elections in Portugal. Since 2005, all parties and independent candidates are required
to submit a comprehensive report of campaign funding and expenditures to the Portuguese
Constitutional Court. These reports should reflect as accurately as possible the geographic
allocation of spending and are then audited and certified by an independent entity that
supports the court. This previously unused dataset covers 308 municipalities, 3 local elec-
tions (2005, 2009 and 2013) and the 12 national parties that typically run (at least in some
municipalities) in local elections, as well as all the coalitions between these parties and the
independent candidates.
There is an extensive literature on the effects and funding of campaign spending, including
both theoretical and empirical contributions, with mixed results. In some cases, like Gerber
(1998) or Morton and Myerson (1992), studies argue that campaign spending matters, while
in others it seems to have no effect (Levitt, 1994). Some authors even suggest that banning
spending could be welfare improving (Prat, 2002).
In a theoretical framework, Coate (2004) develops a political competition model where (pri-
vate) campaign contributions help voters produce more informed choices and provide parties
with an incentive to select the best candidates. Contribution limits only increase welfare
of members of interest groups. In Meirowitz (2008), candidates select levels of effort and
the marginal asymmetries in costs of effort explain why advantaged candidates, like incum-
bents, often get elected, which is reinforced by very tight campaign or effort limits. Wittman
(2008), on the other hand, derives the optimal behaviour of voters not targeted by campaign
advertising and shows that the effect of campaign spending could be negligible for electoral
outcomes. From another perspective, Herrera, Levine, and Martinelli (2008) shows, by in-
cluding turnout in a model of electoral competition, that increases in the volatility of voter
preferences lead to increases in polarisation and campaign spending.
Empirical studies about the effects of campaign spending face essentially three issues. First,
Bruno Carvalho 13
available data may be incomplete or inaccurate, as parties may have an incentive not to fully
disclose information. Second, even if data is available, in many cases it is not geographically
disaggregated, which is particularly cumbersome for subnational elections. In such case,
assumptions need to be made regarding the allocation of expenditures. Finally, there is an
endogeneity issue to be addressed when estimating causal impacts of spending on electoral
results. In fact, if higher spending can lead to higher vote shares, it may also be that spending
is higher (or lower) precisely because the political capital of the candidates is higher ex-ante.
Researchers have either taken advantage of the institutional features of elections (repeated
elections, proportional systems) or used instrumental variable approaches to deal with this
endogeneity issue. Silveira and Mello (2011), for instance, perform an empirical analysis to
show that there is a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes in repeated
Gubernatorial elections in Brazil. Fink (2012) finds mixed support for the effectiveness of
campaign spending in the proportional representation system of German federal elections.
Ben-bassat, Dahan, and Klor (2015), on the contrary, argue that campaign spending is
unable to affect substantially electoral outcomes, based on an empirical study for repeated
elections in Israeli municipalities.
On the other hand, Green and Krasno (1990) isolate exogenous campaign spending decisions
using lagged campaign spending as an instrument. Other instrumental variable approaches
include: using candidate quality (Gerber, 1998 and Green and Krasno, 1988), the tightness
of the race (Erikson and Palfrey, 2000) or the population size of the constituency (Gerber,
1998).
Most studies are conducted in the context of US (congress) elections. Aside from the afore-
mentioned studies, other exceptions include Palda and Palda (1998) in France, Maddens,
Wauters, Noppe, and Fiers (2006) in Belgium, Benoit and Marsh (2008) in Ireland, Samuels
(2001) in Brazil, or Carty and Eagles (1999) and Rekkas (2007) in Canada, for the case of
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federal and general elections, respectively, and Benoit and Marsh (2003a) in the local Irish
election of 1999. Several studies also cover United Kingdom elections (Foos and de Rooij,
2017, Johnston, Cutts, Pattie, and Fisher, 2012, Pattie, Denver, Johns, and Mitchell, 2011),
particularly by exploring the effects of local campaigning on general election outcomes like
in Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse (1995), Whiteley and Seyd (2003), Fisher, Cutts, and
Fieldhouse (2011), Fieldhouse and Cutts (2009) and Fisher, Fieldhouse, Johnston, Pattie,
and Cutts (2016).
In this work, we propose a two-period probabilistic voting model, following Persson and
Tabellini (2002), in which campaign spending is funded through (costly) party contributions
and a statutory allowance provided by the central government. Before the election, can-
didates decide how much to spend in campaigning. However, the amount of the statutory
allowance depends on election results and thus is only determined after the election. Candi-
dates differ in their ideology, their access to party contribution funds to finance campaigning
and their ex-ante popularity.
We show that campaign spending decisions depend crucially on the rate at which candidates
expect to get funds from the central government, which in turn depends on the variance of
voter’s ideological preferences. If that rate is low, the candidate with an ex-ante popularity
advantage spends more than the disadvantaged candidate and wins the election with higher
probability. The result is the opposite if campaign spending entails a high potential statutory
allowance. Similarly, the candidate with a higher cost to access party contributions to fund
campaigning will only spend more (and win with a higher probability) if he believes campaign
spending will entail a higher portion of statutory allowance after the election.
To provide validation to these findings and to test our modelling assumptions, we perform an
empirical analysis using local elections in Portugal. We analyse the data in two perspectives,
i) the winner and runner up perspective, which emphasises the two biggest contenders in each
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municipality, and ii) the individual party level, focusing on the four biggest local parties in
Portugal, irrespective of their placement in the electoral race. This dual analysis encompasses
the approaches of other empirical studies. Most studies focus on electoral contests between
the two top contenders, irrespectively that is the incumbent and challenger (Ansolabehere
and Gerber, 1994, Banaian and Luksetich, 1991, Moon, 2006) or the winner and the runner-
up in the first stage of an election (Ben-bassat et al., 2015, Silveira and Mello, 2011). Others,
like Fink (2012), Rekkas (2007) or Fisher et al. (2011) use the individual party perspective
to evaluate specific patterns across different parties.
We deal with the potential endogeneity issue using an instrumental variable approach. The
choice of the instrumental variable is framed by the legal restrictions in place in Portugal.
In fact, as donations are very limited, public funding is a key determinant of campaign
spending. Thus, we instrument campaign spending with the expected statutory allowance
that candidates may receive after election, which we compute based on the rules of public
funding allocation in place at the moment of the election and candidates’ best guess about
their performance in the election.
Results show that campaign spending matters. In the winner/runner-up perspective we find
that a 1 000e increase in spending of the runner-up leads to an increase of 0.14pp of his
vote share and a decline of 0.35pp of the winning margin. Although a 0.14pp impact may
seem small, for the average runner-up, who spends around 58ek, this accounts for 8.12pp of
the vote share. Winners’ spending seems to be less efficient, particularly when we account
for incumbency advantage, which has also been observed in comparable literature. For the
individual party perspective, we find that an increase of spending of 1 000e leads to an
increase in the vote share between 0.08 and 0.19pp for the two biggest Portuguese parties.
Again, for the average candidate of these parties this accrues to an impact between 6 and
9pp. These findings are robust to the exclusion of campaign spending outliers and flagship
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municipalities, where the campaign spending decisions could be driven by non-local factors.
The empirical results support our theoretical conclusions and stress that campaign spending
is a relevant tool to affect electoral results.
This paper is structured as follows. We start by presenting our model in Section 1.2, where
we discuss the formulation and the baseline predictions. The following section describes the
legal framework of local campaigning in Portugal. The data used is described in Section 1.4.
We then discuss the estimation issues and present our baseline (OLS) estimates. Section
1.6 discusses our identification strategy and Section 1.7 implements it, presenting our main
results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 A model of strategic campaigning decisions
We develop a two-period probabilistic voting model to evaluate the impact of campaigning
on electoral competition in a context where public funding is the main revenue source for
campaigning activities. In our model, each voter decides on whom to vote based on the
welfare derived from the exogenous political platforms proposed by two candidates (W (gj)),
their individual ideology (σi) and the overall popularity shock of the election (δ). The
uniform distributions of the random variables σi and δ are common knowledge.
Each of the two candidates decide on their campaign spending, which increases exposure
and has a positive impact on own popularity. Campaign spending in financed through
party contributions (PCj) and a public statutory allowance (SAj), provided by the central
government. We impose that the campaign budget is balanced, meaning that when spending
exceeds the statutory allowance, it must be paid by the party supporting the candidate. The
novelty of our approach is that we explicitly model campaign funding obtained through
public resources. Most literature about campaign spending effects is framed, as discussed,
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on the US context, where private donations assume a pivotal role.5
Although the rules that determine the statutory allowance each candidate receives are pub-
licly known, the actual value depends on electoral results and thus can only be determined
after the election. In this context, candidates decide campaign spending strategically based
on its expected effect on their probability of winning, and their expectation about the statu-
tory allowance to be received in the next period.
Candidates differ in their ideology, which cannot be credibly changed for the purposes of the
election. However, we assume that one of the candidates may have an ex-ante popularity
advantage (x). This popularity wedge could be because the candidate is better known in
the municipality (maybe he held local office before) or because voters in the municipality
traditionally favour candidates from a given party. We also allow for differentiated access of
candidates to the resources from the parties backing them in the election (kj). In reality, some
parties have deeper pockets and they need not give the same priority to all municipalities.
1.2.1 Set-up
Timing. Our model has three phases that occur in two periods. i) In t = 1, knowing voters’
preferences and the distributions of σi and δ, candidates decide simultaneously the level of
campaign spending (CA and CB). ii) At the end of t = 1, the actual value of δ is realised and
the election takes place. iii) In t = 2, uncertainty about the vote share is realised, pinning
down the statutory allowance (SAj). Then, parties spend PCj to balance the budget.
Voters. The economy is populated by a continuum of citizens, with identical preferences over
the policy platforms implemented by local governments (gj), which provide welfare W (gj).
5There is an extensive literature about political competition when campaigning if financed through party
contributions. Recent examples include Meirowitz (2008) or Chamon and Kaplan (2013).
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These policy platforms are general enough to include a vector of spending and taxes, as well
as non-fiscal policies such as affirmative action or environmental protection.
Voters must decide on whom to vote in the upcoming election, i.e., we do not model absten-
tion. A voter i, with ideology σi, supports candidate A if
W (gA) > W (gB) + σ
i + δ (1.1)
where σi represents voter i’s ideology and δ is the popularity shock.
Ideological bias (σi). The ideological bias can be positive or negative, depending on whether
the voter favours candidate B or A, respectively.
We let σi ∼ U
[
− 1
2φ
, 1
2φ
]
, with φ > 0, i.e., fσi = φ > 0 is the density function.6 If φ is higher,
the distribution gets narrower, reducing the dispersion of the ideological bias. The following
graph illustrates the density functions for φ˜ > φ:
Figure 1.1: Density function of voter ideology for φ˜ > φ.
6Note that E[σi] = 0, so the distribution of the ideological bias is centred around zero.
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Popularity shock (δ). The shock can be positive, neutral or negative, depending on whether
candidate B is respectively more, equally or less popular than candidate A. We introduce an
ex-ante popularity wedge (x) which provides candidate B a popularity advantage, whenever
x > 0, which may result from candidate B being well-known in the municipality, due to a
previous political or entrepreneurial career, for instance. It may also be the result of the
candidate being supported by a party which is typically strong in the municipality.
Campaign spending decisions affect the overall ex-post popularity of the candidates. Specif-
ically, we assume that the campaign spending gap, ∆C = CA − CB, changes the upper and
lower bounds of the distribution of δ, i.e., when A spends more than B, the distribution
shifts in favour of candidate A. The following distribution of δ incorporates these effects:
δ ∼ U
[
− 1
2ψ
−∆C + x, 1
2ψ
−∆C + x
]
,
where ψ > 0 is a measure of the dispersion of the popularity of candidates. Notice that
E(δ) = −∆C+x, i.e., we allow the campaign to overcome the ex-ante popularity advantage.
Figure 1.2 illustrates these impacts:
Figure 1.2: Effect of campaign spending and popularity wedge on overall popularity.
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Candidates. Candidates chose the amount of campaign spending (Cj) to boost the prob-
ability of being elected, knowing that all campaign spending not covered by the statutory
allowance has to be paid off using party contributions (PCj). In practice, candidates choose
the amount of campaign spending to maximise their payoff, i.e.,
Uj = pjχ− kjE [PCj]
2
2
where χ is a (positive) ego rent, pj is the probability of candidate j being elected and
PCj is the amount of the party contributions (or the candidate’s own resources) used in
campaigning. We assume a quadratic cost for PCj for tractability, with candidate B, without
loss of generality, facing a higher marginal cost of own funds, i.e., we assume kB = k > kA =
1. The budget constraint of political campaigns is
Cj = PCj + SAj
Each candidate is entitled to a public statutory allowance (SAj) determined after the elec-
tion, proportional to his vote share (pij). That is, in t = 2 candidate j receives SAj = pij T ,
where T is the total amount of public funds available to all the candidates in the munici-
pality.7 This amount is exogenous and common knowledge for both candidates before the
election takes place.
In this set-up, candidates decide the level of campaign spending in t = 1 based on their
expectation of the statutory allowance to be received in t = 2, i.e., E [PCj] = Cj − E [SAj]
7By definition,
∑
j pij T = T .
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1.2.2 Equilibrium
We solve the model backwards. i) In t = 2, based on the realisation of δ candidates find
out SAj and PCj. ii) In t = 1, the election period, candidates choose Cj to maximise their
payoff.
Our equilibrium is characterised by a swing voter who is indifferent between the two candi-
dates, which, using (1.1) satisfies σS = W (gA) −W (gB) − δ = ∆W (g) − δ. All voters with
σi ≤ σS (resp., σi > σS ) vote for candidate A (resp., B), as depicted in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Swing voter and vote shares.
Thus, the vote share of candidate A, piA, is
piA =
∫ σs
− 1
2φ
φdu = φ
(
σs +
1
2φ
)
= φ
(
∆W (g)− δ + 1
2φ
)
(1.2)
where the last equality is obtained using the definition of swing voter (σS). Notice that as
σS depends on the realised value of δ, piA is also a random variable. Since the statutory
allowance obtained by the party is given by piAT , it is instructive to use the expectation of
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δ to write the expected vote share,
E[piA] = φ
(
∆W (g) + CA − CB − x+ 1
2φ
)
(1.3)
It follows from (1.3) that, for each euro invested in the campaign, the expected statutory
allowance increases by φT .8 Intuitively, φT is the marginal financial return of getting one
voter through campaign spending, as φ is the density function of voters’ ideological bias and
T the total amount of statutory allowance available. Recall also that φ governs the limits of
the ideological bias of voters. Therefore, for a given T , a lower φ leads to higher dispersion in
voter ideology. We assume hereafter that φT < 1 in order to rule out the unreasonable case
in which campaign spending is over-compensated by the central government contribution.
The probability of candidate A winning the election can be obtained from equation (1.2)
and is given by:
pA = P
(
piA ≥ 1
2
)
= P (δ ≤ ∆W (g)) = ψ (∆W (g) + ∆C − x) + 1
2
(1.4)
where the last equality is obtained using the cumulative distribution function of δ.9
The probability of A wining the election is increasing in the voters’ welfare, derived from
the candidates’ policy platforms, and his own campaign spending, and decreasing in the
campaign spending of B and the ex-ante popularity wedge.
Given that the statutory allowance is only determined after the election, we solve the model
starting in t = 2. After the election, δ is realised and thus the vote share of A, piA, is
determined. Therefore, using the amount of total statutory allowance available, T , the
8In fact for candidate j it holds that: ∂E[pij ]∂Cj = φT .
9Given the distributional assumptions of δ, the cumulative distribution function is given by Fδ =
ψ (δ + ∆C − x) + 12 .
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amount of party contribution for campaigning, PCA is given by:
PCA = CA − SAA = CA − piAT = CA −
[
φ
(
∆W (g)− δˆ + 1
2φ
)
T
]
(1.5)
where δˆ is the realised value of δ, and we use the vote share of candidate A in (1.2).
Using the value of PCA, from equation (1.5), and the probability of A winning the election,
pA in (1.4), the optimal level of CA solves
ψχ−
[
(1− z)2CA + (1− z)zCB + (1− z)z(x−∆W (g))− (1− z)T
2
]
= 0
where z = φT < 1.
Conversely, the first order condition for candidate B is
ψχ− k
[
(1− z)2CB + (1− z)zCA − (1− z)z(x−∆W (g))− (1− z)T
2
]
= 0
The first term is the marginal benefit of investing in campaign and is proportional to the
ego rent χ. The term in square brackets represents the marginal cost of campaign spending,
which results from its impact on the expected statutory allowance, compound with the
quadratic formulation of the cost of party contributions. The behaviour of the marginal
cost is related to the expected vote share of candidate A, piA. The campaign spending of
candidate B increases the marginal cost of CA because it has a negative impact on the vote
share of candidate A, as shown in equation (1.3), and therefore forces A into a higher party
contribution. The same is true for x−∆W (g), the exogenous advantage of candidate B.
Notice also that the impact of own spending on the marginal cost is (1− z)2, while the cross
impact is (1−z)z. Therefore, when z < 1
2
, own spending has a higher impact on the marginal
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cost than the opponent candidate’s spending, while the reverse happens when z >
1
2
. As it
will become clear, this fact plays an important role in the nature of the equilibrium.
The best response of candidate A is given by:
CA =
ψ
(1− z)2χ−
z
1− zCB +
z
1− z [∆W (g)− x] +
1
2(1− z)T (1.6)
Solving the maximisation problem of Candidate B, we obtain the best response
CB =
ψ
k(1− z)2χ−
z
1− zCA −
z
1− z [∆W (g)− x] +
1
2(1− z)T (1.7)
The best responses show that the equilibrium depends on the sign of the overall exogenous
advantage of candidate B, ∆W (g) − x; therefore, we simplify matters by assuming that
∆W (g) = 0. We shut down the difference in welfare stemming from different policy platforms
for tractability and in order to focus on the impact of campaign spending on election results.
The equilibrium levels of spending solve equations (1.6) and (1.7):
C∗A =
(1− z)k − z
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ−
z
1− 2zx+
T
2
C∗B =
(1− z)− zk
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ+
z
1− 2zx+
T
2
As a result the equilibrium campaign spending gap (∆C∗) is given by:
∆C∗ = C∗A − C∗B =
k − 1
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ−
2z
1− 2zx (1.8)
Replacing equation (1.8) in equation (1.4) yields the equilibrium probability of A being
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elected:
p∗A = ψ
(
k − 1
k(1− z)(1− 2z)ψχ−
1
1− 2zx
)
+
1
2
(1.9)
It follows that when x = 0, the party making the highest campaign spending wins the
election with a higher probability; however, with x > 0 it is possible that B is the favourite
even if he spends less than A.
In order to better grasp strategic effects, we shut down in turn the ex-ante popularity wedge,
x, and the difference in the measure of tightness in access to party contributions to finance
campaigning, k.
We start by assuming that both candidates have the same access to their respective parties
contributions to fund campaigning, i.e., k = 1. In this case, the sign of equation (1.8)
depends on the value of x and z. Results are summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that both candidates face the same marginal cost of contributions,
i.e., k = 1 and that one of the candidates enjoys an ex-ante popularity advantage, i.e. x 6= 0;
then
i) if 0 < z < 1
2
, the candidate with an ex-ante popularity advantage spends more and wins
with a higher probability.
ii) if 1
2
< z < 1, the candidate with an ex-ante popularity advantage spends less and wins
with a lower probability.
In order to understand the result in Proposition 1, let us concentrate on the case when x > 0
(candidate B has an ex ante popularity advantage). This makes B face a lower marginal
cost of campaign spending than A. When z <
1
2
, the own effect on the marginal cost of
spending is higher than the cross effect and we the candidate with an a priori advantage
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outspends the other. Conversely, when z >
1
2
the cross effect is more important than the
effect of own spending on the marginal cost. That is, each candidate has a very productive
tool to manipulate his opponent’s marginal cost, more so than the opponent’s own tool. This
allows the under-dog candidate A to spend a very high amount, with a sizeable impact on
the marginal cost of B, such that it becomes too costly for B to outbid him. Notice that it
is not optimal for B, the a priori favourite candidate, to follow a similar strategy Given A’s
cost disadvantage, the value of CB needed to cause a similar increase in A’s marginal cost
would be lower, and therefore A could more easily outbid it.
On the other hand, the results for the case of no ex-ante popularity difference and different
costs of party contributions are summarised in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose none of the candidates enjoys an ex-ante popularity advantage, i.e.
x = 0, and a candidate bears a higher cost of party contributions, i.e. k > 1; then
i) if 0 < z < 1
2
, then the candidate with lower marginal cost of party contributions spends
more and wins with a higher probability.
ii) if 1
2
< z < 1, then the candidate with higher marginal cost of party contributions spends
more and wins with a higher probability.
This result resembles that of Proposition 1 in that the candidate with an exogenous disadvan-
tage – which in this case stems from the cost of contributions instead of popularity – outbids
the other when z >
1
2
, i.e., when the cross effect is stronger than the own contribution one.
Based on the model, all our empirical specifications include the following controls. The
dispersion in voters’ ideology, φ, is proxied by measures linked to socio-demographic frag-
mentation (such as the number of parties running or the size of the municipality).10 Ex-ante
10Ezrow (2007) shows that the variance of voters’ preferences is associated with the diversity of policies
offered by parties. In turn, as discussed in Geys (2006), the number of parties running in a municipality is
connected with the socio-economic fragmentation and the size of the municipality.
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popularity advantages, x, are controlled for using a dummy equal to one whenever the in-
cumbent is running for reelection, a variable that accounts for the number of terms the mayor
has been in power, or a dummy for alignment of candidates with the central government.
Finally, the benefit of winning the election, χ (which differ across time and municipalities),
can be accounted for with fixed effects at the municipal level or time dummies.
We can also test the following results, established in Propositions 1 and 2.
Hypotesis 1. Candidates with an ex-ante popularity advantage spend more in campaigning
than their opponents and win the election with higher probability, whenever the expected
financial return of campaigning is low (or the voters are ideologically disperse).
Hypotesis 2. Candidates that face higher restrictions in access to party contribution funds
spend less in campaigning, whenever the expected financial return of campaigning is low (or
the voters are ideologically disperse).
Lastly, the empirical analysis will also allow us to reinforce the validity of our theoretical
model by testing the following assumptions.
Hypotesis 3. Own campaign spending increases own vote shares and opponents campaign
spending decreases own vote share.
Hypotesis 4. Campaign spending is positively correlated with the expected statutory al-
lowance to be received from the central government.
Hypotesis 5. Ex-ante popularity advantages increase vote shares.
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1.3 An application to Portuguese municipalities: back-
ground
The Portuguese territory is organised into three administrative layers. The first level com-
prises the continental territory and the Autonomous Regions, the islands of Azores and
Madeira. The second layer includes 278 mainland municipalities and 30 municipalities in
the Autonomous Regions. Municipalities are then divided in a total of 3092 parishes.
The central government is responsible for the general policy in the country and it is the high-
est body of public administration.11 Regional governments, from the Autonomous Regions,
are hierarchically below the central government, although they possess legislative autonomy
in specific pre-defined areas.
Local power is split between the municipal and the parish level, with the overall goals of
improving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting social and economic development, manag-
ing territorial planning and providing local public goods.12 Local government representatives
are elected in all 308 municipalities simultaneously in a nationwide local election that occurs
every four years.
At the municipal level, the representative bodies are the Town Council and the Municipal
Assembly. Town Council is the executive branch and its members are elected using the
d’Hondt method, depending on the number of votes of each list. The lead candidate in the
list with most votes is appointed as the Mayor. The Municipal Assembly, the deliberative
branch, is composed of members directly elected by the voters and by the presidents of the
Parish Assemblies. The Parish Assemblies, in turn, are also elected directly by voters in the
same election. Therefore, voters are asked to cast three separate votes in each election, one
11Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.
12As defined by Law 159/99.
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for each representative body.
As all local policymakers are elected on the same day, the attention and effort of political
agents regarding these elections is very sizeable. The political campaign period officially
starts two weeks before the election date and ends two days prior to the election, as defined
by Law 1/2001, which regulates the electoral procedures for the local government bodies.
Between pre-campaign and campaign actions, political candidates seeking office spend a
substantial amount in campaigning.13 In the 2005 election, for instance, the five main parties
spent around 62eM in campaigning, or around 7.04e per eligible voter in that election.
Such figures include administrative/logistical costs associated with campaigning, but also
the amounts spent on political promotion events, outdoors, flyers and merchandise.
The baseline rules that currently regulate the funding of political parties, as well as funding
and spending in electoral campaigning, are defined by Law 19/2003.14 This law enforced
strict limits on revenue sources (namely private donations) and expenditure levels for each
type of election. Section A.1.1, in Appendix A.1, details this legal framework and provides
additional information about the spending limits in place in the elections included in our
analysis.
Law 19/2003 also implemented tighter regulatory mechanisms. Since then, candidates are
required to submit a comprehensive report of campaign funding sources and spending ac-
tivities to the Portuguese Constitutional Court. This report is evaluated and audited by an
independent entity that supports the Constitutional Court. In case any deviations from the
rules are detected the Court can sanction the political agents.
13The pre-campaign period is defined as the time between the day when the election date is set by the
central government and the day when the campaigning period officially begins. In this time span, candidates
are allowed to start campaigning actions, although most actions occur during the official campaigning period.
14Law 19/2003 was subsequently altered by Law 64-A/2008, Law 55/2010, Law 1/2013 and Organic Law
5/2015. However, these were mostly incremental changes.
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The regulatory framework and the detailed information available (both in terms of funding
and spending) for the panel of 308 municipalities in 3 elections (2005, 2009, 2013) makes
Portugal an interesting case study for the impact of spending on election outcomes. More-
over, as the Portuguese political party system is dominated by five parties that run both at
central and local level, it is relatively easy to track campaign spending and election outcomes
across time and municipalities.15
1.3.1 The Public Statutory Allowance
The most important sources of funding in campaigning in Portugal are Statutory Allowances
(SA) paid by the central government. Their levels are determined after the election, based
on a formula that depends on electoral results. In the 2005 election, for instance, the five
main parties reported a total revenue of around 59eM associated with the election, of which
16.9% came from donations and fundraisers, 23.7% from party contributions and 59.3% from
the statutory allowance.
The amount of the statutory allowance (SA) to be received by each candidate depends on the
total allowance available for the municipality (TMSA) and the performance of candidates in
the current election. The procedure to determine its amount is described in Figure 1.4.
15Independent candidates running for local elections have gained increased relevance across time, but
they still represent a relatively small share of overall mayor appointments. In 2001, Independent candidates
gathered a total of 84 010 votes in the Town Council election, while in 2017 this figure amounts to 351 327
(6.79% of all the votes). Even so, out of 82 candidates to the Town Council in the 308 municipalities, only
17 independent candidates managed to be elected as mayors.
Bruno Carvalho 31
Figure 1.4: Statutory allowance for local election campaigning.
The total allowance available per municipality (TMSA) corresponds to 150% of the spending
limit (SL) defined for the municipality, determined as shown in Table A.1, in Appendix A.1.1.
To be entitled to a portion of the TMSA, a candidate must run for both the Town Council
and the Municipal Assembly and manage to either elect one candidate or get at least 2% of
votes in both bodies. The TMSA is then distributed for the candidates in the municipality
that fulfil these criteria: 25% is distributed equally between candidates, while the remaining
75% is distributed in proportion to the electoral results for the Municipal Assembly (MA).
In practice, assuming that the criteria are fulfilled and taking the adequate TMSA, the SA
received by candidate j, in municipality k, in period t is given by:
SAj,k,t = fixed_componentj,k,t + variable_componentj,k,t
=
1∑
j partiesj,k,t
× 0.25× TMSAk,t + vshare_MAj,k,t∑
j vshare_MAj,k,t
× 0.75× TMSAk,t
(1.10)
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The statutory allowance received, SAj,k,t, depends positively on the total allowance available
for the municipality, TMSAk,t, and on the vote share of the party at the Municipal Assembly
(MA). On the other hand, if more parties run in the municipality and fulfil the qualification
criteria, every party gets a smaller portion of the fixed component of the SA. Nonetheless,
the SA is capped by the actual amount spent in campaigning, so that parties cannot keep
any portion of the SA that was not effectively spent. The rules of SA attribution imply that
candidates do not know ex-ante with certainty the amount of statutory allowance that they
are entitled to. Parties can use their own resources to fund the campaign before receiving
the SA. However, in principle they would want to spend a value close to their expected SA
to avoid spending their own money or "wasting" potential campaigning resources they could
be entitled to.
As we discuss on Section 1.6, in this work we isolate exogenous changes in campaign spending
taking advantage of the particularities in the allocation of the TMSA amongst the parties
running in a municipality. In particular, we use a modified version of equation (1.10) to
construct our instrumental variable.
1.4 Data and statistical evidence
Our database was compiled using the reports submitted by parties and independent candi-
dates to the Accounts and Political Funding Entity, an independent auditing body of the
Portuguese Constitutional Court. An example of the information available in such reports
is presented in Figure A.1 and A.2, in Appendix A.1.2. Based on the reports, we built and
compiled a new database that comprises a total of 20 variables regarding actual and fore-
casted revenue, and expenditure items associated with campaigning in local elections. We
cover three nationwide elections, in all the 308 municipalities and for all the parties running
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in each municipality (between 2 and 10 parties per municipality).
We also gathered a set of political variables associated with election results using data
provided by the National Elections Commission: vote shares, number of seats won per
party and number of eligible and actual voters, per municipality, for each municipal body.
Based on these variables, we also constructed a set of control variables that are relevant for
our analysis, namely whether the incumbent mayor decided to run for reelection, how many
terms the current mayor has been in power (a proxy for incumbency advantage), how many
parties are running in that election (a proxy for contestability of the election), dummies for
the political spectrum of the candidates/winners and dummies of alignment with the central
government (to capture possible spillovers between central and local voting behaviour).
Although our database comprises a lot of information, using it to estimate the effects of
campaign spending in local elections raises some technical issues. The data about a candi-
date/party can only be effectively used if the party runs for office, in the same circumstances,
in the same municipality for the three elections.
However, this is not always the case. First, particularly small parties may decide not to run in
a municipality in a given year. Second, it may be that the party runs in the municipality, but
in a coalition. Coalitions of parties are commonly decided locally, in a case-by-case fashion.
If in a particular municipality there is a contender expected to have a high vote share in the
election (perhaps the incumbent), parties that previously ran separately may decide to join
efforts and enter a coalition. In such cases, spending and vote shares are reported for the
coalition, so it is impossible to follow the individual parties across time. Finally, following
independent candidates, whose candidacy is not supported directly by a party, is generally
not possible, as there is no municipality where the same independent candidate runs for the
whole time span of our analysis.
In the end, these limitations condition the number of observations available for estimation
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purposes. To minimise this issue and to enrich our analysis, we organise the database in two
ways: i) the winner/runner-up perspective and ii) the individual party perspective.
Focusing on the top contenders for office is very common in the literature. In some cases they
are the incumbent and the challenger, as in Jacobson (1978), Gerber (1998) or Moon (2006),
in others they are the top contenders in the second stage of a repeated election, like in Levitt
(1994) or Ben-bassat et al. (2015). The winner/runner-up perspective restricts the analysis
to the candidates that finished the electoral race in first and second places. As in this case
we focus on the position in the race and not the party, we can include most municipalities in
our analysis. Moreover, in this set-up we can also include independent candidates, smaller
parties and coalitions.
The individual party perspective, as in Fink (2012), Rekkas (2007) or Fisher et al. (2011),
allows us to follow spending patterns of the same party across time. In this approach, we can
distinguish campaign spending effects of parties, irrespective of their placing in the electoral
race. This is important as some parties may spend different amounts, in a different way, and
may even be better at converting campaign spending in votes. We restrict the analysis to
the four main Portuguese parties. This selection includes the two biggest national parties,
the Socialist Party (PS), the main centre-left party in Portugal, and the Social Democratic
Party (PSD), the centre-right analogue. The other two are are smaller parties, one is the
left-wing Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), and the other the right-wing People’s Party
(CDS).16
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used. Panel A shows that the two
main parties (PS and PSD) have a consistently higher vote share than the other two, both
in the Town Council and the Municipal Assembly. Panel B provides similar information,
while focusing on the winner/runner-up in the election. Notice that the average win margin
16We exclude the Left Bloc (BE), a left-wing party that was founded only in 1999. Although the national
relevance of this party has been increasing throughout time, its local importance is still small.
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(difference between the vote share of the winner and the runner-up in the Town Council)
is 19.75pp, although it can go as high as 72pp. Left-wing parties represent 51% of winners
while only 2% are independent candidates. Coalitions of parties win in 16% of the cases
covered by our sample.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Election Results - Party Level
Voter share PS (Town Council) 1 211 39.47 13.75 5 76.6
Vote share PS (Municipal Assembly) 1 209 38.8 11.89 6.7 71.6
Vote share PSD (Town Council) 946 39.99 17.9 1 83
Vote share PSD (Municipal Assembly) 942 39.08 16.09 2.3 75.9
Vote share CDS (Town Council) 688 6.06 8.52 0.4 64.4
Vote share CDS (Municipal Assembly) 603 7.4 8.56 0.5 61
Vote share PCP (Town Council) 1 199 11.06 15.49 0.1 67.7
Vote share PCP (Municipal Assembly) 1 203 11.71 14.58 0.3 64.8
Panel B: Elections Results - Rank in election
Vote share winner (Town Council) 1 232 52.1 8.68 26.8 83
Vote share winner (Municipal Assembly) 1 232 49.44 7.99 26 75.9
Vote share runner-up (Town Council) 1 232 32.35 8.13 9.6 48.9
Vote share runner-up (Municipal Assembly) 1 232 32.81 7.37 12.6 48.4
Win margin 1 232 19.75 13.97 0.02 72.04
D.left-wing Mayor 1 232 0.51 0.5 0 1
D.right-wing Mayor 1 232 0.46 0.5 0 1
D.Mayor belongs to a coalition 1 232 0.16 0.37 0 1
D.Mayor is independent candidate 1 232 0.02 0.15 0 1
Panel C: Campaign Spending Variables
Total Campaign Revenue PS 916 74 993.72 66 695.22 646.7 565 893.5
Total Campaign Spending PS 916 73 644.52 67 206.66 1 081.6 557 111.8
Total Campaign Revenue PSD 679 41 409.54 51 776.89 1 230.5 609 284.2
Total Campaign Spending PSD 679 48 623.99 55 528.4 1 417.2 555 526.1
Total Campaign Revenue CDS 494 11 159.54 19 328.41 0 268 204.7
Total Campaign Spending CDS 493 9 574.39 19 168.58 0 307 758.7
Total Campaign Revenue PCP 902 21 287.7 39 991.52 0 418 164.6
Total Campaign Spending PCP 904 15 189.82 27 384.27 0 211 409.1
Continued on next page
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Total Campaign Revenue winner 915 72 287.61 70 656.36 1 525.8 609 284.2
Total Campaign Spending winner 915 74 404.4 72 098.96 1466 638 744.5
Total Campaign Revenue runner-up 908 60 818.5 98 275.04 503.3 232 5565
Total Campaign Spending runner-up 912 58 563.57 65 303.84 1202.9 557 111.8
Total Campaign Spending gap 905 15 740.52 41 803.91 -176 390 223 957.7
Campaign Spending in Marketing (municipality) 924 137 047.5 145 031.9 11 450.4 1 198 516
Other Campaign Spending (municipality) 924 23 186.52 42 460.08 889.7 734 993.4
Total Campaign Spending (municipality) 923 159 152 171 994.5 16 163.5 1 842 405
Panel D: Controls
Population 1 232 33 984.48 55 298.99 418 564 657
D.Incumbent Mayor running for reelection 1 202 0.72 0.45 0 1
D.Incumbent Mayor was reelected 1 202 0.61 0.49 0 1
Number of terms of Incumbent Mayor 1 202 2.45 1.72 1 10
D.Mayor aligned with central government party 1 160 0.53 0.5 0 1
Number of parties running (Town Council) 1 232 4.24 1.11 2 10
Number of parties running (Municipal Assembly) 1 232 4.08 1 2 9
Monetary values in euros (constant prices - 2010), shares in a scale of 0-100.
Panel C summarises the variables related to campaign revenues/spending. Notice that the
higher spender is the Socialist Party with an average of 75ek. Standard deviations are very
high in general, stressing that spending varies significantly across municipalities.17 The win-
ner spends on average 15ek more than the runner-up, although the variability of spending
is higher for the runner-up. The average total spending in campaigning per municipality
is 159ek, of which 137ek are directly associated with marketing expenditures (billboards,
flyers, events, etc.).
Finally, Panel D describes some of the controls used. In 72% of the cases incumbents in
power run for reelection, and in 85% of the cases they are reelected. The average number of
17The Social Democrat Party (PSD) seems to spend less than the Socialist Party. However, the for-
mer often runs in a coalition with the People’s Party (CDS), which may bias the average of this variable
downwards.
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terms that the incumbent is in power in our sample is 2.45. The number of parties running
for office varies between 2 and 10, with an average of 4.
To get further insight from the data, we can check whether some of the hypothesis defined
in the end of section 1.2.2 have support in our descriptive analysis.
First, as stated in Hypothesis 3 , we want to explore whether there is a relationship between
campaign spending and electoral results. Figure 1.5 plots the gap between the vote shares
of the winner and the runner up (winning margin), against the gap between their campaign
spending (campaign spending gap).
Figure 1.5: Campaign spending gap versus winning margin
The positive correlation is clear, meaning that outspending your competitor is associated
with a higher winning margin.
Second, we want to evaluate whether there is empirical evidence that campaign spending
across competitors in the same municipality is correlated. Figure 1.6 plots the campaign
spending per capita of the winner and the runner up of the election.
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Figure 1.6: Campaign expenditure of Winner and Runner-up
Again, there is a strong positive correlation between the levels of spending of the top political
competitors, meaning that when/where the winner spends more, the runner-up also spends
more. Therefore, there is evidence that when deciding the level of campaign spending,
politicians consider the expected spending of their competitors. The positive relation is
not surprising, as several determinants of campaign spending decisions are common to both
candidates, like the ego-rent (χ), the total amount of statutory allowance available in the
municipality (TMSA, or T in our theoretical model), or the volatility of the popularity and
voter ideology distributions (δ and σi).
Third, we also want to investigate the descriptive evidence that a higher ex-ante popularity
advantage could drive both campaign spending decisions and the probability of being elected.
As shown in Table 1.1, around 61% of the mayors in our sample are reelected incumbents,
which could be evidence in support of the assumption stated in Hypothesis 5, if we take
incumbency advantage as a measure of ex-ante popularity advantage. However, this does
not mean that incumbents running for reelection spend less in campaigning. In fact, a means
test on the campaign spending of the winner rejects the null that campaign spending of
incumbents that are reelected is smaller than the campaign spending of first-time winners at
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5% significance level. If advantaged candidates spend more in campaigning and win elections
more often, there is preliminary empirical support for the result stated in Hypothesis 1 .
Finally, we want to explore whether potential restrictions in the access to party contributions
to fund campaigning activities may condition spending decisions. According to Table 1.1,
the two biggest parties, PS and PSD, spend on average more than the two smaller parties
considered, PCP and CDS. If bigger parties (who have on average higher vote shares) have
deeper pockets, then this higher level of spending can provide preliminary evidence that
Hypothesis 2 established in our theoretical model holds. Note however, that the lower aver-
age campaign spending levels come with a higher standard deviation (in relative terms) of
campaign spending for the smaller parties. The coefficient of variation for CDS and PCP
is above 1.8, meaning that these parties actively spend in campaigning, but target specific
municipalities (where voter ideological dispersion might be smaller).
1.5 Estimating campaign spending effects
To evaluate the effects of campaign spending in local elections, we would like to find the
elasticities of an election outcome variable (vote share, probability of winning or probability
of being reelected) with respect to a variable measuring the level of campaign spending of
the candidates. In a two candidate set-up (j = A,B) and focusing on the vote share of
candidate A, this would be equivalent to estimating the following equation:
vshareA,k,t = β1cspendingA,k,t + β2cspendingB,k,t + ηXk,t + εk,t (1.11)
where β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest and cspendingj,k,t is the total amount spent
in campaigning by candidate j, in municipality k, at time t, Xk,t is a vector of controls and
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εk,t is the error term.
Based on the results of our theoretical model and the preliminary statistical evidence pre-
sented earlier, we would expect that the vote share of candidate A is positively affected by
candidate A’s campaign spending (β1 > 0) and negatively affected by candidate B’s spending
(β2 < 0). In fact, when candidate A spends more, he increases his average popularity and
by consequence he decreases the average popularity of his opponents.
The estimation of such coefficients, however, is cumbersome because of endogeneity issues,
that could lead to biased OLS estimates. From a theoretical perspective, the bias could arise
in two confounding directions. If a politician that already thinks he is going to win (lose)
decides to spend a lot (very little), the bias would be upwards. If on the contrary, he is
so confident about victory that he finds it useless to spend in campaigning, or if he spends
a lot because he is afraid to lose, the bias would be downwards. This bias could be even
more severe when considering that in a local election political parties may allocate campaign
spending funds strategically across municipalities, by focusing their efforts in municipalities
where they believe they could win.
Even so, as a starting point we present the baseline OLS estimates in the next sections, for
both empirical specifications. We start by the winner/runner-up approach and then move
to the individual party perspective.
1.5.1 OLS estimates: winner and runner-up
In this scenario, we formulate a variant of model (1.11), following Ben-bassat et al. (2015),
where the outcome variables are the vote share of the winner, the vote share of the runner-up
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and the winning margin. If the outcome variable is the vote share of the winner we estimate:
vsharewinner,k,t =β1cspendingwinner,k,t + β2cspendingrunner−up,k,t + ηXk,t + εk,t (1.12)
where cspendingwinner,k,t is the campaign expenditure of the candidate that won the election,
in thousand euros, and cspendingrunner−up,k,t is defined analogously and εk,t is the error
term. The vector of controls, Xk,t includes municipal fixed effects, time dummies and a set
of political controls, as well as the population level and a variable to account for the total
campaign spending of parties that ran in the municipality but ended up in third place or
lower, cspendingmun,k,t. Results are shown in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: OLS estimates, using spending of winner and runner up.
V. share winner V. share runner-up Win margin
(1) (2) (3)
C. spending Winner 0.015 -0.005 0.020
[0.011] [0.009] [0.016]
C. spending runner-up -0.035∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.011] [0.018]
C. Spending (mun.) -0.021∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.008] [0.005] [0.010]
Obs. 903 903 903
R Sq. 0.288 0.174 0.179
F-stat 19.723 11.211 11.897
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time
dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level in square brackets.
Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In the first column, we see that although the spending of the winner has virtually no effect
on its vote share, the spending of the runner-up has a negative effect. On the contrary,
column (2) shows that the spending of the runner-up seems to affect positively his vote share,
while the effect of the spending of the winner is not significant. In both cases, campaign
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spending of other parties has a negative effect on the vote shares. The effects of spending
on the winning margin are analogous. In terms of magnitudes, an increase of 1000 euros in
campaign spending of the runner-up leads to a boost of 0.06pp in his own vote share and a
decline of 0.04pp in the vote share of the winner. Therefore, particularly for the runner-up
the assumptions embodied in Hypothesis 3 seem to have empirical support.
Notice that this approach covers virtually all the 308 municipalities in the three elections
(308 × 3 = 924). Table A.3, in Appendix A.2, shows that contestability reduces both the
vote shares and the winning margin. When the incumbent mayor runs for reelection the
vote share of the winner increases, with a corresponding reduction the vote share of the
runner-up. The number of terms that the incumbent has been in power seems to have a
relatively small effect on the vote share. Together, these findings provide support to our
model assumptions, namely as stated in Hypothesis 5.
1.5.2 OLS estimates: individual parties
When analysing the campaign spending effects of individual parties, following Fink (2012),
for each of the four main parties we estimate:
vshareA,k,t = β1cspendingA,k,t + ηXk,t + εk,t (1.13)
where cspendingA,k,t represents total campaign spending of party A, measured in thou-
sand euros. The vector of controls is defined as before, including a variable that accounts
for the total amount spent in campaigning in the municipality by parties other than A,
cspending_munk,t. Results are shown in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.3: OLS estimates, using spending by 4 biggest parties.
V. share PS V. share PSD V. share CDS V. share PCP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C. Spending PS 0.083∗∗∗
[0.015]
C. Spending PSD 0.090∗∗∗
[0.022]
C. Spending CDS 0.135∗∗
[0.061]
C. Spending PCP 0.057∗∗∗
[0.020]
C. spending (mun) -0.046∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.016∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.019] [0.006] [0.004]
Obs. 914 675 464 892
R Sq. 0.141 0.353 0.120 0.107
F-stat 10.837 20.579 3.376 7.010
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Notes: Campaign spending variables in thousands. Each column represents a separate regression,
where the vote share of each of the four biggest party is used as outcome variable. All regressions
include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal
level in square brackets. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All the coefficients in the main diagonal are positive and statistically significant, meaning that
each party’s own spending is positively correlated with its vote share. Campaign spending
of other parties in the same municipality, in turn, decreases the vote share of the party
analysed. Again, the correlation of campaign spending and vote shares supports Hypothesis
3.
Notice that, in this case, by construction, our estimates include only municipalities where the
party whose vote share we use as outcome variable runs individually, with no pre-electoral
coalition with another party in the three elections. Consequently, in Table 1.3 the number
of included observations for each regression ranges between 464, for CDS, and 914 for PS.
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Instead of using the total spending of other parties in the municipality, cspending_muni,t, we
could explore the interactions between the campaign spending of these four parties separately.
Table A.5, in Appendix A.2, shows these effects. Again, the coefficients in the main diagonal
show a positive effect of own campaign spending on the vote shares. Also, the off-diagonal
elements show that spending of competitors negatively affects your own vote share.18
Tables A.4 and A.5 detail the effects of the controls included in the regressions. In both
cases, the set of controls seems to tell the same story. Contestability (a higher number
of candidates) reduces the vote shares. Incumbency advantage also matters, although the
direction of the effect seems to differ depending on the party. Finally, the alignment of the
mayor in power before the election with the central government seems to have mixed effects.
Although these estimates seem to support that campaign spending is relevant, it is important
to address potential endogeneity issues. If they are present, the coefficients may be biased
and, as discussed, the direction of the bias is not obvious.
1.6 Identification Approach: Expected Statutory Allowance
Literature has dealt with the inherent endogeneity of estimating the effects of campaign
spending on electoral results mainly by using the particularities of the elections or by re-
sorting to instrumental variable estimation. Silveira and Mello (2011) and Ben-bassat et al.
(2015) focus on repeated elections, while Fink (2012) argues that the characteristics of a par-
tisan proportional representation system minimise the simulaneity issues. Green and Krasno
(1990), on the other hand, use lagged campaign spending as an instrumental variable to
access the contemporaneous effects of campaign spending. Other instrumental variables in-
18We prefer the former specification because the number of observations included is considerably higher,
particularly for the bigger parties. In fact, by assessing the individual effects of spending of all parties in
the vote shares, we are constraining the sample to include only municipalities where the four parties run
individually and simultaneously in the three election episodes.
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clude candidate quality (Gerber, 1998 and Green and Krasno, 1988), the tightness of the
race (Erikson and Palfrey, 2000) or the population size of the constituency (Gerber, 1998).
In this work, we follow an instrumental variable approach, based on the exogenous rules that
govern local political campaigns in Portugal, described in Section 1.3.1 and in Appendix A.1.
Particularly, we focus on the value of the statutory allowance (SA) candidates expect to get
from the central government.
The choice of the instrument is framed in our theoretical model and justified by its suitable
properties. On the one hand, being the main source of funding for political campaigns,
its value (or the expectation of it) is likely to be a key determinant of the actual amount
spent in campaigning. On the other hand, the rules that determine the exact amount of SA
received are out of the scope of candidates’ control. This is apparent upon closer inspection
of equation (1.10).
First, candidates do not know how many opponents they are going to face in the election,
nor whether these opponents are going to fulfil the criteria to be entitled to public fund-
ing, which affects directly the fixed component of the SA received. Second, they do not
know how well they are going to perform, compared to other candidates, which influences
directly the variable component of the SA. Finally, the actual amount of money available
to be distributed, the TMSA, also varies across elections, depending on the spending limit
threshold where the municipality is placed and the actual indexing value used to convert
these thresholds into a spending limit in euros.19
Our approach is to compute the expected statutory allowance (ESA) each candidate antici-
pates in a given election. If the election occurs at t, the ESA is determined considering the
19The number of eligible voters that defines the spending threshold of a municipality is published by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in the months prior to the election. This could affect the campaign spending
decisions, particularly for municipalities near the threshold limits. Additionally, the indexing value in place
in every election is defined by the central government and its value changed throughout our sample, leading
to different spending limits for municipalities at the same threshold across time (as shown in Table A.2).
Bruno Carvalho 46
On the behaviour of voters and politicians: Municipal elections and the economy.
rules in place at t and the figures that describe the electoral competition stance from the
previous election, in t − 1 (which includes the electoral results and the number of parties
running for office in t− 1).
In particular, we adapt the statutory allowance (SA) formula, given by equation (1.10),
to reflect the best possible information available when candidates are deciding the level of
campaign spending. For party j, in municipality k, in period t the ESA is given by:
ESAj,k,t = fixed_componentj,k,t + variable_componentj,k,t
=
1∑
j partiesj,k,t−1
× 0.25× TMSAk,t + vshare_MAj,k,t−1∑
j vshare_MAj,k,t−1
× 0.75× TMSAk,t
(1.14)
Notice that by using the TMSA of period t we assume that candidates know the legal
framework in place when they define the campaign spending level for the election. To
account for the political stance, we assume that the best guess for each individual candidate
is what happened in the previous election.
To illustrate, consider the case of the Socialist party (PS), in the municipality of Aveiro in
the 2009 election. The data necessary to determine the ESA is given in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: ESA for PS in the 2009 election.
year SL TMSA num_parties vshare_TC vshare_MA
∑
vshare_MA
2005 370 934e 556 401e 4 29.81% 31.2% 94.5%
2009 385 867e 578 801e 5 34.65% 33.99% 96.3%
Notes: Values at constant prices (2010).
The ESA is obtained based on the TMSA for Aveiro in 2009 and the electoral results of the
2005 election in Aveiro. The fixed component is obtained dividing the fixed proportion of the
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TMSA of 2009 by the number of parties that fulfilled the criteria to receive the allowance in
the 2005 election [4]. The variable portion of the TMSA that PS receives receives depends
on the vote share (in the Municipal Assembly) that PS got in the 2001 election [31.2%] in
Aveiro, as a proportion of the share of total valid votes in the election [94.5%]. Using the
formula, the ESA amounts to 179 497e.20 In reality, the Socialist party spent in the 2009
election 178 492.71e in campaigning and received a statutory allowance of 175 463.14e
from the central government.
Note that our main outcome variable of interest is the vote share in the Town Council, as
this is what determines who is the Mayor of the municipality. The instrument, however, is
calculated according to the votes cast for the Municipal Assembly (MA) in the prior election
(as these are the results used to distribute the statutory allowance in reality). Further
discussion about the exclusion restriction is presented in Section 1.7.3.
We use the ESA to instrument campaign spending in a two stage least squares set-up:
(1st stage) cspendingj,k,t = θ1ESAj,k,t + ηXk,t + vk,t
(2nd stage) vsharej,k,t = β1cspendingj,k,t
∧
+ ηXk,t + εk,t
(1.15)
where vsharej,k,t may refer, depending on the specification, to the vote shares of the winner/runner-
up or the vote shares of the four main parties in municipality k and time t. Xk,t is a set
of controls, that include municipal dummies, time dummies, political and demographic vari-
ables, as well as measures of campaign spending done by other parties in the municipality.
Overall, the construction of the instrumental variable for both the winner/runner-up and
the individual parties perspectives is similar. However, there are some important important
distinctions to be made.
The summary statistics for our instrumental variables are presented in Table A.7. The
20That is, ESAPS,Aveiro,2009 = 14 × 0.25× 556401 + 31.294.5 × 0.75× 556401 = 179497
Bruno Carvalho 48
On the behaviour of voters and politicians: Municipal elections and the economy.
expected statutory allowance computed shows the relative differences between the parties,
with the two biggest parties having significantly higher average values. The averages for the
winner and the runner-up are also high. It is also important to note that the variability of
the instrumental variable is high, shown by high standard deviations (in particular for the
smaller parties, relative to the average) and by the large ranges in all cases.
To compute the ESA in the winner and runner-up perspective we start by identifying the
top two contenders in the Town Council election occurring in t. We then use the Municipal
Assembly electoral results of the election in t − 1 as their best possible guess about their
performance in t, regardless of their ranking in the prior election. As discussed before, an
important advantage of this approach is that it includes coalitions of parties and independent
candidates, whenever they end up in the top two places. As a result, the computation of
this variable is somehow complex, requiring a set of technical assumptions when we measure
backward performance. These assumptions are presented in detail in Appendix A.3.1.
Figure 1.7 exhibits the high correlation between our expected statutory allowance and the
actual campaign spending, for the winner and the runner-up.
Figure 1.7: ESA vs. actual campaign spending (winner and runner-up).
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In the individual parties’ specification, as discussed, we focus on the four biggest local parties
running for local office. Tracking the record of those parties is relatively simpler, as we need
only to gather the Municipal Assembly vote shares that the candidates of obtained in the
previous election. Importantly, as in this case we care about the party and not its ranking in
the election, there are cases where the ESA cannot be computed. In some cases, particular
for smaller parties, even though the party ran for the Municipal Assembly in the former
election he might not have ran for the Town Council, or may have had less than 2% of the
votes in one of the municipal bodies, which means the party did not qualify to receive SA
in the former election.21
In Figure 1.8 we show the correlation of the ESA of each party with their actual spending
in campainging.
Figure 1.8: ESA vs. actual campaign spending (PS, PSD, CDS and PCP).
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Correlation between campaign spending
and theoretical subsidies
Expected Statutory Allowance of PS Expected Statutory Allowance of PSD
Expected Statutory Allowance of CDS Expected Sta utory Allowance of PCP
and expected statutory allowance
21This is far less of an issue for the winner and runner-up perspective, as top contenders in an election at
t generally performed well enough in the previous election and were thus entitled to the Statutory Allowance
in that election.
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Again, there is a clear positive correlation, particularly for the Socialist party and for the
cases where both campaign spending (and the ESA) are lower (excluding the top outliers).
The positive correlations found both in Figures 1.7 and 1.8 highlight how the expectation
about the amount of public statutory allowance to be received influences spending, which
supports both our theoretical modelling assumptions (as stated in Hypothesis 4) and our
empirical identification.
1.7 Causal Effects of Campaigning
1.7.1 IV estimates: winner and runner-up
The results for the winner and runner-up perspective are shown in Table 1.5.
In columns (1) and (2) the outcome variable is the vote share of the winner candidate. The
first stage, in column (1), shows that the expected statutory allowance is a good predictor
of the level of campaign spending of the winner and that the spending of the runner-up has
positive (albeit not significant) impact on the spending of the winner. Even so, only the
spending of the runner-up (and to a smaller extent the spending of the remaining parties in
the municipality) seem to affect the vote share of the winner. The coefficient of the spending
of the winner has the expected sign, but it is not statically significant.
A similar specification is applied using the vote share of the runner-up as the outcome
variable, reported in columns (3) and (4). The first stage shows that the expected statutory
allowance explains well the campaign spending level, with both the spending of the winner
and of the remaining parties in the municipality having a positive (not significant) effect.
In this case, the second stage shows a strong effect of the instrumented campaign spending
(of the runner-up) in his own vote share. An increase of 1 000e leads to an increase of
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the vote share of 0.14pp, this effect is significant at the 1% level. Although this effect may
seem small, for the average runner-up, who spends 58ek, this effect means that campaign
spending accounts for 8.12% of his vote share.
Table 1.5: Campaign Spending effects on vote shares, winner and runner-up. (IV Estimation)
V. share winner V. share runner-up Win margin
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C. Spending winner 0.036 0.069 -0.015 0.198
[0.026] [0.068] [0.012] [0.147]
ESA winner 0.548∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.169
[0.136] [0.144] [0.113]
C. Spending runner-up 0.090 -0.038∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗
[0.088] [0.009] [0.045] [0.168]
ESA runner-up 0.448∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
[0.095] [0.131] [0.096]
C. Spending (mun) -0.031 -0.019∗∗ 0.001 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.040 0.007 0.009
[0.065] [0.009] [0.030] [0.006] [0.062] [0.033] [0.019]
Obs. 903 903 903 903 903 903 903
R Sq. 0.283 0.282 0.220 0.066 0.300 0.226 -
F-stat 11.021 18.927 12.848 9.562 12.956 14.060 7.993
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
F-test excl. 16.31 - 22.10 - 13.27 11.8 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls
include the population level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms
that the mayor in power at the time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of
candidates running for the election. We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central
government. Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Finally, we evaluate the impact of campaign spending on the winning margin. We do so by
instrumenting both the spending of the winner and the runner-up with their expected statu-
tory allowance. The results of the corresponding first stages are consistent withn previous
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specifications. In the second stage, we observe that the spending of the winner increases the
size of the winning margin, while the opposite happens for the spending of the runner-up
(significant up to the 5% level). In practice, an increase of a 1 000e of the spending of the
runner-up has a combined effect over the vote share of both the winner and runner-up that
translates to the reduction of the winning margin by 0.35pp.
Contrary to this last specification, in the first two we only instrument the spending of each
candidate with the corresponding expected statutory allowance. The spending of the other
candidate is not instrumented. In this way we have a clear depiction of the effect of own
expectation on own campaign spending decisions.22
In all cases, the F-test for excluded instruments is above 10 meaning that our instrument
is relevant in explaining the campaign spending decisions of the winner and the runner-up.
The exogenous variation in spending that we capture with our IV approach seems to indicate
that the OLS estimates, shown in Table 1.2, have a downward bias.
Overall, Table 1.5 shows that while most of the coefficients of campaign spending have the
expected signs, only the spending of the runner-up can affects the vote share. Several studies,
like Jacobson (1990), Palda and Palda (1998), Moon (2006) or Benoit and Marsh (2008),
showed that incumbent (the majority of our winners) spending may have smaller effects than
spending of challengers (the majority of our runner-ups).23
In our case, as Table A.8 in Appendix A.4 shows, campaign spending of the winner affects
his vote share in a significant manner until political controls are introduced. Specifically, the
coefficient of the dummy variable that is equal to one whenever the incumbent is running
22For robustness we also run each regression instrumenting for both the winner and the runner-up ex-
penditure. Albeit there is a small decline in the descriptive power, results are qualitatively similar. We also
run regressions including only the spending of each candidate (excluding all other spending), our baseline
findings remain unchanged.
23In fairness, the debate about the relevance of incumbent vs challenger is long lasting, and there is also
evidence that spending of incumbent also matters: Gerber (1998), Erikson and Palfrey (2000), Samuels
(2001) and Benoit and Marsh (2003a).
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for re-election seems to affect the vote share in an important manner, both in terms of size
and statistical significance. Interestingly, this does not mean that the winner spends less
in campaigning.24 The same variable is also significant in explaining the amount spent in
campaigning, as is clear from the estimation of the first stage equation shown in column (7),
of Table 1.5.25
Thus, a possible explanation for the lack of significance of the winner’s campaign spending
may be associated with some particularly high incumbency advantage.26 As discussed in
Magee (2012), campaign spending of the incumbent is relevant mostly when he feels threat-
ened by strong challenger, thus a high incumbency advantage may be associated with a lower
effect of winner’s spending.
At this point, it is useful to revisit our theoretical Hypotheses. First, in all cases, the expected
statutory allowance has a strong positive correlation with campaign spending decisions, which
supports Hypothesis 4. Second, regarding the effects of campaign spending on vote shares,
all the coefficients of the runner-up have the expected sign: a positive sign for own spending
and a negative one for competitor’s spending. This supports Hypothesis 3, at least for the
runner-up.
The role of the ex-ante popularity wedge (x) is particularly evident for the case of the winner,
if we take incumbency advantage as a proxy for a positive popularity wedge. As discussed,
although incumbency advantage drives the campaign spending of the winner upwards it also
affects directly the vote share in a sizeable manner, reducing the scope of effectiveness of
campaign spending per se, which supports Hypothesis 5 and partially supports Hypothesis 1.
Finally, in this set-up it is not clear how the tightness in access to party contributions to
24As shown in Section 1.4 he actually spends more.
25The details about the impact of the controls in the case of the runner-up are also provided on Table A.9.
The point estimate of the effect of runner-up spending in is own vote share is stable across specifications.
26Recall that in our sample in 61% of the cases the winner of the election is an incumbent seeking
reelection.
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fund campaigning (kj) affects spending decisions and the vote shares. However, given that
the top contenders for office in local Portuguese elections are often the two biggest parties
in our sample, this approach may not be the best to evaluate our theoretical claims from
Hypothesis 2. In fact, if the availability of party resources is correlated with party size, these
two parties (and their candidates) would have similar kj.
1.7.2 IV estimates: individual parties
In reality, different parties may spend in campaigning in a different manner, and that spend-
ing may affect vote shares in different ways. The individual parties’ perspective enables this
kind of analysis, particularly given that our sample covers four parties of different sizes, that
encompass a good portion of the political spectrum.
Table 1.6 summarizes the results of our IV estimation, where the columns (1), (3), (5) and
(7) present the estimation of the first stage equations and the remaining the corresponding
second stages.
In all cases, the expected statutory allowance has a positive effect on the actual spending in
the election, at least at 5% significance level. The difference in the coefficients across parties
is mostly associated with the variability in spending across the different parties (Panel C of
Table 1.1).
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Table 1.6: Campaign spending effects on vote shares, party level. (IV Estimation)
V. share PS V. share PSD V. share CDS V. Share PCP
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending PS 0.082∗∗∗
[0.031]
ESA PS 0.600∗∗∗
[0.110]
C. Spending PSD 0.188∗
[0.110]
ESA PSD 0.483∗∗
[0.191]
C. Spending CDS -0.055
[0.211]
ESA CDS 0.404∗∗
[0.157]
C. Spending PCP 0.157
[0.106]
ESA PCP 0.356∗∗
[0.137]
C. Spending (mun) 0.086∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.112∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.008 0.032 -0.022∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.009] [0.045] [0.024] [0.042] [0.011] [0.019] [0.008]
Obs. 890 890 568 568 188 188 604 604
R Sq. 0.260 0.1296 0.320 0.3550 0.213 0.069 0.106 0.057
F-stat 12.696 7.822 14.895 17.806 4.220 1.762 4.030 4.331
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 29.64 - 6.42 - 6.57 - 6.74 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.012 . 0.012 - 0.010 -
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls
include the population level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that the
mayor in power at the time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates
running for the election. We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government.
Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
In the second stage, we find a positive effect of the instrumented spending in the vote share
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for PS, PSD and PCP, although this effect is not statistically significant for the latter. For the
Socialist Party, for instance an increase of 1 000e in campaign spending increases the vote
share by 0.08pp, which for the average Socialist candidate accounts for around 6% of his vote
share, a relatively sizeable portion of the Socialist party’s sample average vote share (39%).
On the other hand, as expected, the spending of other parties in the same municipality has
always a negative (generally significant) effect on vote shares. For the Social Democrat party
(PSD), the point estimate is even higher (suggesting an impact of campaign spending on the
vote share of the mean PSD candidate of around 9%).
The F-test of excluded instruments is only above 10 for the Socialist Party. However, for
the remaining parties the instrument is significant at the 5% level. It is important to notice
that the amount of observations captured in this approach varies significantly across parties,
which may affect the significance of the results for other parties aside from the Socialist
Party. In Appendix A.4 we provide more detailed tables per party, reporting the effects of
our control variables.
The results of this specification can also be connected to our theoretical assumptions and
findings. For the two biggest parties, own campaign spending increases vote shares and
competitor’s campaign spending reduces it (as stated in Hypothesis 3). For all parties, the
expected statutory allowance seems to have a high impact on campaign spending decision
(Hypothesis 4).
Finally, in this set-up it seems clear that bigger parties, with perhaps deeper pockets not
only spend more, but are more able to spend in a way that influences vote shares. This shows
that in fact the tightness in the access to party funds (kj) to finance campaigning matters
for spending decisions and spending efficiency, as stated in Hypothesis 2.
Combined, our two specifications support our empirical strategy choice and provide empirical
support for our modelling assumptions and main theoretical prescriptions.
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It is important to note that, given the nature of our identification strategy, we are capturing
effects of campaign spending that could be seen as a lower bound of the overall effects. As
we are instrumenting spending with the expected statutory allowance based on prior election
results, our first stage captures mostly the spending levels that are necessary to keep the
same vote share that was obtained in the last election (consolidation spending). In our set-up
we are not targeting changes in campaign spending strategies that could make a runner-up
of a former election become a winner of the current election, for instance. In such cases,
campaign spending effects could be even higher.
1.7.3 Instrument Exogeneity
One important concern related with our identification strategy is the exogeneity of the in-
strument. As shown in equation (1.14), our instrumental variable is a function of the lagged
vote share the candidate got in the Municipal Assembly (MA) in the previous election.
This vote share could affect the vote share for the Town Council (TC, our outcome variable)
through channels other than the campaign spending. If a party is regularly strong in a
municipality, past vote shares, even in other local representative bodies, can embody its
popularity in the municipality. Consequently, if the use of the ESA is equivalent to using
the vote share as an instrument, the exclusion restriction would not be satisfied.
A first point to be made is that although the vote shares for the TC and the MA are strongly
correlated, they do not systematically coincide. The correlation for the four main parties
is on average 0.98. However the difference between the vote share obtained in the Town
Council and the Municipal Assembly differs depending on the party and spans between -7.9
and 21.6 for the Socialist Party, for instance. More details about the difference in the vote
shares are available in Table A.6, in appendix. This correlation drops to 0.85 for the average
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of the four biggest parties if the lagged vote share in the MA is used.
On the other hand, our instrumental variable depends on more than the vote share. As
discussed in Section 1.6, it depends on the TMSA, which is set by the central government,
and on the number of parties that run in the municipality and qualify to receive the ESA.
Both these components vary across time and municipalities, which makes our instrument a
non-linear function of the past electoral success.
Finally, we can also test if our findings would be analogous if we used only the lagged MA
vote share as an instrument, instead of the ESA. The results for this alternative instrumental
variable specification are presented in Table 1.7. Panel A and B of this table replicate the
first stage results presented in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Using lagged vote share of Municipal Assembly as IV
Panel A: Winner/runner-up
(dependent 2nd stage) V. share winner V. Share runner-up Win margin
(dependent 1st stage) C. Spend. Winner C. Spend. runner-up C. Spend. winner C. Spend. runner-up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
V. share winner (lag) 0.133 0.227 0.197
[0.156] [0.176] [0.179]
V. share runner-up (lag) 0.311∗∗∗ 0.168 0.422∗∗∗
[0.113] [0.192] [0.154]
Obs. 903 903 903 903
F-test excl. 0.73 7.57 0.87 4.16
Panel B: Individual Parties
(dependent 2nd stage) V. share PS V. share PSD V. share CDS V. share PCP
(dependent 1st stage) C. Spend. PS C. Spend. PSD C. Spend. CDS C. Spend. PCP
(5) (6) (7) (8)
V. share MA (lag) 0.278∗∗ 0.037 0.251 0.384∗∗
[0.124] [0.201] [0.234] [0.161]
Obs. 892 568 244 886
F-test excl. 5.06 0.03 1.15 5.65
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the winning
margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include the same controls included in the baseline specification in Tables 1.5
and 1.6. Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In general, the coefficients of our first stage regression are smaller when we instrument using
only the lagged vote share, meaning that the correlation of the vote share with campaign
spending is weaker than the one for the ESA. More importantly, the statistical significance
in the first stage is reduced/lost in almost all cases. This leads to a significant reduction on
the F-tests of excluded instruments, that are all below 10, which implies that we have no first
stage in this case. These findings increase the confidence on the exogeneity and suitability
of our instrument.
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1.7.4 Excluding flagship municipalities
An important robustness check for our results is to guarantee that our findings are not driven
by a small subset of municipalities. To that extent, we replicate Table 1.5 and Table 1.6
removing the 18 district capitals and the capitals of the Autonomous Regions. In reality, the
electoral results in these municipalities are more visible at the national level and spending
in such municipalities could be driven by non-local reasons.
Results associated with the winner and runner-up perspective are quantitatively similar, as
shown in Table 1.8. In this case, the spending of the runner-up still appears to be more
relevant in affecting both the vote share of the winner and of the runner-up (columns (1) to
(4)).
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Table 1.8: Campaign spending effects: winner and runner-up (No flagship municipalities)
V. share winner V. share runner-up Win margin
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C. spending winner 0.058 0.010 -0.010 0.331
[0.039] [0.087] [0.015] [0.371]
ESA winner 0.449∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.165
[0.126] [0.132] [0.133]
C. Spending runner-up 0.034 -0.041∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ -0.471
[0.098] [0.011] [0.051] [0.380]
ESA runner-up 0.461∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
[0.090] [0.116] [0.093]
C. Dpending (mun) 0.041 -0.031∗∗ 0.050 -0.027∗ 0.018 0.059 0.014
[0.065] [0.014] [0.046] [0.014] [0.054] [0.049] [0.037]
Obs. 845 845 845 845 845 845 845
R Sq. 0.291 0.283 0.196 0.093 0.318 0.206 -
F-stat 10.173 17.816 9.973 8.446 12.717 10.709 5.878
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 12.73 - 26.30 - 14.59 13.58 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 -
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls
include the population level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that
the mayor in power at the time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates
running for the election. We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government.
Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
When we use the winning margin as outcome variable, however, the significance of the results
disappears upon excluding the flagship municipalities. Even so, the size and the sign of the
coefficients remain.
Table 1.9 shows that the results for the individual party specification, excluding flagship
municipalities, are very similar to our baseline specification. In this case, the campaign
spending of PS, PSD and PCP have a positive effect on the vote share, while competitors’
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spending reduces the vote share. The magnitude of the effects is also very similar, if not
higher.
Table 1.9: Campaign spending effects on vote shares, party level. (No flagship municipalities)
V. share PS V.share PSD V. share CDS V. share PCP
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending PS 0.102∗∗
[0.048]
ESA PS 0.520∗∗∗
[0.111]
C. Spending PSD 0.156∗
[0.087]
ESA PSD 0.574∗∗∗
[0.187]
C. Spending CDS 0.084
[0.453]
ESA CDS 0.205
[0.133]
C. Spending PCP 0.197∗
[0.108]
ESA PCP 0.375∗∗∗
[0.108]
C. Spending (mun) 0.100∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.055 -0.111∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.015 0.026 -0.026∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.013] [0.043] [0.023] [0.033] [0.015] [0.020] [0.009]
Obs. 834 834 538 538 168 168 553 553
R Sq. 0.269 0.129 0.349 0.367 0.161 0.156 0.163 0.078
F-stat 12.105 7.001 14.184 16.992 2.571 1.473 4.251 3.691
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.1760 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 22.10 - 9.41 - 2.35 - 12.01 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.003 - 0.1302 - 0.000 -
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Controls
include the population level, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent is running for reelection, the number of terms that
the mayor in power at the time of the election has been in power, as well as a variable that accounts for the number of candidates
running for the election. We also include a dummy whenever the candidate is aligned with a party in the central government.
Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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The fact that our baseline results survive the exclusion of the municipalities where campaign
spending may be driven by different factors, supports our main conclusions. The instrument
still captures the exogenous movement in campaign spending and it identifies a statistically
significant effect of campaign spending to ensure the consolidation of vote shares across
elections.
We also conducted two additional robustness checks not included here for brevity. First, we
excluded only Lisbon and Oporto, the two biggest Portuguese cities and then we excluded
campaign spending (mild and severe) outliers.27 Given the high variability of our data, these
observations could be skewing our results. In both cases, our baseline conclusions remain
unchanged.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on campaign spending in a context where public
funds cover a substantial part of the total spent by the political candidates. Our theoretical
model is a stylised two-period probabilistic voting model, expanded to include the effects
of campaign spending. In a two candidate world, we assume candidates chose campaign
spending levels, while trying to take as much advantage as possible from the expected statu-
tory allowance provided by the central government. We allow candidates to differ in terms of
their ex-ante popularity level and their access to private (party contribution) funds to finance
campaign spending. Campaign spending can be used to influence the average popularity of
the candidates in a given municipality. We argue that spending increases exposure and thus
affects positively the candidate’s popularity. Differences in terms of ex-ante popularity and
27We define outliers as observations that lie outside the following intervals. i) an observation is a mild
outlier when xi /∈ [Q1 − 1.5(Q3 − Q1);Q3 + 1.5(Q3 − Q1)] ii) an observation is a severe outlier when
xi /∈ [Q1 − 3(Q3 −Q1);Q3 + 3(Q3 −Q1)]. In practice, we calculated the boundaries of these intervals for all
spending variables and then re-estimated the equations removing all the observations outside these intervals.
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access to party contributions to fund campaigning lead to different equilibrium outcomes.
We then conduct an empirical exercise using a novel database construct based on the cam-
paign spending reports submitted by candidates to the Portuguese Constitutional Court.
Our database includes local campaign expenditures for all the parties running in the Por-
tuguese local elections of 2005, 2009 and 2013, covering all the 308 Portuguese municipalities.
Our empirical exercise is grounded on the theoretical part in that we use the expected statu-
tory allowance candidates think they might receive after the election as an instrumental
variable for the campaign spending. The controls included in the empirical estimation are
also a result of our modelling assumptions and results.
We perform the analysis from two perspectives. First, in the winner and runner-up perspec-
tive, we focus on the two biggest contenders for office and find that, while spending of the
runner-up increases his vote share and decreases the winners’ vote share, campaign spending
of the winner seems to be less relevant, particularly when we control for incumbency advan-
tage. In practice, for the average runner-up campaign spending accounts for around 8% of
own vote share.
Second, we focus on the spending patterns of individual parties by evaluating the impacts
of the campaign spending by the four biggest parties in Portugal. In this case, we find that
campaign spending effects are more robust (and sizeable) for the two biggest parties. For
the average Socialist party candidate, for instance, campaign spending accounts for around
6% of own vote share. Our results are robust to several specifications.
We also contribute to a nascent literature on the campaign spending effects on local elections,
particularly mayoral elections. Most research so far has been done for presidential, general
or state elections, both focusing on national and local level campaigning. To the best of our
knowledge, except for Gierzynski, Kleppner, and Lewis (1998), Benoit and Marsh (2003a,b),
Young and Austin (2008), Holbrook and Weinschenk (2014) and Ben-bassat et al. (2015)
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there are no other local election studies available up to this point. However, the study
of campaigning in local elections, provided that the information available is reliable, could
enrich substantially the knowledge of campaign spending effects. Not only because more
disaggregated data, with higher frequency, improves the power of statistical analysis, but
also because from a theoretical perspective spending in local elections is closer to voters and
potentially more targeted.
Lastly, our work could set the path for an almost unexplored avenue of research regarding
campaign spending determinants and effects. Literature has mostly focused on contexts
where campaign spending is mostly financed through donations, but little research has ad-
dressed the particular properties of the electoral systems where funding is mostly public, as
it is currently the case in most European countries. Public money in campaigning might be
a way to “level the political playing field" and further research is required to draw definite
conclusions. Our findings seem to indicate that the Portuguese system of public funding
for elections, perhaps because the allocation mechanism relies heavily on election results, is
not doing enough in this respect, as campaign spending seems to benefit mostly the bigger
parties. Exploring the virtues of mechanisms in other countries could provide important
information to politicians, voters and policy-makers.
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Chapter 2
Central Government Performance and Lo-
cal Election outcomes: A randomized ex-
periment 1
2.1 Introduction
The recent debate about how so-called fake news may have influenced the US 2016 presi-
dential election, the Brexit vote or the recent 2018 Brazilian election has sparked renewed
interest in the role of information on electoral outcomes (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, King
et al., 2017). Election periods are awash with official campaign coverage, interviews, op-eds
and other stories where political agents either self-promote or attack other candidates. It
is of crucial importance to understand how people react to this information when shaping
their perceptions, vote or other political participation decisions.
In this paper, we first analyse how information about the incumbent central government
affects voters’ perception about the government. Second, we assess how this updated perfor-
mance perception affects voters’ electoral choices in local elections. We perform a randomised
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Diogo Mendes, Cláudia Custódio and Susana Peralta.
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experiment that exposed 1800 students of two business schools in Lisbon to a bundle of in-
formation about the central government in power during the 2017 Portuguese local election,
held on October 1st.
News were selected to encompass several subjects relevant to central government action in
diverse policy areas, ranging from the aggregate level (Public Finance, Pensions and Youth
Employment) to fields where central government policy has a closer connection with local
politics (National Health Service, Road Safety and Education). For each policy area, we
selected two news articles from the same mainstream national media outlet, one conveying
a negative and the other a positive message about the central government action in that
policy area. These were then abridged and combined in different ways to generate 12 differ-
ent treatments: 6 versions conveying positive information, and the remaining 6 conveying
comparable negative information. Each treatment included a bundle of information with two
news articles (in two different policy areas), a graph and picture.2 Thus, for each positive
treatment there is a corresponding negative treatment where the two news articles verse the
same policy areas. The control group was subject to neutral information about a Portuguese,
not endangered, dog breed.
The implementation took place in the weeks surrounding the local election. First, in the
two weeks prior to the election, we collected respondents’ socio-demographic and political
information in a baseline survey and then we implemented the treatment. In the week after
the election a follow-up survey was implemented, to gather information about actual voting
in the 2017 election.
Regarding our first research question, our main result is that only negative information has
a significant effect on the general perception of central government performance; whereas
2The graph was produced with actual data to support/strengthen the information conveyed by the
article, so that graphs associated with corresponding positive and negative articles were visually similar.
The picture was the same for each subject, irrespective of the tone of the information.
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both positive and negative news affect policy-specific perceptions of central government per-
formance. These findings are in accordance with other work showing a negativity bias in
non-political contexts. Baumeister et al. (2001), for instance, discuss reasons why negative
information/experiences have stronger effects on a broad range of psychological phenomena.
Using experimental approaches, Olsen (2015) assesses whether equivalent satisfaction and
dissatisfaction measures have similar effects on the evaluation of Danish hospital services.
James and Moseley (2014) perform a field experiment in two British municipalities, showing
that information about low absolute performance on waste recycling services lowers citizen
satisfaction (with no corresponding effects for positive information). Similarly, using a psy-
chophysiological experiment Soroka and McAdams (2015) show that viewers react strongly
and more sustainably to negative TV news, while linking this fact with the concept of loss
aversion.
Some strands of literature also frame negativity bias within the context of political behaviour.
Lau (1982, 1985), for instance, discusses why and how different dimensions of negativity
affect political behaviour, using survey experiments. Nannestad and Paldam (1997) show
that economic voting is more pronounced when the economic activity is slowing down than
when it is improving, using Danish data. James and John (2007) study the impact of
performance information publication on electoral support for the incumbent, finding that
incumbents with low performance are punished in the polls. More recently, Lockwood and
Rockey (2015), departing from Soroka and McAdams (2015) findings, frame negativity bias
in terms loss aversion in a probabilistic voting model and then show, using data on elections
to US state legislatures, that loss aversion affects both electoral competition and election
outcomes. Based on survey data from the UK, Tilley, Neundorf, and Hobolt (2018) show
that voters punish incumbent governments in elections as a reaction to worsening personal
financial circumstances, particularly if that reduction can be pinpoint to government actions.
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Our second research question pertains to voters using their local vote to punish or reward the
central government. The link between the perceived performance of the central government
and local voting behaviour can happen due to at least three reasons. First, voters can
see the party system as a selection mechanism for local candidates (Geys and Vermeir,
2014). Hence, if the party in power at the central level is performing well, local candidates
politically aligned with the central government can be perceived as more competent and
capable. Second, voters may expect to benefit from having a mayor with close relations with
the central power (Fiva and Halse, 2016). Finally, local elections can be seen as second order
elections. In this case, voting behaviour in such elections can be a channel to send a message
of approval/punishment to the central government (Marien et al., 2015).
We explore the effects of the information provided on the intention to vote for the Socialist
Party, the head of the government in power at the central level when the election occurred.
Overall, we find no evidence of average treatment effects, possibly due to treatment dilution
(Angrist, 2006). Unobserved characteristics, like prior exposure to external information,
may be associated with non-compliance or protocol deviations. As a result, the treatment
administered in our paper may be an intent-to-treat. We explore this avenue with a two-stage
least squares analysis as suggested by Angrist (2006). In the first stage, we instrument the
performance perception about the central government with the treatment dummies (which
corresponds to our first question) and then use the fitted values of this first equation to
estimate the impact on the voting behaviour towards the Socialist Party. We find that
an improvement in the perception about central government performance might increase
the likelihood of voting for the Socialist Party. The results however, are not robust to all
specifications.
This work contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the role of information
as an election outcome determinant has primarily focused on the impacts of performance
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information (economic voting). In a seminal paper, Kramer (1971) uses aggregate data
to evaluate whether national economic conditions (and the perceived performance of the
incumbent party) affect voting behaviour for the US House of Representatives. More re-
cently, James (2011) shows that published information influences performance perception
and satisfaction, particularly when partisan effects are present. In a more aggregate per-
spective, Taniguchi (2016) evaluates whether economic indicators can act as a determinant
of upper house elections in Japan, while Kappe (2018) uses UK data to evaluate reference-
point-dependent behaviour in economic voting. From a theoretical standpoint, Ashworth,
Bueno de Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2018) show that voter rationality can be reconciled
with the effects of exogenous shocks (outside of the control of politicians, like natural disas-
ters) affecting the probability of reelection of an incumbent. Economic voting in multilevel
governance is discussed by Anderson (2006), who shows that economic voting is weakest in
countries with stronger multilevel governance, particularly when assigning responsibility for
economic outcomes between government levels is difficult. In Portugal, Martins and Veiga
(2013) show that the performance of the national economy affects the success of candidates
in local municipal elections, particularly if they are from the same party of the incumbent
central government.
Additionally, our work relates to literature about media coverage impact and bias. Soroka
(2006), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) , Garz (2014), Eberl, Boomgaarden, and Wagner
(2017) and Haselmayer, Meyer, and Wagner (2017) evaluate empirically the media coverage
(in some cases, specifically negative news) and their impacts on election outcomes.
As we are looking for the feedback of central government performance perception on local
voting behaviour, our work is also close to others regarding second order elections. Clark and
Rohrschneider (2009) , Schakel and Jeffery (2013) evaluate the relationship between voting
behaviour in European elections and national developments and Marien et al. (2015) studies
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the relationship between voting in local and federal elections in Belgium.
Finally, as we implement the surveys in a period of electoral campaigning, our work is also
related with studies that evaluate messages conveyed during the campaigning period, either
about candidates’ valence or ideology. The first work about negative campaigning effects
was developed by Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994), where the authors show that negative
campaigning reduces voter turnout, in a survey experiment in California. More recently,
in a field experiment around the 2004 US presidential election, Arceneaux and Nickerson
(2010) show that personally delivered messages can influence voting preferences. Fridkin
and Kenney (2011) conclude that uncivil and relevant negative information affect voting
behaviour, based on published news and on a survey conducted during the US Senate election
of 2006. Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi (2015) performed a large scale experiment in an
Italian municipality, during the 2011 local elections, concluding that information treatments
(particularly about candidate valence) impact actual vote and individual vote declarations.
Finally, in a relatively new branch of literature that explores citizen heterogeneity and its
influence on campaigning effectiveness, Galasso and Nannicini (2016) conducted a survey
and a natural experiment in two municipal elections in Italy, finding that females react more
to positive information, while males to negative information.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. We start by providing some background
on the political organisation in Portugal. Then we describe in detail our experimental design
and discuss the main features of the data collected. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we present the
main results and we conclude in the following section. In appendix we provide samples of
our treatment information and other relevant details about the experimental design. Access
to the full set of surveys is available upon request.
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2.2 Experimental Design and Methodology
This section begins with a brief outline of the Portuguese institutional and political back-
ground. Next, we describe in detail our experimental design, the timeline of implementation
and the structure of the survey administration process, including a discussion about the
randomisation process. By the end of the section, we present the main methodology used to
analyse results.3
2.2.1 The Portuguese Institutional Background
The Portuguese territory is administratively organised in three layers. The first layer com-
prises the central government and two autonomous governments in the archipelagos of Azores
and Madeira. The second layer is constituted by 278 mainland municipalities and 30 mu-
nicipalities in the Autonomous Regions. Municipalities are then divided into a total of 3092
parishes. Local power is split between the municipal and the parish level, with the overall
goals of improving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting social and economic develop-
ment, managing territorial planning and providing local public goods.4 Local government
representatives are elected in all the municipalities and parishes simultaneously in a nation-
wide local election that occurs every four years. The municipal government is composed of
an executive branch – the Town Council – , and a legislative one – the Municipal Assembly.
Both are directly elected, with seats allocated proportionally using the d’Hondt method ac-
cording to the number of voters of each (closed) electoral list. The first ranked candidate of
the most voted list for the Town Council becomes the Mayor. Besides the directly elected
members, the Municipal Assembly also includes the presidents of the Parish Councils, which
3This experiment was registered at the American Economic Association, the information submitted can
be found at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2539.
4As defined by Law 159/99.
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are nominated based on the electoral results for the Parish Assemblies also directly elected
by voters.
Central legislative elections are held every four years, differing from local ones by a two-year
period. In exceptional circumstances, however, national elections may be anticipated by the
Portuguese President. Our experiment took place around the 2017 local election, whilst the
last legislative election had occurred in 2015. In this case, voters have had enough time to
build up a belief about the central government’s performance, as the central incumbent was
in the middle of its term when local elections were held. In 2015, the incumbent centre-right
coalition earned the highest vote share, but failed to secure a majority in the parliament,
leading the runner-up centre-left Socialist Party to form a government supported by its left-
wing counterparts in the parliament.5 The October 1st, 2017 local election was won by the
Socialist Party (PS), who managed to appoint 159 out of the 308 mayors, while the main
centre-right party appointed a total of 98 mayors.6
The Portuguese political party scene is dominated by 5 main parties, which are represented
in the Portuguese Parliament. Together, either running alone or heading a coalition in a
given municipality, these parties gathered 85,95% of all the votes for the Town Councils in
2017. This low fragmentation of the political market allows voters to more easily connect
central and local policy outcomes through the (mis)alignment of local and central government
elected officials, thus creating room for spillovers between central government performance
and local political outcomes.7
5The centre-right coalition, formed by two parties – the Social Democratic Party (PPD-PSD) and the
People’s Party (CDS) –, obtained 38,49%, while PS, the Left Bloc (BE) and the Portuguese Communist
Party (PCP) obtained 32,32%, 10,19% and 8,25%, respectively.
6PPD-PSD run in most of the 308 municipalities, either alone or in coalition with other smaller right
wing parties.
7Independent candidates running for local elections have gained increasing relevance across time, but
they still represent a relatively small overall share of mayor appointments. In 2001 independent candidates
gathered a total of 84 010 votes in Town Council elections, while in 2017 this figure amounts to 351 327 (6,79%
of all the votes). Even so, out of 82 independent candidates to the Town Council in the 308 municipalities,
only 17 managed to be elected as mayors.
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2.2.2 Experimental Setup
The purpose of our experiment is to test i) the impact of positive and negative news about
recent factual information on specific policy areas on subjects’ perception about central
government performance, and ii) the impact of this updated perceived performance on local
election voting behaviour. The latter hinges on the individuals using their local votes to
punish or reward the party in power at the central level. The underlying hypothesis is that
central government performance can be perceived as an “exogenous” determinant of local
voting behaviour. This may happen for several reasons. As in Geys and Vermeir (2014),
the party can be seen as a selection mechanism for local candidates. Thus, if the central
government is performing well the local candidates from the same party could be perceived
as more competent or reliable. It may also be that voters expect to draw benefits, like an
increase in central government transfers to the municipality, due to having a mayor that is
aligned with the central government (Fiva and Halse, 2016). Lastly, local elections may be
seen as second order elections (Marien et al., 2015). In this case, voters may use them as an
opportunity to send a message to the central government.
To this purpose, we design and implement a randomised field experiment at the time of the
2017 local election, between September 18th (baseline) and October 6th (post-election sur-
vey), using 1800 undergraduate and graduate (master-level) students in two Lisbon business
schools. Our experiment consists of randomly presenting eligible and non-eligible voters with
factual information about central government policies and performance in the week before
the 2017 local Portuguese elections. All surveys were administered in-class, to a total of 71
classes.
The experimental design encompassed three different survey rounds.8 The baseline survey
8The specific implementation calendar is detailed in Figure B.1, Appendix B.1.
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was implemented two weeks before the election and aimed to collect baseline data such as
sociodemographic context and political preferences, awareness and motivation. Respondents
were also asked about their planned voting behaviour in the local election taking place within
two weeks. The treatment round took place in the week before the election and it consisted
of randomly exposing participants to an information bundle about central government per-
formance. The follow-up survey was implemented in the week following the election, with
the purpose of collecting self-reported voting behaviour, not only in terms of participation,
but also the chosen party (for the voters who cast a vote).
As in Galasso and Nannicini (2016), the treatment is administered in the final of the two-week
official political campaign period, when politicians tend invest a greater effort in campaigning
through a number of political rallies, fact disclosing and advertising themselves in diverse
ways and platforms.9 Therefore, it is very likely that participants were exposed to other
external information. The exogenous treatment is thus a marginal shock whose intensity
may depend on political literacy or pre-existing perception about government performance.
It may happen that the information provided (intention-to-treat) is not new to participants
and therefore treatment has a diluted effect for some of them.
2.2.3 The News Treatment
We employ a between-subject design, in which each survey participant was exposed to ei-
ther positive, negative or neutral information about central government performance. We
denote these groups as positive or negative treatment, and control group, respectively. Each
respondent was presented with a pair of news articles about two different central government
9The official campaign period starts two weeks before the election date and ends two days prior to the
election, as defined by Law 1/2001 that regulates the electoral procedures for local government bodies.
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policy areas, adapted from mainstream national media outlets.10
The news articles were selected following four pre-defined guidelines. Firstly, they should be
as recent as possible. Secondly, central government policy areas with varying degrees of media
coverage should be selected. We use the following policy areas: public finance (debt and
investment), national health system, old-age pensions, education, youth employment, and
road safety. Thirdly, for the same area, positive- and negative-tone news should be available
from the same source and within a negligible time gap. That is, if a positive treatment
consists of two positive pieces of information about, say, public finances and pensions, then
there is a corresponding negative treatment with two negative pieces of information about
the same two policy areas, from the same media outlets. Finally, to the extent possible,
we aimed at diversifying media outlets to avoid asymmetric perception of different outlets
amongst voters to influence our results – we ended up with two newspapers and one radio
station.
We created six positive, six negative, and one neutral information bundle, i.e., a total of 13
different bundles of two news articles each, according to the following structure. The first
three information bundles use public finance, mixed with youth employment, road safety,
and pensions. The remaining three bundles mix the national health service with youth
employment, road safety, and education. The control group was administered two news
articles about a not endangered Portuguese dog breed, the Serra da Estrela, designed to
have a similar extension and format as the treatment ones. One should highlight that public
finance was attracting a very high level of media attention by the time of the experiment,
with the government claiming a substantial improvement in the country’s financial health.
By contrast, health policy received considerably lower media attention in the months before
10Surveys and information bundles are in Portuguese. News were slightly edited by eliminating less
important sentences for the sake of shortness, as a way to focus readers’ attention on the most important
messages.
Bruno Carvalho 77
the election. The remaining policy areas were chosen to cover both macroeconomic outcomes
(youth employment and pensions) and microeconomic policies (road safety and education),
to ensure that our results are not driven by the specific nature of the policies covered in the
news articles. A detailed description of all information bundles is provided in Appendix B.1,
Table B.2.
For each policy area, we were able to find a positive and negative-tone news article on the
field, with minimal time gap and from the same source. As an example, on the 6th of
September 2017, a national radio station (TSF) announced that the Ministry of Education
planned to hire 1.500 auxiliary teaching staff during the next school year. Two days later,
the same source reported that there were schools delaying the beginning of the school year
due to staff shortage. Another example is the National Health System (SNS, the Portuguese
abbreviation), where the positive news is about a higher budget allocation to the Health
Ministry, while the negative is about an increase in the outstanding debt to SNS suppliers.
Each information bundle appeared in the middle of the treatment survey, and included a
headline (in bold bigger font) and an abridged version of the selected news. The first article
included a graph created from actual data by the researchers to support the information
conveyed in the text. The graphs were built to be visually similar across the positive and
negative-tone news, despite the different information in the two. The second news article was
accompanied by an illustrative picture common to the positive and the negative-tone article.
An example of a positive and the corresponding negative information bundle is provided in
Appendix B.2. Given the high education level of our subjects, we are confident that they
were able to comprehend the written information content of the treatment.11
The design of the information bundles follows from a number of objectives. Firstly, combining
two news articles in each treatment bundle increases the possibility of the treatment being
11We do not intend to test the effectiveness of different delivering formats, but rather to test positive and
negative-tone information conveyed in a similar format.
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informative for respondents. Even if the respondent is aware of one of the articles, it is
less likely that she has had previous access to the two, particularly when combined with
the visual information.12 Secondly, relying on truthful and credible information allows us
to avoid the caveat in James (2011), who does not find evidence of negative bias in a set
of two lab experiments. As the author points out, the negative information made available
for respondents was not “real” and was instead created to mimic, in a comparable way, the
positive information conveyed. Thus, the absence of negativity bias may be associated with
the negative information provided contradicting the prior perception of the citizens. Thirdly,
due to the our 12 treatment versions, we can disentangle the impact of giving information
about a given policy area from that of the actual tone of the message. Lastly, the thirteen
different information bundles reduce the likelihood of contagion across different treatment
groups. This is an important concern, given that the surveys were administered in-class,
implying that control and treated subjects responded to the surveys side-by-side in the same
physical space.
2.2.4 Sampling and Randomisation
We implemented the experiment in two Lisbon business schools (NovaSBE and ISCAL).
At NovaSBE, each survey was implemented in a different round (one round a week, for a
period of 3 weeks), while at ISCAL logistic reasons related to the academic calendar forced
us to collapse the implementation into two rounds, with both baseline and treatment surveys
merged, and implemented the week preceding the election.
The surveys were filled in on paper, either at the beginning or the end of classes, under
the supervision of a member of the implementation team.13 Participation was voluntary and
12Our baseline survey included questions to ascertain respondents’ perception about central government
performance, which allows us to measure the immediate impact of the information.
13The implementation team was composed of the authors and some Ph.D. students who received specific
Bruno Carvalho 79
anonymous, and there were no monetary incentives for participants. Respondents were asked
to create a unique identifier at the beginning of the baseline survey, combining specific digits
of their birthdates and phone numbers, which they could easily replicate in the following
rounds.14 This ensures anonymity, while allowing the research team to link the three survey
rounds for each respondent. This information was clearly stated in the survey cover page and
was read by a member of the implementation team in the beginning of each implementation
round.
The main caveat of our approach is that it does not rely on a representative sample of
the population. This does not, however, threaten internal validity, as the treatments were
randomised. The advantage of relying on university students and implementing the surveys
in-class, however, is that the opportunity cost of response time is fairly low, which allowed
us to collect a fairly high amount of information. The total time to answer the three surveys
is around 30 minutes (NovaSBE sample) and 20 minutes (ISCAL sample). Our sample is
fairly diverse geographically and age-wise. It covers 170 out of the 308 municipalities, which
guarantees that our results are not driven by the political situation of the most represented
municipality, Lisbon. The minimum legal voting age in Portugal is eighteen. Given that the
bulk of our sample is constituted by undergraduate students, around 40% of our subjects
are first-time voters. Our data allows us to test whether these voters with little or no voting
experience are more susceptible to the information that they are given in the experiment.
The randomisation procedure was made at the individual level, and implemented as fol-
lows.15 We organised the surveys prior to implementation by creating blocks of six surveys
according to the following sequence: 1 control, 2 positive, 1 control and 2 negative treatments
training in order to adopt a standardised procedure in all classrooms. Additional details about the imple-
mentation process can be found in Appendix B.1, where Figure B.1 shows the timeline of the implementation
and Table B.1 summarises the type of information collected in each survey.
14In total, the identifying code allows for 365 000 possibilities.
15The alternative to randomise at the class level was discarded due to lack of variability and uneven class
sizes, which would make it difficult to have balanced treatment and control group sizes.
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(CPPCNN), where surveys with positive and negative treatments were randomly drawn from
the six positive and six negative available versions. These blocks were then distributed in
class on a row by row basis. Such a procedure aimed at ensuring adequate randomisation
(balancing) and minimising contagion between treatment groups as a result of positive and
negative surveys being answered side-by-side. This option comes at expense of potential
contagion from treatment to the control group, which we minimised by requesting the class
to keep silent during the surveys.
2.2.5 Identification and Outcome Variables
We divide our analysis into two separate parts, corresponding to the two research questions
identified in Subsection 2.2.2, i.e., we test i) whether the treatments change the subject’s
perception about central government performance, and ii) the extent to which the informa-
tion treatment changes the actual voting behaviour of the subjects – namely, turnout and
chosen party.
To evaluate the relevance of the information provided for the performance perception updat-
ing, we ask the subjects a set of questions about their subjective assessment of government
performance, both in general terms and in specific policy areas. Respondents are asked
about their opinion towards the general performance of the incumbent central government
both in the baseline and the treatment surveys; hence, we can compute the actual change in
perceived government performance induced by the treatment.16 This question, as shown in
Figure B.6 and Figure B.8 (Appendix B.3), required subjects to classify government perfor-
mance on a Likert-type scale ranging from “Very Unsatisfactory” to “Very Satisfactory”, not
allowing for neutral views.17
16Table 2.1, in appendix, shows the average ex-ante perception of performance of the central government
is very similar across the two treatment and the control groups.
17This scale was later converted to range from -1 (negative) to 1 (positive).
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The subjective assessment about performance in specific policy areas is also surveyed twice,
once before and once after treatment. In the first round, all subjects are asked about a
common set of policy areas under the jurisdiction of the central government in Portugal,
these include, but are not limited to, all those covered in the news articles of the information
treatment. The second round arises immediately after the news treatment and prompts
subjects to respond whether, and how much, the news articles changed their perception
about central government action in the specific policy area it covers.18 The possible responses
in the second round were ’Yes, improved a lot’, ’Yes, improved’, ’Did not change’, ’Yes,
worsened’ and ’Yes, worsened a lot’. Figure B.7 shows how the question was presented to
the respondents who read the article about road safety. Moreover, we ask about the impact
of the information on the perception of the performance of the Socialist Party. This second
question allows us to explore up to what extent the opinions about the central government
are tied to the performance perception of the party has a whole, which could help disentangle
the mechanism through which this information affects local voting behaviour
The main outcome variables in this first step are the general and policy-specific government
perception. Therefore, the baseline equation we estimate is as follows:
perf_measurei = α + β1POSi + β2NEGi + γXi + εi (2.1)
where perf_measurei is the measure of performance reported by subject i, POSi (resp.,
NEGi) is an indicator of the treatment received by subject i, and Xi is a vector of control
variables, including socio-demographic and political variables. Standard errors are clustered
at the class level.
In the second part, our aim is to test the extent to which the information treatment changes
18More specifically, the NovaSBE classes were asked in the baseline survey and the treatment one, after
the news articles, whereas the ISCAL classes were asked in the same first survey, before and after the news
article.
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actual voting behaviour of the subjects – namely, turnout and chosen party, or more generally
interest in the election. For that, we rely on the self-reported retrospective voting behaviour
reported by the subjects in the follow-up survey (which took place from the 2nd to the 10th
day after the election, depending on the classes).
Because of unobserved characteristics (e.g., prior exposure to external information) or the
time devoted to actually reading the bundle of news articles, there may be problems of
non-compliance or protocol deviations. For this reason, the news treatment administered
is best seen as an intent-to-treat. As explained in Angrist (2006), regressing the outcome
variable (as casting a vote for the Socialist Party, or the decision to turnout) directly on
treatment assignment will provide conservative estimates because of the so-called treatment
dilution problem. The solution is to use treatment assignment as an instrument for the actual
treatment – in our case, the modified perception of government performance –, and then
estimating the impact of the instrumented perception on the outcome variables. In this set
up, the first part of our analysis coincides with the first stage regression in the instrumental
variables approach used to identify the causal impact of the treatment on voting behaviour.
Therefore, our first stage estimation is given by (2.1), and in the second stage we implement
the following specification:
yi = α + βperf_measurei
∧
+ γXi + ηi (2.2)
where yi is the outcome variable of interest, i.e., whether or not one voted, or for whom.
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2.3 Data
Our data consists of around 4800 individual survey responses in the three survey rounds.
Since the link between the rounds relies on an anonymised identifier built by each respondent,
it is prone to error. Discarding the individuals for whom we do not have answers for the
three rounds, we end up with a total sample of 1 800 students – 478 from NovaSBE, and
the remaining from ISCAL. In each round, we implemented surveys in 71 classrooms, with
a number of attendees ranging from 15 to 150. In table B.4, we present the main descriptive
statistics.19
Most of the sample is composed of bachelor students, with an average age of 21.3 years.
Although age ranges from 16 to 54 years, the distribution is skewed to the right, with a
non-negligible percentage of non-eligible voters (5%), and even more first-time voters, as
around 47% were not in legal age to vote in the previous election of 2016.20 This feature
enables us to test the impact of information provision on inexperienced voters.
Around 60% of the sample is female and 29% of the students do not live in their original
family residence. On average, household size is 3.6 elements, the equivalent household income
per capita is around 1350 euros, and 70% of the students do not contribute financially to
the household income. In terms of religion, the majority is Catholic (55%), while 37%
have no religion. Respondents were also asked about parents’ job and schooling status,
with 16% mentioning that at least one of the parents is currently unemployed. Roughly
half of the sample has at least one parent who attained higher education, and 27% have
at least one parent who is a civil servant. Naturally, most of the subjects are from the
Lisbon agglomeration, although 170 (out of 308) Portuguese municipalities are represented.
19A more complete set of descriptive statistics of all the information collected is available upon request.
20In the beginning of 2016 there was a presidential election. The President of the Republic is elected
directly in a runoff election.
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A spatial representation of municipalities of origin is mapped in Figure B.9.
We collected information about respondents’ political knowledge, interest, experience, and
preferences, shown in panels B, C and D of Table B.4. Party affiliation is reported by 6% of
the respondents, while 26% report a low understanding of politics. We depict the distribution
of respondents along the political spectrum for each of the schools in Figure B.10.21 Overall,
30.7% of the respondents identify as left or centre-left, 19% chose centre and 48.3% identify
as right or centre-right. Less than 2% report far-right or far-left ideologies. Most respondents
are aware that the local election is approaching, and 77% state in the baseline survey that
they are willing to vote. We collected voting intentions for the ones who intend to vote
(’Which candidate do you plan to vote for?’), but also for the remaining ones (’In case you
would vote, which candidate would you vote for with the highest probability?’).22 Pooling
the answers from these two groups, 23% do not know for whom they plan to (or would) vote
and another 23% plan to (or would) vote PS (the central government incumbent). The most
common reason for not voting was distance from the voting booth (36%). Panel F presents
descriptive statistics of the main reasons driving the choice for both voters and non-voters.
Panel E shows the performance perceptions. We start by presenting the descriptive statistics
of baseline perception on general government performance. On a scale from -1 (negative)
to 1 (positive), the average is 0.15 (statistically different from zero at 1% confidence level),
reflecting the high government popularity at the time. As regards perception about specific
areas, economy and public finance perform quite well, and so does culture. Agriculture,
forests and sea, together with health are rated negatively.23
21We asked respondents to self-locate on a left-right scale. We opted to focus on this more standard
classification and not ask about the socially conservative/liberal axis, given the over-representation of unex-
perienced voters.
22In both cases, respondents could choose a “Prefer not to answer” option.
23The negative result on agriculture, forests and sea is not surprising given the forest fires in 2017, which
spread due to a severe drought but also ineffective fire-fighting systems. They lead to 109 deaths and a
four-fold increase in the burnt surface, relative to the previous 10-year average.
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In order to grasp which government areas drive the general baseline perception, we regress
the latter on the area-specific ones. The results presented in Table B.5 show that the econ-
omy and public finance are the most relevant ones. This is true also when we consider the
subsample of ISCAL respondents (column 2), with a higher percentage of left-wing subjects.
In columns 3 and 4, we split the estimation by voters that in 2015 (last parliamentary elec-
tions) voted for the socialists or the opposition parties (PSD and CDS), and again economy
and public finance are the most important policy areas. The opinion about government
intervention in labor and social security also seems to drive the general performance per-
ception. Economic salience has been widely explored in the literature. Lewis-beck and
Stegmaier (2000) argue, based on a survey of the literature, that voters generally weigh eco-
nomic issues heavily than other issues when deciding on whom to vote. More recently, Singer
(2011a,b) discusses how economic salience fluctuates, particularly during financial crisis. It
is not surprising that after the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis, respondents’ opinion about
the central government performance is mostly driven by the performance in economic-related
areas.
To ascertain whether voting in local elections could be driven by central government per-
formance, we asked respondents whether they would use the vote in local elections to send
a message to the government, one-third of the sample say they would, and amongst those,
42% would send a positive message. The responses to these questions remains fairly stable
when the question is repeated after the treatment.
In the follow-up survey, 64% of the respondents state that they voted, and 33% voted or
would have voted for PS. Official figures set the national turnout to 55%, which is below
the self-reported turnout by the respondents’. This is consistent with self-reporting bias in
post-election surveys, due to misreporting of non-voters (Selb and Munzert, 2013). The gap
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in our survey is smaller than the average difference identified in Selb and Munzert (2013).24
Still according to official figures, 38% of the voters voted for the Socialist Party in the 2017
election.
We next present a set of balance tests, as an ex-post test to the validity of the randomisation
protocol. In Table B.3, Appendix B.1, we show the distribution of responses by survey
type. As expected given our CPPCNN randomisation procedure, each of the three groups
corresponds to around one third of the sample. The distribution by survey type is also close
to uniform. In Table 2.1, we present averages for a set of baseline variables by treatment
group, which are not statistically different across the three groups (positive and negative
treatments, and control group).
Table 2.1: Balance tests.
Group Female ISCAL Age Displaced HH income Gov. perf. perc.
T. Pos 0.59 0.73 21.0 0.29 2530.4 0.16
T. Neg 0.60 0.74 21.7 0.29 2546.9 0.15
Control 0.57 0.74 21.2 0.29 2479.6 0.15
Pos./Neg. (p-value) 0.871 0.927 0.057 0.829 0.926 0.887
Treat./Contr. (p-value) 0.344 0.959 0.646 0.979 0.704 0.772
Notes: The last two rows present the p-value of t-test for mean equality. The “Pos./Neg.” tests equality in means
between positive and negative treatment, while the “Treat./Contr.” tests the difference between treatment and
control groups.
2.4 Change in Perceived Government Performance
This section presents the results on the immediate effect of the information treatment on
government performance perception, both in general and in specific areas, relative to the
baseline perception.
24The authors compare survey turnout rates in 130 elections (covering 43 countries) with the actual
turnout rates and find an the average discrepancy of 13%, with a maximum of 42%.
Bruno Carvalho 87
Table 2.2 presents information about the impact of the treatment. It shows the perception
update in the policy area covered by each news article, both regarding the government –
columns 1 and 3 – and the party in charge (PS) – columns 2 and 4.25 On average, the
news were perceived as expected since the positive (negative) treatment affects positively
(negatively) the performance perception. Interestingly, correlations between the government
and perception about the Socialist party are strong (0.65 for article 1, and 0.78 for article
2).
Table 2.2: Averages of government and PS performance perception by treatment group
Article 1 Article 2 Both articles
perf. Gov. perf. PS perf. Gov. perf. PS gen. perf. Gov. ∆ gen. perf. Gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive treatment 0.169 0.114 0.221 0.180 0.210 0.059***
Negative treatment -.009 -.0384 -0.084 -0.084 0.076 -0.081***
Control group - - - - 0.182 0.026*
Notes: Performance Gov. and performance PS are post-treatment are 5-level scales coded between -1 and 1 that measure of
performance perception in the policy areas covered in the treatment areas. General government performance is a 4-level scale,
coded between -1 and 1, to measure aggregate government performance perception after treatment. Significance levels:* p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 5 displays the average general government perception after the treatment, i.e. the
answer to the question shown in Figure B.8, in Appendix B.3. This highlights that post-
treatment, all groups have, on average, a positive perception about the general performance
of the central government. Even so, the perception is clearly better for the respondents
that received the positive information (0.2, versus 0.08 for the ones that received negative
information).
However, what we want to evaluate is whether the perception changed. Column 6, shows
25That is, the average (by treatment group) of the answers to the questions show in Figure B.7, in
Appendix B.3.
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the average change in the general perception about central government performance from
the baseline to the performance perception after-treatment.26 On average, respondents that
received the positive (negative) treatment improved (worsened) their perception about cen-
tral government performance, with the negative impact being slightly larger in terms of
magnitude.
Table 2.3 presents the main estimates of equation (2.1), for the case where the outcome
variable is the perception of government performance in the specific policy areas that were
included in the treatment.27 Irrespective of the controls included, positive and negative
treatment had the expected effects. In all cases, the positive (negative) treatment improved
(worsened) the perception about government performance in the specific policy areas about
which information was shown. These results are in line with the ones discussed in Table 2.2.
26The change is computed based on the differences in the answers to the question shown in Figure B.6
and the question shown in Figure B.8.
27In Appendix B.5, in Table B.6, we provide the complete version of Table 2.3, where the coefficients of
our controls are shown.
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Table 2.3: Impact of treatment on Specific Government Performance
Post-Treatment Specific Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.129***
(11.16) (10.92) (8.96) (8.30) (8.27) (9.01) (9.07)
T. NEG -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.123***
(-9.29) (-8.76) (-7.95) (-8.31) (-8.45) (-7.67) (-7.64)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(4.75) (4.68) (4.56) (3.77) (3.73) (3.80)
PS spectum -0.010
(-0.64)
Support spectrum 0.019
(1.55)
Intent vote PS 0.026*
(1.68)
Intent vote support 0.026*
(1.98)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1737 1711 1508 1132 1132 1145 1145
Adj. R Sq. 0.152 0.164 0.160 0.178 0.179 0.190 0.190
F-stat. 182.104 138.063 42.500 29.053 29.795 36.705 35.079
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception associated to the policy areas covered in treatment,
a 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG. and T.POS. are dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents were
subject to negative/positive treatment. Plans to vote PS is a dummy variable equal to one when respondent reports an
intention to vote for the Socialist Party, before the election. Baseline government performance perception is 5-level scale
coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls include
socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.4 presents the estimates of equation (2.1) for our main performance measure of
interest.28 That is, the post-treatment general perception of central government performance.
28Again, the complete version of Table 2.4 is provided in Appendix B.5 (Table B.7).
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Table 2.4: Impact of treatment on general government performance
Post-Treatment General Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.028 0.033** 0.031** 0.017 0.018 0.035* 0.036*
(1.53) (2.17) (2.00) (0.90) (1.01) (1.88) (1.92)
T. NEG. -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(-4.30) (-5.59) (-5.45) (-5.45) (-5.61) (-4.84) (-4.78)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.668*** 0.662*** 0.676*** 0.649*** 0.658*** 0.658***
(28.87) (26.75) (22.50) (20.82) (25.20) (25.16)
Centre 0.026
(1.19)
Left + Centre 0.079***
(4.42)
Intent Vote PS 0.061***
(3.54)
Intent Vote support 0.058***
(3.66)
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1731 1708 1513 1145 1145 1153 1153
Adj. R Sq. 0.020 0.485 0.488 0.524 0.532 0.525 0.525
F-stat. 16.786 367.202 126.584 144.385 153.743 104.678 103.975
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception, a 4-level scale coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG.
and T.POS. are dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents were subject to negative/positive treatment. Plans to
vote PS is a dummy variable equal to one when respondent reports an intention to vote for the Socialist Party, before the
election. Baseline government performance perception is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered
at class level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest
in politics. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 1 reports results for perceived (general) government perception, without any con-
trols. In the second column, the baseline government performance is added, while column
3 adds further controls for socio-demographic and political characteristics. Columns 4–7
add alternative controls for the respondent’s political preferences. “Centre” is an indicator
of whether respondent’s ideology is situated at the centre of the political spectrum. “Left
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+ Centre” is an indicator of whether the respondent identifies with centre or left-of-centre
ideologies (the ones of the parliament coalition that supports the government). We also
include indicators for whether respondents declared in the baseline survey that they plan to
vote for PS or the left-wing parties in the parliamentary coalition. Not surprisingly, three
out of these four variables are positive and significant at 1% confidence level, showing that
not only PS voters but also respondents aligned with supporting parties present a higher
propensity to rate the government more positively. Interestingly, introducing ideological or
voting intentions as controls does not change the effect (neither the explanatory power, nor
the coefficient) of the baseline government performance perception (third row of the table)
in our outcome variable, which shows that the assessment of the government performance is
not driven only by ideological positioning.
Overall, the coefficient of the positive treatment is positive, small and only significant in
some specifications. This contrasts with the negative treatment. In the latter, the effect is
significant throughout all specifications. The impact of the negative treatment is sizeable:
it is equal to one-fourth of the standard deviation of the general government perception.
These results suggest that there is evidence of negativity bias in our sample (James and
John, 2007), as negative news have a more pronounced effect than positive news.
The negativity bias could potentially be driven by a previous negative opinion about the
government in the specific policy area. We show in Table 2.5, that this is not the case by
interacting an indicator variable of a previous negative opinion on the negative treatment,
which turns out to be non significant. We also assess the role of prior interest in the policy
area covered by each news article. In both these specifications the control group is ignored,
as the information provided is not related with any specific policy area; therefore, we are
directly comparing the positive (omitted) and negative treatment.
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Table 2.5: Impact of each article on specific government performance
Specific Gov. Perf.
Article 1 Article 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. NEG. -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.212*** -0.295*** -0.294*** -0.394***
(-7.98) (-7.77) (-3.92) (-15.42) (-12.89) (-9.17)
Negative opinion -0.088*** -0.051
(-2.84) (-1.16)
T. NEG. x Negative opinion 0.023 -0.009
(0.55) (-0.15)
High interest 0.012 -0.041
(0.33) (-0.84)
T. NEG x High interest -0.001 0.225***
(-0.03) (4.74)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.115*** 0.091*** 0.110** 0.045** 0.036 0.070*
(5.01) (3.95) (3.07) (2.17) (1.44) (2.30)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1004 972 275 995 969 274
Adj. R Sq. 0.095 0.104 0.120 0.185 0.190 0.202
F-stat. 12.759 11.669 . 24.491 23.825 -
p-value 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 -
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception associated to the policy areas covered in treat-
ment, a 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG. is a dummy variable equal to 1 whenever respondents were subject
to negative/positive treatment. Negative opinion and High interest are dummy variables equal to 1 when respondent
reports a negative performance perception (or a high interest) on the policy area of the treatment he received. Baseline
government performance perception is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level,
t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics.
Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Columns 1 and 4 confirm the negativity bias obtained in Table 2.4. In columns 2 and 5,
the treatment is interacted with a variable for whether subjects reported a baseline negative
opinion about government performance in the specific policy area, while in columns 3 and
6 the treatment is interacted with an indicator of high self-reported interest in that policy
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area.29 We do not find any support for the hypothesis that a negative baseline opinion makes
participants update perception differently when exposed to negative information. However,
there is some evidence that participants with a greater interest in a specific policy area react
less negatively to the negative treatment. This may be due to these individuals’ stock of
information on the topic, which can decrease the impact of the provided information.
Besides the prior opinion/interest in a given policy area reported, there are other socio-
demographic characteristics that may affect the awareness of respondents to the areas about
which information is provided. One of them, is the profession of the parents. For instance,
respondents whose parents are teachers are likely more informed about the educational land-
scape in Portugal than others, and therefore may react differently to information about gov-
ernment performance in educational matters. In unreported descriptive statistics, around
45% of the respondents report political discussions within family and with close friends as
one of the most important sources of political information, only surpassed by outdoor adver-
tising and media (TV, radio, newspapers). In fact, only 12% of respondents state they never
participate in conversations about politics with their relatives. Also, 40% of the sample state
that their position in the political spectrum results from family and friends’ environment.
We test this hypothesis in Table 2.6, using whether at least one of the parents has one
of these occupations – teachers, physicians, retired –, combined with the news articles on
education, health, and pensions, respectively.30
29The question about interest in each area was just collected at NovaSBE.
30The remaining policy areas covered in the treatments – public finance, youth employment or road safety
– do not have professions directly linked to them.
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Table 2.6: Impact of each article on specific government performance, by parents’ job and
job status
Specific Gov. Perf.
Teacher Doctor Retired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T. NEG -0.353*** -0.315*** -0.375*** -0.344*** -0.068 -0.056
(-6.73) (-6.02) (-12.04) (-10.50) (-1.34) (-0.97)
T. NEG x JOB 0.299*** 0.284** 0.020 -0.063 -0.065 -0.023
(2.69) (2.33) (0.20) (-0.50) (-0.64) (-0.19)
JOB -0.116 -0.121 0.129 0.149 0.090 0.047
(-1.48) (-1.45) (1.35) (1.36) (0.84) (0.53)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.175*** 0.121** 0.079** 0.048 0.085 0.061
(3.10) (2.04) (2.47) (1.47) (1.39) (0.88)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 127 114 394 360 191 169
Adj. R Sq. 0.263 0.175 0.249 0.227 0.009 0.012
F-stat. 15.822 6.069 51.789 12.181 1.365 1.635
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.256 0.082
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception associated to the policy areas cov-
ered in treatment, a 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG. is a dummy variable equal to 1 whenever
respondents were subject to negative/positive treatment. Job is a dummy variable equal to 1 when respon-
dent reports having a parent that is a teacher, a doctor or retired. Baseline government performance
perception is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics
reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in poli-
tics. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
We find that having at least one teacher as parent leads subjects to react less negatively
to the negative treatment involving education.31 By contrast, we do not find a statistically
significant effect of having at least one parent as a doctor or a retired parent.
31Including more education- and health-related jobs, such as school staff or nurses does not alter the
results.
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2.5 Impact of Updated Government Perception on Vot-
ing Behaviour
The previous section provides convincing evidence that the information treatment has an
effect both on the perception about the incumbent central government and the incumbent
(Socialist) party in charge. We now tackle the second research question, i.e., the extent to
which this exogenously-induced updated perception translates into different voting outcomes
at local level.
Our main variable of interest is the likelihood to vote for the Socialist party in the local elec-
tion. We start by presenting the reduced form OLS regression of the following specification:
V ote_for_PSi = β1POSi + β2NEGi + γXi + ηi
Regressions presented in Table 2.7 control for baseline government performance and initial
intention to vote for PS (reported before the election). The second column adds the set of
socio-demographic and political controls used in the previous regressions.
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Table 2.7: OLS regression of voting for PS on treatment groups
Vote for PS (OLS)
(1) (2)
T. NEG -0.023 -0.016
(-0.90) (-0.57)
T. POS. 0.003 0.010
(0.11) (0.37)
Intent to vote for PS (gov. party) 0.603*** 0.599***
(17.21) (15.84)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.165*** 0.164***
(6.40) (5.77)
Controls No Yes
Obs. 1189 1085
Adj. R Sq. 0.279 0.265
F-stat. 187.714 67.016
p-value 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is dummy variable equal to one when
respondent reports having voted (or having the intention to) for the
Socialist Party in the election. Intent to vote PS is defined analo-
gously, but refers to voting intentions before the election. T.NEG.
and T.POS. are dummy variables. Baseline government percep-
tion is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are
clustered at class level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. All
regressions include municipal fixed effects. Controls include socio-
demographic and measures of engagement in politics. Significance
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Regressions in Table 2.7, as well as all others in this section, include municipal fixed effects.
We include them because when assessing the likelihood of voting for the Socialist Party, one
should consider the particularities of the electoral competition in each of the municipalities
covered by our sample. These are not associated to treatment or necessarily covered by our
controls. The voting outcome – whether or not the subject voted for the Socialist Party – is
regressed directly on the treatment variables and there is evidence of no average treatment
effect. As expected, there is a positive and very strong correlation between the intent to vote
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for the Socialist Party and the actual self-reported vote after the election.
The lack of effect of the treatment in the outcome variable can be due to two reasons. First,
it may be that voters do not benefit/penalise local candidates based on their perception
about the central government performance. This could provide evidence that local elections
are not second order elections, as argued by Marien et al. (2015), whose main conclusion is
that “local candidates contribute strongly to the salience of electoral decisions on the local
level". On the other hand, this could also be associated with the treatment dilution problem
discussed in Subsection 2.2.5.
To assess the treatment dilution problem, we proceed to the instrumental variables approach,
where the updated perception on central government performance is instrumented with the
treatment. In this way, we isolate the impact of an exogenous treatment-induced change in
government performance perception on the probability of voting for PS. Results are presented
in Table 2.8, where after-treatment general government performance is instrumented with
two sets of instruments, following the specification shown in equation (2.2).
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Table 2.8: Second stage regression (2SLS) of voting for PS on treatment-induced exogenous
general government performance
Vote for PS (2SLS)
IV: T. Pos. & T. Neg. IV: Survey Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
General gov. performance 0.223 0.203 0.293** 0.312*
(1.29) (1.02) (1.87) (1.92)
Intent to vote for PS 0.589*** 0.589*** 0.565*** 0.564***
(16.02) (15.22) (15.87) (14.93)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.015 0.036 -0.033 -0.030
(0.13) (0.27) (-0.32) (-0.28)
Participant Controls No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1166 1051 1166 1166
Cent. R Sq. 0.3734 0.3841 0.3659 1051
F-stat 229.22 65.54 220.13 60.58
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is dummy variable equal to one when respondent reports hav-
ing voted (or having the intention to) for the Socialist Party in the election. Intent to vote
PS is defined analogously, but refers to voting intentions before the election. General gov-
ernment performance and Baseline government performance are 4-level and 5 level scales,
respectively, coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics
reported in parenthesis. All regressions include municipal fixed effects. Controls include
socio-demographic and measures of engagement in politics. Significance levels: * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In the first case, we instrument with the two treatment-group dummy variables. Second,
we instrument with which of the 12 questionnaire indicator variables. All specifications
control for baseline government performance perception, implying that we focus on a change
in perception due to treatment. Throughout the columns, we observe that an increase in
treatment-induced general government performance leads to a higher probability of voting
for PS. The point estimates range from 0.293 to 0.312, which means that a one-standard
deviation increase in government performance perception increases the likelihood of voting
PS by about 11 to 12 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant only when
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we use all the survey dummies as excluded instruments; bundling the negative and positive
treatments does not provide significant estimates, even if the coefficients have the expected
sign. These results provide some support to the idea that the perception about the central
government can affect voting behaviour in local elections.
2.6 Conclusion
In this work we implemented a randomised experiment on students of two business schools
with a twofold goal. First, measuring the impact of positive and negative information in
shaping performance perceptions and, second, assessing whether the perception of perfor-
mance about the central government action can affect local voting behaviour.
Our experiment took place around the 2017 local election and our treatment consisted of a
bundle of positive or negative information. Each bundle included two news articles and two
visual aids (a graph and a picture) on a specific policy area. In total, we created 12 different
questionnaires that cover diverse policy areas such as public finance and road safety. With
this design we aim at contributing to the literature on the effects of positive and negative
information, specifically in two ways. First, we convey factual information, from respected
media outlets in Portugal, in two different tones. This means that, contrary to other studies
where the message in at least one of the tones is fictional, we provide a factual information
treatment to all subjects. When this is not the case, subjects’ reactions may be influenced
by prior knowledge that the information provided is not factual. Additionally, the diversity
in terms of policy areas included, unprecedented in previous studies, allows us to assess
specifically the tone of the message, instead of specific effects associated with particular
topics.
In terms of performance perception updating, our first research question, results provide
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clear and robust evidence of negativity bias. Although both positive and negative informa-
tion affects the students’ perception in specific policy areas, only the negative information
sticks and leads to a decline in the general perception about the central government perfor-
mance. Using the comprehensive dataset we gathered, we investigate these findings further,
to identify potential drivers. We show that our finding is not driven by respondents’ already
having a negative opinion on the subject of the news presented. However, having a greater
interest in the field seems to reduce the reaction to negative information.
The second question we explore is related with the interplay of different government layers in
electoral outcomes. The literature about second order elections, mainly focused on European
elections, shows that voting behaviour is sometimes driven by factors that are not related to
the respective government layer. Moreover, voters may see the party system as a selection
mechanism for local candidates and thus information about the performance of the central
government can benefit candidates from the same party at the local level.
In principle, this link would mean that a better performance perception about the central
government could have positive effects on the local voting behaviour for the parties heading
or supporting the central government. Our findings show that there is no average treatment
effect, meaning that the information provided (although affecting the perception about cen-
tral government performance) does not affect local voting behaviour. These results can be
interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, they could mean that when voting for lo-
cal elections, voters do not rely extensively on their perception about the central government
performance. On the other hand, they could be the result of a treatment dilution problem.
We investigate the treatment dilution issue further and find some evidence of spillovers
using an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we instrument the ex-post general
government performance measure with our treatment dummies. The fitted values of this
regression are then used to assess the impact of the treatment on voting intentions. In
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this context, we find some evidence that an increase in the performance perception leads
to an increase in the likelihood to vote for the Socialist Party, i.e., the central government
incumbent.
Overall, our results indicate that information provision affects the perception about politi-
cians, particularly for negative information. These findings can be particularly relevant in
the context of the effects of fake news and negative advertising. An interesting avenue for
future research would be to explore further the impact of negative versus positive informa-
tion in multilevel governance systems, particularly testing connections between intermediate
and local levels of governance. For instance, the impact of information about federal/state
government on voting behaviour at the municipal level.
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Chapter 3
Finding Local Fiscal Multipliers: Do Lo-
cal Elections matter?1
3.1 Introduction
In 2009, Barack Obama launched a $787 billion stimulus package to boost recovery after
the 2008 crisis. The stimulus amounted to 4% of the US GDP and was one of the largest
ever implemented in the US (the New Deal stimulus, for instance, amounted to 1.5% of
GDP), increasing the resources available for investment from central to local level. In a
speech, in 2008, he stated “We’ve got shovel-ready projects all across the country. And
governors and mayors are pleading to fund it. The minute we can get those investments to
the state level, jobs are going to be created”.2 In sharp contrast, the 2010 sovereign debt crisis
induced a broad wave of pro-cyclical policies across Europe. Facing slower economic growth
(or even recession), several countries implemented sizeable austerity packages, arguing that
spending stimulus could not overlook financial stability. Germany, the biggest economy of
the Eurozone, announced in 2010 an austerity package including spending cuts, tax increases
and a reduction of public employment expected to generate cumulated savings of around $95
1This chapter was written in co-authorship with Francesco Franco and Susana Peralta.
2The big promise, The Economist, August 2012.
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billion by 2014. These two strategies rely on two diametrically opposing views on the impact
of public spending on the economy, and have triggered renewed interest in the accurate
estimation of the impact of public spending on the economy.
Fiscal multipliers measure the effect of a given fiscal variable (e.g., expenditure) on an out-
come of interest (e.g., output). Traditionally, the literature has focused on fiscal multipliers
at an aggregate level (for individual countries or a panel of countries), with varying results
depending on the countries, the time span, the policy and outcome variables and, partic-
ularly, the methodology used (Ramey, 2011, 2019). The recent literature has showed that
multipliers depend on the economic context, i.e., they are state dependent. Revenue and
expenditure multipliers are not the same when the economy is in expansion or recession, or
when monetary policy is near the zero lower bound or even when government spending is
increasing or decreasing.3
The key challenge in the estimation of fiscal multipliers is reverse causality, since expenditure
can cause changes in output, which itself has an impact on spending. Credible estimation
relies on finding discretionary policy decisions that are unrelated to output. Since this proves
a difficult task when dealing with a panel of countries, a recent branch of the literature takes
advantage of the quality and availability of local level data to estimate fiscal multipliers.4
Acconcia et al. (2014), for instance, capture spending cuts arising from dismissal of public
authorities due to suspicions of Mafia infiltration in city councils to compute fiscal multipliers
for 95 Italian provinces. Serrato and Wingender (2016) use shocks in population estimates
to compute fiscal multipliers to 3000 US counties.5 Both papers use a strategy similar
3The study of state-dependent multipliers was pioneered by Barro and Redlick (2011) and Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012) that studied the sensitivity of multipliers to periods of economic expansion and
recessions and by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) that first evaluated the interplay between the
monetary policy stance and the fiscal multipliers.
4Although national and subnational multipliers are not directly comparable, as it has been discussed in
the literature (Chodorow-Reich, 2018, Ramey, 2011).
5Guo, Liu, and Ma (2016) use earmarked transfers to National Poor Counties in China to compute local
spending multipliers for 1800 Chinese counties.
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to the narrative approach to find an instrumental variable to identify spending shocks.6
Brückner and Tuladhar (2014) addresses the simultaneity concerns using a system-GMM,
where government expenditure is treated as an endogenous regressor and instrumented with
lagged expenditure, to estimate the state-dependent impact of local spending of Japanese
prefectures.
Other relevant empirical studies in local fiscal multipliers using US data (for county, region or
state levels), include Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, and Wooston (2012), Clemens and
Miran (2012), Wilson (2012), Shoag (2013), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Dube, Kaplan,
and Zipperer (2014), Dupor (2015), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2015) Adelino, Cunha,
and Ferreira (2017), Dupor and Guerrero (2017) and Dupor and McCrory (2018). Outside
the US, Buchheim and Watzinger (2017) performed a county-level study for Germany, while
Corbi, Papaioannou, and Surico (2017) evaluated effects economic effects of federal transfers
to Brazilian municipalities. A comprehensive overview of the literature and a discussion
about the relationship between local and national fiscal multipliers is provided by Chodorow-
Reich (2018).
In this paper, we use local elections to capture discretionary spending increases and com-
pute their effect on local output in Portuguese municipalities. Levitt (1997) uses a similar
instrument to identify the impact of police on crime, taking advantage of the fact that the
size of the police force increases disproportionally in mayoral and gubernatorial election
years. The validity of our instrument relies on an extensive literature on political business
cycles. Coelho et al. (2006) and Veiga and Veiga (2007) show that there is evidence of local
political business cycles in Portugal. Fiva and Natvik (2013) provides an empirical applica-
tion for Norwegian municipalities, and Drazen and Eslava (2010), for Colombian ones. Our
instrumental variable approach has two main advantages: i) it is easy to understand and
6The narrative approach was pioneered by Romer and Romer (2010) and it is frequently used (and widely
discussed, e.g. Hebous and Zimmermann (2018)) in the estimation of macroeconomic fiscal policy effects.
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implement; ii) it is easier to replicate for other countries, because it is less context-specific
than the approaches used so far. In fact, replicating our strategy in other countries could
provide important insight from a comparative perspective. We also contribute to the litera-
ture on state-dependent local fiscal multipliers, by analysing the influence of the size of the
municipality and the political cycle on the fiscal transmission mechanism.
To compute the multipliers of local spending in Portuguese municipalities we gather a com-
prehensive database of local spending and local output measures. Information about ex-
penditure and revenues of 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities is continuously available
between 1986 and 2014. We focus on the effects of fiscal expenditure manipulation, partic-
ularly in infrastructure investment and current expenditure.7 Our main outcome variable is
the total private wage bill of full-time employees in the municipality. We further decompose
the wage bill into a price component (the mean wage) and a quantity component (the num-
ber of workers in the municipality). Our goal is to assess what drives the effects on the wage
bill, which is key for an adequate understanding of possible policy implications.
The main results are as follows. We show that local spending spikes lead to a positive change
in the local wage bill. Increasing spending per capita by 1% leads to a boost between 0.09
and 0.14% of the contemporaneous wage bill. The effect is driven by local employment,
which increases between 1.5 and 1.7%, on average, in response to investment and current
expenditure, respectively. We also show that this effect is influenced by contextual factors.
Multipliers are substantially higher in bigger municipalities and lower in municipalities where
the mayor has been in power for more than 3 terms.8
7Investment expenditure is the most significant component of capital expenditure and includes expenses
on land acquisition, housing, other buildings and constructions - road works, public space maintenance,
waste treatment, etc. Current expenditure is mainly comprised of local public sector payroll and purchases
of current goods and services.
8We focus specifically on 3 terms because that is the maximum number of terms allowed under the
term limit law currently in place. Term limits for local government bodies were implemented in 2005 (Law
46/2005) and they were binding for the first time in 2013.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present a brief
discussion about the institutional framework in Portugal. Section 3.3 shows the main features
of our data and Section 3.4 describes our empirical model and the identification strategy. We
then present our main results. Section 3.6 discusses state-dependent local fiscal multipliers.
The last section concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Local Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy in Portugal is defined both at the central and local levels.9 The local admin-
istration is split between the municipality and the parish levels. The mainland territory is
divided in 278 municipalities, which are subsequently divided in a total of 2882 parishes.10
Each municipality has a Town Council (executive body), headed by the mayor, and a Mu-
nicipal Assembly, the legislative body.
The local government aims at improving the well-being of inhabitants, promoting social and
economic development, managing territorial planning and providing local public goods.11
As described in Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais (2004), municipalities manage, and in
some cases provide, rural and urban equipments, energy, transportation, education, health
care and sports, civil protection, municipal police, sewage and waste collection and social
welfare local policies. The highest proportion of revenues stems from transfers from the
central government, exogenous to municipalities. They are free to set and collect fees within
some legal limits; as regards local taxes, the municipalities rely on a property tax, surtaxes
9The Portuguese territory includes a mainland territory and two autonomous regions, the islands of
Azores and Madeira. Given that the two archipelagos have autonomous regional governments, with some
freedom to define fiscal policy locally, we concentrate on the mainland territory.
10Out of the current 278 municipalities, 3 were created in 1998 (Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela), therefore
our empirical analysis will make use of 275 municipalities. Including the islands (the Autonomous Regions
of Madeira and Azores), there are 308 municipalities, divided in 3091 parishes.
11Law 159/99, Law 169/99 and Law 5-A/2002 jointly define the competences and attributions of all local
level administrative bodies.
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on the personal and corporate income taxes, which they can set within given tax ranges, and
an indirect tax on the sale of real estate, which is set by the central government. Importantly,
municipalities cannot change the tax base. It is therefore fair to assume that municipalities
have more autonomy in choosing spending allocation than the total revenue they collect.
The accounts of local government bodies are public and made available on a yearly basis.12
They provide information at the municipal level and specify both revenue and expenditure
totals and breakdowns in a set of baseline categories.
The following graph plots the evolution of total spending and total revenue of mainland
municipalities in Portugal, in real terms, from 1986 to 2014.13
Figure 3.1: Per capita revenue and expenditure
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12These accounts have been published by the Local Administration Authority, DGAL, an entity within
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, since 1978. The figures are available for all years except 1984 and 1985.
13As we discuss later, the time frame of the analysis is decided based on data availability regarding the
outcome variables of interest.
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Local spending increased sharply until 2001 (from around 2ebn to almost 8ebn), stabilises
between 2001 and 2008, and contracts sharply after 2009 (to less than 7ebn in 2014), as
a response to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the fiscal adjustment programme
implemented in Portugal between 2011 and 2014. Total revenue follows closely the evolution
of spending, hence there is no concern of deficit accumulation in the period under analysis.
This path is roughly consistent with the business cycles for the Portuguese Economy.14
Between 1986 and 1999 the macroeconomic fundamentals evolved positively: the average
real GDP growth was around 4%, while inflation stabilised at 2.3% in 1999 (dropping from
12.6% in 1986); additionally, the unemployment rate decreased from 8.3% (in 1985) to 4.4%
in 1999. Since 2000, economic conditions deteriorated with an average real GDP growth of
1.38% until 2008, and -0.81% between 2009 and 2013.15
Figure 3.2 shows the disaggregated per capita revenue into its current and capital compo-
nents.
14After a long period of right-wing dictatorship (between 1933 to 1974), the period between 1974 and 1980s
was characterised by high economic and political instability. In 1986 Portugal joined the European Union
and, in the following years, economic stability and economic growth increased, with European structural and
cohesion funds playing a key role in increasing the country’s development and the standards of living of the
population.
15Source: PORDATA and Bank of Portugal.
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Figure 3.2: Per capita revenue disaggregation
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The disaggregation of local per capita expenditure is shown below. The main items of
current expenditure are payroll and the purchases of goods and services, while the most
important component of capital expenditure is investment. Investment expenditures include
all increases in fixed capital. Such an increase may be due to a purchase or production of
durable goods, or improvements in the existing goods to boost their productivity or life span.
Other capital expenditures include financial expenditures and capital transfers to parishes.
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Figure 3.3: Per capita expenditure disaggregation
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The breakdown of total investment expenditure is as shown in Appendix C.1, in Figure
C.1. Panel A shows that the average investment expenditure per capita peaked at more
than 400e in 2001 and 2002, and has been declining since then. The relative weight of
all seven components is relatively stable, as shown in Panel B. Overall, miscellaneous con-
structions and expenditures associated with other (non housing) buildings are the most
relevant components. Miscellaneous constructions include street and complementary con-
struction/maintenance, sewage, water distribution and treatment, waste treatment and a
residual expenditure category, while other buildings reflect expenditure in sports facilities,
social infrastructure and a residual category.
Bruno Carvalho 111
In this paper, we focus on expenditure side policy, particularly in total current expenditure
and in a subset of capital expenditure, investment spending.
3.3 Data
We use data on local public finance accounts; municipal economic, social and demographic
indicators; macroeconomic fundamentals and municipal political data. The time span of our
analysis is constrained by the simultaneous availability of these types of data. As a result,
we focus on the period between 1986 and 2014.
Local public finance data, including the expenditure variables that are our key explanatory
variables, is obtained from the Local Administration Authority, an entity under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as explained in section 3.2. As regards the outcome
variable, we proxy local output using the total wage expenditure of full time private sector
workers in each municipality. Although national wage expenditure does not reflect all output
variations, this is the best proxy available since we have no measure of GDP disaggregated
to the municipal level in Portugal.16 As we show in Figure C.2, in Appendix 3.3, the changes
in the national wage bill of private sector workers measured in real terms are very close to
the growth rate of real GDP across time (Panel A). Panel B shows the strong correlation
between the two variables.
We further disaggregate changes in the wage bill into changes in the average wage paid to
employees (price effect) and the number of employees (quantity effect). All the employment
and wage data is obtained from the Portuguese linked employee-employer administrative
dataset (Quadros de Pessoal - QdP), which includes information about all the companies
16Another measure of local GDP is the local value added. However it is only available from 2001 onwards
and at the NUTS III level. NUTS are official statistical units defined by the Eurostat. Currently, the
mainland territory of Portugal is divided into 25 NUTS III.
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operating in Portugal, collected by the Ministry of Employment.
The mean wage is obtained by calculating a simple average of wages of full time workers by
municipality.17 Our measure includes both the fixed and the variable components of wages,
to capture any fluctuations in wages. In Portugal, reducing the base wage (the main fixed
component) is generally not legally possible, so we expect that changes in wages resulting
from local government stimulus occur mainly in the variable components of wages.18 The
total number of workers in the municipality is the sum of the full-time workers in all the
companies (or their subsidiaries) located in a given municipality.19
Other socio-demographic variables, like population density, lagged local budget deficit, lagged
change in number of firms in the municipality, were also collected. Such variables are used
mainly as controls, as the effectiveness of government spending is likely to be conditioned by
several municipal-specific factors.
We capture the national business cycle with a set of macroeconomic controls, obtained from
the Bank of Portugal Statistics and the International Financial Statistics (IMF). These
macro-controls include real GDP growth, fixed capital accumulation as share of GDP, na-
tional unemployment rate, private consumption as share of GDP and the reference interest
rate of 10 year treasury bonds. The option to include time dummies is not available as these
would be collinear with our instrument, which is an election year indicator.
Finally, due to the nature our identification strategy, we also collect a set of political variables.
The political wing of local governments, the number of terms the mayor has been in power
17The maximum amount of regular work time is defined by law and set to 40 hours/week. However,
collective bargaining agreements stipulate different limits for different sectors, like banking (35 hours/week).
To avoid excluding particular sectors, we code all workers with at least 35 hours/week (140 hours/month)
of paid work as full-time. This excludes roughly the bottom 1% of the sample in every year.
18According to the article 129 of the Labour Law (Law 7/2009) employers are not allowed to demote or
reduce wages of workers, unless in very strict conditions (as when the company is facing severe financial
difficulties).
19Therefore, outcome variables are source-based rather than residence-based. If someone lives in a mu-
nicipality but works in another, his wage and employment will be considered in the latter.
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and a set of dummies to signal whether the party in power has a majority in the Town
Council and the Municipal Assembly, and political alignment with the central government.
All the data used is annual, with all monetary variables at constant prices of 2010, converted
using the GDP deflator. Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix C.1, Table C.1.
3.4 Methodology
Our empirical model draws on the literature about fiscal transmission mechanisms at local
level, particularly Acconcia et al. (2014). The baseline specification we estimate is:
yt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + βgt,i + γXt,i + εt,i, (3.1)
where αi are municipal fixed effects, trendt,i is a linear municipal specific time trend, Xt,i
is a set of controls and εt,i is the error term. The outcome variable, yt,i, is the percentage
change of the per capita wage bill (or the mean wage/the number of workers) in municipality
i. Finally, gt,i, represents the difference in the per capita spending variable (current or
investment expenditure) from period t−1 to period t, scaled by the lagged outcome variable
of interest.20 This follows Barro and Redlick (2011) and ensures that both spending and
output variables enter the equation in the same relative units, so that the estimate of β is
directly the impact multiplier. Two recent studies about local fiscal multipliers, Acconcia
et al. (2014) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018), also use the same scaled change in spending
instead of a regular percentage change.21
20Specifically, the spending and outcome variables are given by: gt,i =
Gt,i−Gt−1,i
Yt−1,i
and yt,i =
Yt,i−Yt−1;i
Yt−1;i
.
21Including actual changes of both variables would lead to an elasticity that could be converted ex-post
to a multiplier, typically by multiplying the elasticity by the sample average ratio of the output variable by
the spending variable. As discussed in Ramey and Zubairy (2018) post-estimation of fiscal multipliers from
elasticities can lead to over estimation of multipliers, particularly for wide time spans.
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The vector of controls, Xt,i, includes up to two lags of the outcome and government spending
variables (to account for potential autocorrelation) and a set of socio-demographic and polit-
ical controls (microeconomic controls) and of macroeconomic fundamentals (macroeconomic
controls). To control for time variant effects we include a linear municipality-specific time
trend, as in De Witte, Geys, and Schönhage (2018) or Besley and Burgess (2004), as well as
a set of macro economic controls.22
Estimating equation (3.1) carries a number of challenges. First, if government spending can
lead to changes in output, it can also be the case that spending is driven by it. Although
local spending is arguably less responsive to output than aggregate, country-level spending,
there are a number of channels through which it may be influenced by municipal economic
activity. Municipalities have a number of responsibilities in the social area, such as childhood
and elderly care, or public housing, in which family contributions are usually indexed to
private income, and the remainder has to be covered by the municipal budget; mayors
may respond to the economic cycle by spending more (or less) to overcome the cycle; finally,
public employment may be used to counteract periods of high unemployment. Consequently,
credible identification must rely on an exogenous source of variation.23
In this paper, we use election episodes to instrument local spending.24 Our IV specifica-
tion is implemented using 2SLS, with the spending variable of interest being instrumented
with a dummy variable that is equal to one whenever a local electoral episode occurs,
22The inclusion of municipality-specific time trends allows for each municipality’s time variant character-
istics to evolve according to an idiosyncratic trend.
23The macro literature addresses endogeneity with a variety of techniques(Whalen and Reichling (2015),
Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2016)). The two most common approaches are i) based on economet-
ric/empirical assumptions, as in the Choleski Decomposition or the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identifica-
tion scheme, and ii) the narrative approach (Romer and Romer, 2010), where researchers identify particular
exogenous movements in fiscal policy using different sources of information (like news reports or major his-
torical events). Econometric-based methods like VARs and, more recently, the Local Projection Method
of Jordà (Jordà, 2005), require different identification assumptions when compared with estimates in the
context of DSGE models, for instance.
24Instrumental variables can be seen as the microeconomics counterpart of the narrative approach.
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D.local_electiont. Thus, the first stage regression of our baseline specification is:
gt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + δD.local_electiont + γXt,i + vt,i, (3.2)
where δ measures the effect of the occurrence of a local election in the local spending variables
and vt,i is the error term. The second stage equation is then given by:
yt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + βgt
∧
+ γXt,i + εt,i, (3.3)
where β is the impact local fiscal multiplier. All equations, otherwise explicitly stated,
are weighted by the municipal population level to reflect municipal size heterogeneity, as in
Shoag (2013) and Acconcia et al. (2014). Standard errors are robust and clustered to account
for heteroskedasticitiy and possible spacial correlation (due to common municipal/regional
characteristics).25
3.4.1 Identification strategy: Local Elections and Government Spend-
ing
Several studies have documented that politicians manipulate spending for electoral purposes,
a result which has been confirmed for Portugal by Veiga and Veiga (2007).26 We depart
from this result and use the political business cycle to compute local fiscal multipliers for
Portuguese municipalities, between 1986 and 2014. Our data spans seven electoral episodes,
25As in Acconcia et al. (2014), we cluster at the NUTSIII×year level, to incorporate the business cycle
common particularities of neighbouring municipalities. Our results are robust to clustering at the NUTSIII
or at the municipality level.
26Eslava (2011) provides a discussion about the motivations of fiscal deficits, including the opportunistic
behaviour of politicians that use them to win elections.
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corresponding to 4 year terms, in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013.27
All the elections in our sample occurred in the last quarter of the respective year; therefore,
we assume that elected local governments only take office effectively in the following year, as
the budget in place up to the end of the election year was prepared by the former incumbent
Town Council.28 The election of 2005, for instance was held in October 9th. The mayor
takes office up to 20 days after the final results of the election are determined and has to
prepare the budget for 2006 in the three months that follow. The budget in place until
December 31st of 2005 was approved in the last quarter of 2004. In this context it is realistic
to assume that the incumbent local government decides in the last quarter of 2004 whether
it is going to hike up expenditure in order to increase the odds of being re-elected in the
2005 election.29
Figure 3.4 plots the national average of per capita spending variables of interest. Vertical
lines highlight years in which local elections took place.
The upper panel provides the national average, in levels, of the spending variables. Current
expenditures increase throughout the sample period (blue line); however, larger increases
seem to occur in electoral years. Capital expenditures, and particularly Investment expen-
ditures (red and green lines), are more volatile and increase more sharply in electoral years.
This pattern is even clearer in the bottom figure, that plots the year-on-year change in the
same variables, where all variables exhibit positive growth rates in election years.
27The first local election in Portugal was in 1976. Between 1976 and 1985 four elections took place, as
initially local mandates were set to 3 years. From 1985 onwards elections occurred every 4 years.
28According to the Law 73/2013, that establishes the financial rules and procedures for local governments,
the budget of year t is prepared by the Town Council and submitted for approval to the local deliberative
branch, the Municipal Assembly, up to the end of October of t − 1. If local elections took place between
July 30th and December 15th (as occurs in every election year in our sample) the budget proposal should
be submitted up to three months after the elected government formally takes office.
29Even if the mayor does not run for the election, he may still wish to increase spending to increase the
chances of the candidate he endorses (most likely, belonging to the same party) being elected.
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Figure 3.4: Local Government Spending and Municipal Elections
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
in 
Eu
r
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
(national average per capita)
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
20
30
40
%
 ch
an
ge
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Current Expenditures Capital Expenditures Investment Expenditures
(percentage changes)
Vertical lines represent (local) election years.
Local Expenditure and Local Elections
Table C.2, in Appendix C.2, shows the sample average of the spending variables in election
and no-election years. Investment expenditure per capita is 38e higher in election years
(corresponding to a 12.8% difference) and the differences are significant up to the 1% level.
Differences in current expenditures are, as expected, less sizeable (+42e and +3.4%) and
the statistical significance of the test of difference in means is smaller.
Next, we tackle the exclusion restriction.
3.4.2 Validity of the Instrument
To argue for the exogeneity of our instrument, we need to establish that i) changes in
outcome variables do not lead to election episodes and ii) that election episodes only affect
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the outcome variables through the government spending channel.
Local electoral episodes are scheduled by the central government at least 80 days in advance.30
The length of each term is defined ex-ante and set to four years. If the local government
is for some reason dismissed, the mayor can either be replaced or an interim election may
occur. The mayor who is elected in the interim election serves a short term only until the
following pre-determined nationwide local election. In the period covered by our analysis,
only three interim elections occurred.31 Therefore, local elections are exogenous to local
decision makers and the evolution of local outcome variables, whether positive or negative,
does not affect the pre-determined electoral calendar.
As regards the exclusion restriction, note that most of the expenditure directly associated
with elections is campaign spending, mostly financed through public funds. The legislation
in Portugal restricts campaign funding sources to party/candidate contributions, private
donations (heavily restricted) and a statutory public allowance attributed to candidates
by the national government.32 As a consequence, most of the spending is financed by the
statutory allowance.
In the next figure we plot the costs and funding sources of three local election episodes, based
on the reports that candidates submit to the Portuguese Constitutional Court for audit.33
30Law 1/2001, August 14th.
31The most important was in Lisbon, in 2007, because the incumbent mayor lost the support of his
political party.
32Parties and campaigning funding and expenditures are regulated by the Law 19/2003, subsequently
altered by Law 64-A/2008, Law 55/2010, Law 1/2013 and Organic Law 5/2015.
33Detailed expenditure and revenue reports are required under the Law 19/2003 and are available from
2005 onwards.
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Figure 3.5: Campaign Spending in Local Elections (2005/09/13)
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Panel (A) shows total (national) expenditure and funding associated with campaigning for
the five biggest Portuguese parties, whether they are running by themselves or in a coalition.
These parties are, from the left to the right of the political spectrum, the Left Bloc (BE),
the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democrat
Party (PSD) and the People’s Party (CDS). In 2005 these parties spent a total of 64 million
euros. Since then total spending has been declining, due to changes in the campaigning laws
that reduced spending limits per municipality and also the maximum statutory allowance
available per municipality. As it is clear from panel (B), the most important source of
funding is the statutory allowance, with donations playing a residual role. Table C.3, in
Appendix C.2, provides more detailed information on campaign spending figures, showing
that in 2005, for instance, 63% of the spending was financed by the statutory allowance.
There are coalitions in the data, which are decided case-by-case, depending on the political
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situation in each municipality.34 Although other parties and independent candidates run for
local elections, they gather a very small amount of votes when compared to the big five. In
2005, for instance, out of the 308 municipalities, 301 mayors were elected in one of the five
big-party lists, and only 7 were independent.
The reduced importance of donations and the fact that even party contributions are in some
sense publicly funded alleviate potential concerns about campaign spending being a shock to
the local economy per se.35 Additionally, it is important to stress that most of the spending
is associated with campaigning materials, that include outdoors, flyers and political events.
Figure C.5, in Appendix, shows the campaign spending of the top 5 contenders in Portuguese
local, presidential, European and general elections, as a percentage of the GDP of the respec-
tive year. Local elections, due to their nature, are the ones carrying the highest campaigning
costs despite the fact that they represent, at their peak, less than 0.04% of the GDP. It is,
therefore, unlikely that this spending has more than residual direct effects on the economy.
The only other cost that can be attributed directly to election episodes are the administrative
costs of organising the election. In 2005, that figure amounts to 7,3em and includes all the
expenditure that the Direction of Internal Affairs bears in election logistics.36 Its most
significant component (63% of the 7,3em) is the compensation offered to the members of
voting assemblies for the administrative tasks performed on the election day. The resources to
support this spending come from the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that transfers
most of the funds to the local administration, that in turn pays suppliers and administrative
staff.37
34Most coalitions in our period of analysis are between the centre-right PSD and the right-wing CDS.
35Party contributions are financed by the parties’ budget, which is also heavily regulated. Parties survive
mostly based on public grants they are entitled to.
36This cost is smaller than the administrative cost of the National Referendum about the decriminalisation
of abortion held in 2007 that, according to the same source, had a 9,1em cost.
37Moreover, it is likely that the administrative costs are a function of the municipal population size, for
which we control in our regressions.
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We also investigate whether elections (even if non-local) are, in itself, a shock to our local
spending variables. This is relevant to establish the channel through which election episodes
can affect local economic developments. In the absence of a proper counterfactual, we regress
our local spending variables on dummies that are equal to one whenever there is an election
(local or not) in our sample.
Results are shown in Table 3.1. In practice, we are running a simplified version of our first
stage equation, equation (3.2), to check whether the strong positive correlation observed for
both outcome variables and local election episodes (in the first line of the table) also occurs
for non-local elections. These regressions include municipal fixed effects and the standard
errors are robust and clustered at the municipal level. Recall that spending variables in
our empirical model are differences in spending scaled by the lagged outcome variable. As
a result, in Table 3.1, the outcome variables in columns (1) and (3) are spending changes
scaled by the per capita wage bill, in columns (2) and (4) by the mean wage and in columns
(3) and (5) by the number of workers
Overall, there is no consistent pattern (of positive correlation) in any type of election aside
from the local elections, which shows that these politically motivated spending spikes are
specifically associated with municipal elections. The only exception are the presidential
elections, for investment expenditures. These results are driven by the fact that presidential
and local elections sometimes occur in the same year. Moreover, the Portuguese President
has no executive powers in general and cannot influence the budget of local municipalities
directly. So it is not plausible that spending in local elections is being driven by presidential
elections. To circumvent possible confounding effects due to the timing of non-local and
local elections, in the last line of the table we report the estimates for a dummy that is equal
to one whenever non-local election occurs. The coefficients are negative in all cases and are
significant only for current expenditures, establishing that, on average, a non-local election
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has, at best, a negative impact on local spending.
Table 3.1: Effects of election episodes on local government spending.
Investment Expenditure (per-capita) Current Expenditure (per-capita)
Wage bill Mean Wage Workers Wage bill Mean Wage Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D.local election 44.686∗∗∗ 4.299∗∗∗ 4.760∗∗∗ 32.837∗∗∗ 2.830∗∗∗ 3.364∗∗∗
[11.254] [0.705] [1.397] [10.727] [0.691] [1.062]
D.general election 15.645 1.627∗∗ 1.127 -5.757 -1.152 -0.535
[12.553] [0.627] [1.414] [9.829] [0.628] [0.986]
D.european election -27.455∗∗ -1.385∗∗ -3.329∗∗ 9.755 0.279 0.948
[13.082] [0.687] [1.510] [6.619] [0.431] [0.712]
D.presidential election 75.473∗∗∗ 4.056∗∗∗ 7.990∗∗∗ 15.863 0.785 1.251
[16.834] [0.904] [1.888] [14.722] [0.941] [1.468]
D.any non-local election -6.998 -1.029 -1.032 -19.282∗∗ -1.759∗∗∗ -1.833∗∗
[12.287] [0.644] [1.406] [8.008] [0.506] [0.801]
N 7733 7733 7733 7733 7733 7733
Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the lagged
outcome variable of interest (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). The explanatory variables D.local_election,
D.general_election, D.european_election and D.presidential_election are dummies that are equal to one in every year a local,
general, European or presidential election occurs, respectively. D.any_non_local_election is a dummy variable, equal to one
when a non-local election episode occurs. All regressions are estimated separately and in all cases they include municipal
fixed effects. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year
level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Our instrument therefore satisfies the conditions for unbiased estimates of local fiscal mul-
tipliers. Moreover, it has the potential of being replicable for future research; in fact, it was
already used by Levitt (1997). Most studies about local fiscal multipliers are based on the
particularities of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, ARRA (Chodorow-Reich
et al., 2012, Dupor and McCrory, 2018, Wilson, 2012), or using a set-up with strong links to
country particularities. Acconcia et al. (2014), for instance, uses council dismissals in Italian
municipalities as an instrument for the decline in local spending, an identification strategy
which is unlikely straightforward to replicate in other settings.
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3.5 Baselines Multipliers
In this section we present the baseline estimates of the main model, described by equation
3.1. In each of the following tables we present the estimates of local investment and current
expenditure on the three outcome variables of interest: the wage bill, the mean wage and
the number of full-time workers in the municipality. Overall, OLS estimation of equation
3.1, reported in the first two columns of each table, yields multipliers of the expected sign,
but very small and generally not statistically significant. Our IV estimates, obtained from
estimating equations 3.2 and 3.3 in a 2SLS framework, provide more sizeable multipliers,
both for investment and current expenditure.
The impact multipliers of local spending on the wage bill are presented in Table 3.2. The first
stage estimates show a clear positive impact of local elections on local government spending,
particularly for investment expenditure. The F-test of excluded instruments is well above
10 (42 for investment expenditure and 19 for current expenditure), which provides further
support for our identification strategy.
The impact of these politically motivated spending spikes on the wage bill is 0.09, for in-
vestment expenditure, and 0.12 for current expenditure, both significant up to the 1% level.
These figures imply that a spending increase of 1% causes a contemporaneous increase of
0.1% in the wage bill.
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Table 3.2: Wage Bill Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 0.00** 0.09***
[0.00] [0.02]
Current Expenditure 0.00 0.12***
[0.00] [0.04]
D. local election 30.94*** 22.89***
[4.66] [5.18]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.02 0.02 0.05 - 0.29 -
F-stat 4.12 3.73 11.89 6.18 5.49 6.34
p-value 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
F-test excl. - - 42.14 - 18.72 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as
the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year private-
sector wage bill (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). The Wage bill is the percentage change
on the per-capita municipal expenditure in private-sector wages of full-time employees (at least 140 paid
hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects,
municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Two
lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets,
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-
stage least-squares, using D.localelection as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local
election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table C.4, in Appendix C.3, shows the effects of the lags of the outcome and explanatory
variables. Interestingly, both the first and the second lags of investment expenditures are
significant and positive (column 4), implying that investment expenditure affects the wage
bill beyond the immediate contemporaneous effect. For current expenditures, the results are
analogous, although only the first lag is significant.
Following Acconcia et al. (2014), we calculate the dynamic multipliers of investment and
current expenditure, by adding up the coefficients of contemporaneous and one-year lag of
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spending (while correcting for lagged effects of the outcome variable), to capture the (two
years) cumulative effects of local spending.38 For investment expenditures this dynamic
multiplier amounts to 0.09, while for current expenditures it is approximately 0.17.39 Notice
also that investment and current spending decisions do not seem to be a result of local
economic activity. The coefficients of the two lags of the wage bill are not significant in the
first stage equations, as shown in columns (3) and (5).
Albeit statistically strong, the actual point estimates in Table 3.2 seem relatively small. As
discussed before, the total wage expenditure in a municipality is driven by two different
components, the actual wages paid (price effect) and the number of people employed in
the municipality (quantity effect). Wages and the number of workers may react differently
to contemporaneous spending spikes leading to confounding effects on the wage bill. The
results in Table 3.3 show that the wage-bill impact is mostly driven by municipal private-
sector employment.
An election leads to an average increase of 1.30% of per capita investment expenditure scaled
by the lagged employment level (column 3). This positive impact is highly statistically
significant and leads to a positive change in the number of workers in the municipality. An
exogenous spike in local investment expenditure by 1% of the number of workers in the
municipality leads to an increase in the number of full-time workers of 1.5%. For current
expenditure the effects are similar. The positive relation between election episodes and spikes
in current expenditure changes is present, however the F-test for the first stage is below the
usual threshold of 10. Even so, we reject the null that the instruments are weak up the 1%
significance level, which provides some support to our identification strategy.
38As usual in fiscal multiplier literature, we assume that lagged spending is exogenous to the current state
of the economy.
39Using the information on Table C.4, Appendix C.3, the calculations are straightforward: βinv ≈ 0.085 ≈
0.09+0.01
1−(−0.17) and βcurr ≈ 0.17 ≈ 0.12+0.081−(−0.19) .
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Table 3.3: Workers’ Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 0.01 1.50**
[0.01] [0.64]
Current Expenditure 0.01 1.71**
[0.01] [0.83]
D. local election 1.30*** 1.14***
[0.35] [0.42]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.03 0.03 0.07 - 0.27 -
F-stat 2.68 2.48 7.09 2.44 3.64 3.01
p-value 0.0205 0.0305 0.0000 0.0330 0.0029 0.0107
F-test excl. - - 13.41 - 6.99 -
p-value - - 0.0003 - 0.0084 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined
as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year
total number of full-time private-sector workers in the municipality (Current expenditure is defined
analogously). Workers is the percentage change on the total number of full-time (at least 140 paid
hours/month) private-sector workers in the municipality. All estimated equations are population
weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microe-
conomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable
are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local election as an
instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election years. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
To better illustrate the impact of spending on local job creation, we can calculate the cost-
per-job implied by the workers’ multipliers.40 The per capita cost-per-job is calculated as the
inverse of the workers’ multiplier, which for investment expenditures is 1/β = 1/1.50 ≈ 0.67
while for current expenditure it amounts to 1/β = 1/1.71 ≈ 0.58. The total monetary cost
can be obtained by using the population level of the mean municipality in our sample (35
40Serrato and Wingender (2016), Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) and Buchheim and Watzinger (2017)
while using different methodologies to compute their employment multipliers, report the cost-per-job to
make comparisons with other studies easier.
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154 inhabitants), this implies that the average municipality can produce a private-sector job
with 23 436e investment expenditure and 20 558e of current expenditure.41
As in other comparable studies, we find that the OLS estimates have a significant downward
bias, particularly when we assess spending effects on the number of workers. This bias
indicates that local policy spending choices are not systematically driven by the state of
the local economy.42 At the same time, the existence of anticipation effects seems to be less
relevant in our case. First, the presence of anticipation effects would mean that our multiplier
estimates would be a lower bound estimate, which would indicate that the employment
multiplier could be even higher. Second, although economic agents may expect municipal
spending to increase in electoral years, they can neither anticipate it with certainty, nor
anticipate the exact dimension of the increase.
It is also important to stress that our cost-per-job, ranging from $24 875 to $28 358, lies
comfortably within analogous estimates from previous works.43 Corbi et al. (2017), for
instance, by exploring the discontinuties in terms of population thresholds that govern the
allocation of federal transfers to municipalities in Brazil, estimate a cost-per-job of $8 000.
Adelino et al. (2017) estimate that on average the cost of creating a job in US muncipalities
is approximately $20 000. Similarly, Buchheim and Watzinger (2017) evaluating the effects
of a sizeable German infrastructure stimulus package at the county level, estimate a cost-
41Using the average municipality population across time does not condition our estimate of the cost-
per-job significantly, as population has been relatively constant during the time span of the analysis. The
municipal population yearly average varies across time between 34 041 and a peak of 36 187, which would
imply a cost-per-job between 22 694e and 24 125e.
42Acconcia et al. (2014) point out that the size of the downward bias of a positive OLS multiplier could be
a result of a high degree of countercyclical fiscal policy. Given the particularities of our municipal spending
variables, we believe that it is not the case here. As discussed, municipal expenditure at t is defined in the
municipal budget at the end of t−1, meaning that it is not likely that expenditure reacts contemporaneously
to the state of the local economy. Additionally, the first and second lags of our outcome variables in the first
stage equations of Tables C.4 to C.6 are generally not significant in explaining the evolution of the spending
variables of reference.
43The conversion to USD was done using the average exchange rate of USD-EUR between 1999 and 2016,
based on the annual period-average exchange rate from the IFS database of IMF.
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per-job of 25 000e. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) finds a similar cost-per-job of $26 000 as
a result of the countercyclical impulse provided by the transfers to state government under
the ARRA, in 2008. Finally, Serrato and Wingender (2016) estimates that the cost-per-job
generated by a rise in federal transfers to US counties amounts to $ 30 000.44
The results for the mean wage are presented in Table 3.4, where the first stage estimates, on
columns (3) and (5) of Table 3.4
Table 3.4: (mean) Wage Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 0.02*** 0.10
[0.01] [0.07]
Current Expenditure 0.02 0.15
[0.01] [0.11]
D.local election 3.89*** 2.53***
[0.51] [0.44]
Observations 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.08 0.08 0.13 - 0.28 -
F-stat 18.74 13.28 47.45 15.30 7.32 13.02
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-test excl. - - 56.35 - 32.03 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as
the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year mean
private-sector wage of full-time employees (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Wage is the
percentage change on the mean municipal private-sector wage of full-time employees (at least 140 paid
hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects,
municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Two
lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported in brackets,
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-
stage least-squares, using D.local election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local
election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
44Others studies identify higher figures for the cost of creating one job position, namely Wilson (2012)
$125k/job or Dube et al. (2014), $120k/job, both in the US.
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Again, F-tests of excluded instruments show that spending increases significantly in election
years. The fiscal multipliers, although positive and more sizeable than the OLS estimates,
are not statistically significant. In practice, this means that local spending spikes do not
lead to contemporaneous changes in the mean wage. It is reasonable that, anticipating
downward wage rigidity, employers are reluctant to increase wages following a temporary
shock, anticipating that they will not be able to decrease them subsequently, if needed.45 In
fact, according to Table C.5 in Appendix C.3, if wages respond to spending changes, that
effect is mostly for investment expenditure and with a one period lag, as the impact of Lagged
Investment Expenditure in the mean wage is positive and statistically significant.
3.5.1 Including spending from years prior to local elections
Our identification strategy is based on the hypothesis that mayors increase local spending
to increase electoral success. So far, we considered only the expenditure spikes that occur
in the year of the election. However, Figure 3.4 suggests that at least some of the electoral
motivated spending may occur in the year prior to the election.46
We include the effects of the year prior to the election by expanding our set of instrumental
variables. Consequently our first stage equation becomes:
gt,i = αi + ηtrendt,i + δ1D.local_electiont + δ2D.local_electiont−1 + γXt,i + vt,i, (3.4)
where D.local_electiont is a dummy variable equal to one in all local election years (and
45Several studies document the high wage rigidities in the Portuguese labour market, namely as a result
of the prohibition, by law, to reduce wages (downward wage rigidity). As Martins (2015) points out, based
on survey data on Portuguese firms, downward wage rigidity constraints are less binding only for firms
with a low fraction of permanent and high-skilled workers, particularly when the share of the flexible wage
components is high.
46The implementation of ambitious investment projects (building council housing, for instance) takes
longer and so they may need to start in the year prior to the election.
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zero otherwise) and D.local_electiont−1 is a similar variable, equal to one in all years prior
to an election episode. Consequently, δ1 measures contemporaneous effect and δ2 measures
the lagged effect of local elections on our local spending variables. The remaining variables,
as well as the second stage equation, defined by equation 3.3, remain the same.
Table 3.5 shows the first and second stage estimates for investment and current expenditure
on the mean wages and on the number of full time workers. It is interesting to note that the
F-test of excluded instruments is higher for investment expenditures, which is the spending
item that is more likely to be enacted in the year before the election, as discussed above.
This is confirmed by the coefficients of D.local election (lag), which is higher for investment
expenditures’ changes (columns (1) and (5)). The F-tests of excluded instruments are above
10 for both the investment and current expenditure.
The inclusion of the year prior to the election reduces the power of our instruments for
the employment specifications, as both for investment and current expenditures the F-test
of excluded instruments is below 10. Even so, the implied multipliers are positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level. Employment multipliers are slightly lower (between
0.9 and 1.3) than in the baseline specification.
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Table 3.5: Wage and Workers’ Multipliers (including year prior to local election)
Panel A: Mean Wage Panel B: Workers
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure 0.18** 0.91*
[0.07] [0.48]
Current Expenditure 0.28** 1.31*
[0.13] [0.69]
D.local election 4.30*** 2.53*** 1.52*** 1.28***
[0.52] [0.46] [0.37] [0.46]
D.local election (lag) 1.00** 0.44* 0.65* 0.36***
[0.44] [0.26] [0.34] [0.12]
Obs. 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.033 - 0.006 - 0.051 - 0.001 -
F-stat 27.41 17.23 6.02 16.78 8.50 3.08 2.71 3.65
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0158 0.0196 0.0000
F-test excl. 32.44 - 14.23 - 8.12 - 5.28 -
p-value 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0003 - 0.0053 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change
in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year relevant outcome variable (mean private-sector wage or
the number of full-time employees in the private sector). The outcome variables, Wage or Workers, are defined as the percentage
change, in the municipality, of the outcome variables of interest. All estimated equations are population weighted and include
municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. One
lag (2nd order) of the outcome and explanatory variables are also included (not shown). Standard errors, reported in brackets,
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using
D.local election and D.local election (lag) as instrumental variables, which are equal to one, respectively, in years of local elections
and in years prior to local elections. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Including the effect of previous year expenditure generates a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on the mean wage. This suggests that wages may take longer to adjust than
employment, although we interpret this result with caution, given the rigidity of the wages
documented in previous literature. It may be that these results are driven by the creation
of better paid jobs or by the variable components of the wage. The small magnitude of the
impact – an increase of 1% of local spending, scaled by the lagged mean wage, leads to a
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boost of the mean wage between 0.2% and 0.3% – confirms our cautious interpretation of
the result.
3.6 State-Dependent Multipliers
The literature about state-dependent fiscal multipliers takes advantage of diverse economic
conditions to estimate heterogeneous fiscal multipliers, e.g., depending on the business cycle
(Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari, 2015), for countercyclical spending in reces-
sions (Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin, 2015), in recession periods associated with banking
stress or weak public finances (Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito, 2016), or near the zero
lower bound (Ramey and Zubairy, 2018). (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh, 2013) expanded
the heterogeneity dimensions to include the level of debt, the exchange rate regime or the
level of development of the country.47 Evidence of state-dependence at subnational level is
more scarce. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), for instance, show that subnational spending
multipliers are higher in periods of national and state-level economic slack (measured by
unemployment).
In the next sections we i) discuss the effects of municipality size on the fiscal multipliers
and ii) assess whether the local political cycle affects both the spending spikes and the local
output effects. Having established that our results are driven by local employment, we focus
on the number of workers as the outcome variable of interest.
47Parker (2011) provides a discussion about the need and relevance of reflecting the economic cycle in the
estimation of fiscal multipliers.
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3.6.1 Are multipliers affected by the size of the municipality?
The size of the municipality is likely to affect the value of the local fiscal multipliers. Bigger
municipalities have more dynamic labour markets and financial resources of such municipal-
ities are also potentially higher. Moreover, the potential scope for large spikes in investment
expenditure is also higher, as repairing a central avenue in a big city is most likely more
expensive than doing a similar repair in a small village.
An obvious way of assessing heterogenous effects of local spending in municipalities of dif-
ferent sizes is run the baseline regressions discussed in the last section for samples restricted
on population quartiles. As the overall population level does not change very expressively
during the period of our analysis, we compute population quartiles using the whole sam-
ple. Therefore, for each outcome variable, we run four separate regressions, using the same
baseline specification, except for the inclusion of population weighting in the estimation
procedure. We estimate the multipliers for municipalities that lie between the 3 quartiles:
Q1=8119, Q2=16 097 and Q3=37 438.
Table 3.6 shows the effects of local spending on the number of full time workers in the
municipality. The effects are more sizeable as the population level increases. Increasing
investment expenditure by 1% leads to an increase of 7.64% of municipal employment in the
top quartile, which corresponds to a cost-per-job of 13 025e, while for current expenditure
this figure amounts to 8 469e, for the average municipality in this quartile.48
48The cost-per-job is obtained by dividing the average population level, for the municipalities above the
third quartile (99512 inhabitants), by the value of the multiplier obtained in Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Workers’ Multipliers, by population level.
pop. ≤ Q1 Q1 < pop. ≤ Q2 Q2 < pop. ≤ Q3 pop. > Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure 0.21* 0.04 1.76** 7.64*
[0.12] [0.17] [0.86] [4.04]
Current Expenditure 0.54** 0.03 1.84** 11.75*
[0.26] [0.11] [0.77] [6.33]
Obs. 1845 1845 1768 1768 1756 1756 1803 1803
F-stat 5.45 4.74 2.30 2.15 3.42 5.89 1.81 1.76
p-value 0.0001 0.0003 0.0438 0.0582 0.0047 0.0000 0.1091 0.1183
F-test excl. 6.86 9.91 12.25 2.35 9.70 32.98 19.82 30.73
p-value 0.0091 0.0018 0.0005 0.1255 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The estimation procedure and the definition of all
variables used are analogous to the one implemented in Table 3.3, except for the fact that regressions are not population
weighted. Population quartiles were determined for the whole sample and are such that Q1=8119, Q2=16097 and
Q3=37438. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The multiplier is significantly higher than the one obtained in our baseline estimates in
the last quartile and substantially smaller in the first quartile. This shows that in bigger
municipalities local spending is able to affect the local economy more sizeably.
These findings could be a consequence of two issues. On one hand, smaller municipalities
are likely to have scarcer resources and so they cannot increase local spending enough so
that there is a significant impact on the private sector labour market.49 On the other hand,
smaller municipalities typically have less resident companies and so the Town Council may
need to hire companies in neighbouring municipalities to undertake the projects.50
For reference, we also report in Appendix C.4.1 the estimates, by population level, for the
wage bill and the mean wage. Table C.7 shows that both the wage bill multipliers and
49To illustrate, the average investment per capita in municipalities in the first quartile of the population
is 148e while for the municipalities above the third quartile the figure amounts to 425e.
50The average number of firms in municipalities in the first quartile is 131, municipalities above the third
quartile have, on average 2466 firms.
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the relevance of our instrument (evaluated by the F-test of excluded instruments) increase
as population increases. The effects over the wage bill are more visible above the median
municipality, population wise. For municipalities above the third quartile an increase of
spending, scaled by the per capita wage bill, of 1% increases the municipal wage expenditure
by 0.14% for investment expenditures and 0.25% for current expenditure. These results are
higher than the ones implied by our baseline estimates. The findings for the mean wage, in
Table C.8, are similar, although the effects over the mean wage are still not significant across
all the population quartiles.
Tables C.9 to C.11, in Appendix C.4.1, provide further support to these results. In each table
we calculate the multipliers for each of our outcome variables, by restricting the sample to the
municipalities that have cities and coastal municipalities.51 These work as two alternative
measures of the size of the municipality. Overall, the results are similar.
3.6.2 Political Stance
We now analyse the extent to which mayors with higher political capital, as proxied by the
number of terms in office, give rise to differences in spending, and whether this translates into
heterogenous effects on the local economic activity. In this section, we do so by re-estimating
our baseline models using interactions.
Since Besley and Case (1995), much has be written about the consequences of term limits for
accountability and their impact on governance. Smart and Sturm (2013) use a theoretical
model to discuss how term limits induce politicians to implement their preferred policies
and can thus improve the voters’ information about them. Leguizamon and Crowley (2016),
in turn, discusses that the reduction of accountability due to the existence of term limits
51According to Law 11/82, a village can be classified as a city if it has at least 8000 inhabitants and if it
possesses certain collective structures like hospitals, cultural centres, schools (at least up to the secondary
level) and public transportation, among others.
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suggested by Besley and Case (1995) may be mitigated by the prospects of future careers
outside mayoral office for these incumbents. Klein and Sakurai (2015) show that first-terms
mayors in Brazil (not term-limited) reduce local taxes and shift spending from current to
capital items in election years, to boost the probability of being reelected. Alt, Bueno De
Mesquita, and Rose (2011), exploiting variation in US gubernatorial term limits, argues that
the effects of term limits vary on essentially two dimensions: accountability (that makes
term-limited mayors less worried about voters’ welfare) and competence (that makes more
experienced mayors, more efficient policy makers).52
Term limits for mayors – a maximum of three consecutive terms – were introduced in Portugal
in 2005, but only became binding in the 2013 election. Lopes da Fonseca (2016) shows that
term limited mayors in Portugal are more fiscally conservative, in that they set lower tax
rates and spend less than their counterparts who can be up for reelection.53
In Table 3.7 we investigate the heterogenous effects of local spending multipliers for mayors
that have been in power for at least 3 terms.54 We define the threshold at 3 terms because
the average number of terms in our sample is 2.5 (ranging from 1 to 10) and because, in that
way, we can provide some rationale to the limit imposed by the Law 46/2005.
52Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011) surveys the literature about term limits, and shows that there is
evidence of different behaviour of term-limited central governments, for a panel of 52 countries.
53Also in Portugal, Veiga and Veiga (2018) show that term-limits increase voter turnout in local Portuguese
municipalities.
54D.high terms is equal to one whenever number of terms>3.
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Table 3.7: Workers’ Multipliers, for municipalities with the same mayor for more than 3
terms.
Panel A: Workers and Inv. Exp. Panel B: Workers and Cur. Exp.
1st St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 1.63**
[0.72]
D.high terms × Investment Expenditure -0.28
[0.82]
Current Expenditure 3.02**
[1.24]
D.high terms × Current Expenditure -2.21*
[1.24]
D.high terms 0.36 0.10 -0.89 0.51 1.06*** 0.47
[0.36] [0.29] [0.65] [0.37] [0.36] [0.99]
D.local elections 1.25*** 0.17 0.85*** 0.27
[0.32] [0.11] [0.24] [0.18]
D.high terms × D.local elections 0.16 1.14** 1.15 1.59*
[0.50] [0.47] [0.88] [0.88]
Obs. 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.09 0.02 - 0.29 0.00 -
F-stat 5.90 3.28 2.29 4.19 2.87 2.86
p-value 0.0000 0.0019 0.0257 0.0002 0.0059 0.0061
F-test excl. 7.53 3.40 - 6.41 1.54 -
p-value 0.0006 0.0339 - 0.0017 0.2151 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local
Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year number of workers. The outcome variable is the percentage change of the
number of Workers, in the municipality. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-
specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.localelection and
D.high terms × D.local election as instrumental variables. The former is equal to one in all election years and the latter is an interaction
term, equal to one for all municipalities whose mayor, in election years, is in power for more than 3 terms. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Both the coefficients of D.high terms and of the interaction variable suggest that mayors that
have been in power for long spend more than mayors in earlier terms, although the effects
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are not statistically significant (shown in columns 1 and 4).
Moreover, the economic effect of spending is smaller for experienced mayors, particularly for
current expenditures. The fiscal multiplier is 3.02% for municipalities with mayors between
the first and the third terms. From the fourth term onwards, the employment multipliers
reduces to 0.81% (3.02-2.21), which is smaller than the 1.71% linear multiplier shown in
Table 3.3. This figure implies a cost-of-job created of 43 400e.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper uses a novel instrument to identify exogenous local spending shocks and estimate
local fiscal multipliers. We take advantage of the opportunistic behaviour of politicians in
electoral periods and instrument exogenous changes in local spending using a dummy variable
for the election year to capture electorally motivated expenditure.
Local elections in Portugal are scheduled by the central government and take place in fixed
four-year intervals and are, as such, exogenous to local policy makers. To establish that elec-
tions are not per se a shock to local output, we investigate the logistics and financials of local
elections. We show that election episodes entail administrative and campaign costs which
represent a negligible share of 0.04% of GDP. Administrative costs are supported mostly by
the municipalities and campaign costs by political parties. Typically costs materialise in the
campaign period, two weeks prior to the election day. Therefore, it is unlikely that the direct
cost of electoral episodes represents a shock to local output which makes us confident about
the validity of the instrument.
Using a rich panel dataset with detailed information on municipal level expenditure and
revenue, we analyse two expenditure items (local investment in fixed assets and current
expenditure) and conclude that the former is more prone to political business cycles. We
Bruno Carvalho 139
References
then compute local fiscal multipliers of municipal spending on three local outcome variables
of interest: the total wage expenditure of full time workers in the private sector (wage
bill), the mean wage of private sector workers and the total number of full-time workers in
the municipality. Overall, we find that local expenditure shocks in electoral years lead to
contemporaneous increase in both the wage bill (around 0.1%) and in the number of workers
(between 1.5 and 1.7%). The municipal mean wage is more rigid and, if anything, responds
with a one period lag, with a small effect that ranges from 0.4 to 0.6%. These results are
robust to different specifications and to the inclusion of the year prior to election as an
additional instrument.
We also evaluate the sensitivity of multipliers to different demographic, and political contexts.
We show that multipliers are higher for bigger municipalities and find evidence that mayors
in power for longer periods tend to produce spending (particularly current) that has smaller
effects on the local economic activity.
The main contributions of this paper are to provide a new identification strategy and to
add to the literature on state-dependent multipliers by investigating previously unexplored
dimensions of heterogeneity. Our approach could be replicated virtually to all countries where
subnational, exogenously set elections occur, thus providing the ideal tool to perform cross-
country evaluation of local fiscal multipliers. This could improve our knowledge about the
transmission mechanisms of local fiscal policy and provide an important tool for comparative
analysis.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1
A.1 Campaigning in Portugal
A.1.1 The rules of campaigning in local elections
Law 19/2003 establishes the baseline set-up that regulates campaign spending and funding
in Portuguese elections, depending on the election type. In what follows we summarise the
rules for local elections.
Campaign spending for local elections is limited, by a spending ceiling per municipality. This
ceiling is defined according to the number of eligible voters in the municipality and is binding
for every candidate/party running for office. The expenditure ceiling for each municipality
is defined using the reference value for social subsidies (IAS), then multiplied by a positive
constant, depending on the threshold for the specific municipality.1
As shown in Table A.1, municipalities are divided in four thresholds that depend directly
on the amount of eligible voters and a fifth that includes the two most important cities in
1IAS, Indexante dos Apoios Sociais, is defined every year by the central government and is used as a
reference (minimum) value for social transfers and other public spending. For reference, the value for 2017
was 421.32e.
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Portugal.2
Table A.1: Spending Limits and number of municipalities per threshold.
Thresholds Num. Municipalities
Level Criteria Limit 2005 2009 2013
1 ≤ 10 000 eligible voters 150×IAS 118 114 113
2 > 10 000 and ≤ 50 000 eligible voters 300×IAS 150 146 145
3 > 50 000 and < 100 000 eligible voters 450×IAS 21 25 26
4 ≥ 100 000 eligible voters 900×IAS 17 21 22
5 Lisbon and Oporto 1350×IAS 2 2 2
Table A.1 also includes the number of municipalities in our sample that are associated to
each threshold. Albeit the distribution is fairly stable, the number of municipalities in levels
three and four has been increasing, at the expense of the two bottom levels.
Spending limits within each threshold should evolve primarily due to the yearly updates of
IAS, however subsequent legislation imposed additional restrictions during the period of our
analysis. For the 2005 election the reference value was, in practice, the minimum wage of
374.70e, while for the 2009 and 2013 elections the minimum wage level for 2008, 426e, was
used. The total spending limit for each threshold level was reduced even further by the Law
1/2013, that imposed an additional cut of 20% for each level, with immediate effects on the
2013 election.
2Lisbon and Oporto are the two biggest and most important cities in Portugal. The corresponding
municipalities, albeit not necessarily the ones with the highest number of eligible voters, have a higher
spending limit.
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Table A.2: Spending Limits per threshold level and year.
Spending Limits
Level 2005 2009 2013
1 61 822.32 64 311.18 50 321.94
2 123 644.65 128 622.36 100 643.88
3 185 466.97 192 933.56 150 965.81
4 370 933.95 385 867.13 301 931.63
5 556 400.92 578 800.69 452 897.44
Values reported at constant prices (2010).
The spending limits in place in each election, for each threshold, are shown in Table A.2.
Overall, limits increased slightly from 2005 to 2009 and declined sharply in the 2013 election.
Notice also that, by construction, the 20% cut penalized municipalities in the top levels to a
larger extent, in absolute terms. In Lisbon and Oporto, for instance, the reduction amounted
to 126ek.
Funding for elections is also heavily regulated. Allowed revenue streams are divided in four
items: the public funding for the election, parties’ contributions, donations and fundraisers.
Donations and fundraising in cash are limited to 25e per donor, higher donations are allowed
whenever the identity of the donor can be tracked (up to a limit of 22 482e, per donor).3
Parties’ can use their own funds in campaign spending, provided that the funds are allocated
to spending in a particular municipality.
3Figures report to the 2005 local election.
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A.1.2 Candidates’ reports on campaign spending and revenue
Figure A.1: Revenue Report of Socialist party in municipality of Amadora (2013 election).
Figure A.2: Expenditure report of Socialist party in municipality of Amadora (2013 election).
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A.2 OLS estimation: Additional Tables
Table A.3: OLS estimates, using spending of winner and runner up.
V. share winner V. share runner-up Win margin
(1) (2) (3)
C. Spending winner 0.015 -0.005 0.020
[0.011] [0.009] [0.016]
C. Spending runner-up -0.035∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
[0.009] [0.011] [0.018]
C. Spending (mun) -0.021∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.008] [0.005] [0.010]
Population 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection 3.870∗∗∗ -2.143∗∗∗ 6.012∗∗∗
[0.746] [0.703] [1.319]
Mayor num. terms 0.247 -0.430∗ 0.677
[0.223] [0.222] [0.415]
Num. parties (TC el.) -2.201∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -0.981∗
[0.359] [0.316] [0.592]
D.Align. central gov. 0.370 -0.704∗ 1.074
[0.423] [0.401] [0.748]
Obs. 903 903 903
R Sq. 0.288 0.174 0.179
F-stat 19.723 11.211 11.897
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time
dummies and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level in square
brackets. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: OLS estimates, using spending by 4 biggest parties. (with controls)
V. share PS V. share PSD V. share CDS V. share PCP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C. Spending PS 0.083∗∗∗
[0.015]
C. Spending PSD 0.090∗∗∗
[0.022]
C. Spending CDS 0.135∗∗
[0.061]
C. Spending PCP 0.057∗∗∗
[0.020]
C. Spending (mun) -0.046∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.016∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.019] [0.006] [0.004]
Population -0.000∗∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection 0.300 1.108 -0.217 -1.255∗∗∗
[0.935] [1.133] [1.389] [0.448]
Mayor num. terms -0.424 0.575∗ -0.199 0.432∗∗∗
[0.265] [0.323] [0.379] [0.145]
Num. parties (TC el.) -1.096∗∗ -2.525∗∗∗ -0.905 -0.256
[0.423] [0.591] [0.752] [0.198]
D.Align. central gov. -1.111∗∗ 0.933 -0.376 -0.075
[0.504] [0.609] [0.431] [0.231]
Obs. 914 675 464 892
R Sq. 0.141 0.353 0.120 0.107
F-stat 10.837 20.579 3.376 7.010
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Notes: Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies
and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level in square brackets. Significance
levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Individual campaign spending effects, by party.
V. share PS V. share PSD V. share CDS V. share PCP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C. Spending PS 0.088∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.017 0.002
[0.029] [0.022] [0.011] [0.007]
C. Spending PSD -0.043∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.033∗∗
[0.023] [0.023] [0.010] [0.013]
C. Spending CDS -0.116 -0.058 0.180∗∗∗ -0.004
[0.072] [0.087] [0.062] [0.015]
C. Spending PCP 0.043 -0.089∗∗ -0.024 0.089∗∗
[0.047] [0.043] [0.019] [0.044]
Population -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection -2.719∗ 3.537∗∗ 0.248 -0.646
[1.446] [1.479] [1.368] [0.728]
Mayor num. terms 0.221 -0.211 -0.253 0.175
[0.459] [0.431] [0.391] [0.186]
Num. parties (TC el.) -1.829∗ -1.923∗∗ -0.618 -0.614
[0.957] [0.876] [0.510] [0.434]
D.Align. central gov. -0.411 1.778∗∗ -0.601∗ 0.271
[0.877] [0.877] [0.355] [0.375]
Obs. 463 462 438 458
R Sq. 0.109 0.333 0.114 0.142
F-stat 2.198 10.329 3.384 3.519
p-value 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Campaign spending variables in thousands. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies
and controls. Robust and clustered standard errors at municipal level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Bruno Carvalho 163
Appendices
A.3 Expected Statutory Allowance
Table A.6: Difference between vote shares for Town Council (TC) and Municipal Assembly
(MA).
V. share (TC) - V. share (MA) Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
PS 1 209 0.7 2.97 -7.8 21.6
PSD 939 0.96 2.93 -9.9 15
CDS 591 -0.58 1.74 -24.9 18.6
PCP 1 196 -0.64 1.72 -10.3 9.1
Table A.7: Instrumental Variables: Expected Statutory Allowances.
ESA Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Winner 924 77 742.85 47 108.66 13 944.7 349 607.7
Runner-up 924 60 278.93 40 187.8 0 346 340.6
PS 899 65 019.36 40 700.3 11 834.5 300 708.7
PSD 614 63 835.16 36 305.95 7 240.1 259 519.6
CDS 239 25 575.93 17 115.66 5 684.2 97 857.9
PCP 638 34 513.38 31 798.07 6 018.1 237 355.4
A.3.1 ESA for winner and runner-up: Assumptions
To compute the ESA in the winner and runner-up perspective we need assumptions that
cover the following cases: i) if the winner/runner-up is part of a coalition today, but in the
previous election he run by himself; ii) if the winner/runner-up runs alone, but was part of
a coalition in the former election; iii) if the winner/runner-up is an independent candidate
running for the first time.
If in election t two parties run in a coalition, while they run separately in t−1, we argue that
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the coalition expects to gather in t the sum of the individual vote shares in t−1. In the second
case, that is if in election t two parties run separately, but in t − 1 they run in a coalition,
we infer the relative importance of the coalition members in t− 1 based on the last election
where they run separately. Finally, for independent candidates we assume, preferably, the
average vote share of independent candidates in the same district.4 Whenever this vote
share is not available (or it is made only of one observation), we take the national average
instead. In both cases, this averages provide a reasonable expectation of electoral success
for independent candidates, in a set-up dominated by party-candidates. If the independent
candidate was associated to party in the previous election, the lagged Municipal Assembly
share assumed is the simple average between the measure of the expectation of independent
candidates and the vote share of that party in the same period/municipality.5
4Portugal is divided in 18 mainland districts. Although districts are not administrative regions, they
form the electoral constituencies based on which the seats in the national parliament are allocated in general
elections. Hence, they are the most relevant subnational division (above municipalities) for electoral purposes.
5This assumption reflects both the particularities of independent candidacies and the potential leverage
that these candidates may have as a result of being part of party in the previous election. If, for instance,
the independent candidate was elected in t− 1 through the Socialist Party, then part of the political capital
of the Socialist Party will in principle stick to the candidate when he runs independently. In fact, there are
cases where the independent candidate in t is the incumbent mayor elected by a given party in the prior
election. In such situations, it is clear that albeit losing the support of the party, this candidate will gather
votes from some former partisan voters.
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A.4 IV Estimation: Additional Tables
Table A.8: Effect of campaign spending of the winner.
V. share winner V. share winner V. share winner V. share winner
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending winner 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.029
[0.037] [0.039] [0.041] [0.026]
ESA winner 0.678∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
[0.120] [0.120] [0.140] [0.142]
C. spending (mun) 0.020 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.020 -0.032∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.035∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.026∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.011] [0.043] [0.011] [0.042] [0.008] [0.045] [0.007]
Population -0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
D.Mayor run. reelection 5.593∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗
[2.572] [0.754]
Mayor num. terms -3.082∗∗∗ 0.261
[0.889] [0.222]
Num. parties (TC el.) -3.946 -2.064∗∗∗
[2.456] [0.364]
D.Align. central gov. -0.370 0.234
[1.725] [0.414]
Obs. 914 914 914 914 914 914 914 914
R Sq. 0.224 - 0.224 - 0.249 0.076 0.274 0.284
F-stat 28.746 7.631 28.746 6.855 24.526 13.561 11.735 21.464
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 30.83 - 32.00 - 16.55 - 16.91 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Standard
errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Effect of campaign spending of the runner-up.
V. share runner-up V. share runner-up V. share runner-up V. share runner-up
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending runner-up 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
[0.030] [0.030] [0.040] [0.044]
ESA runner-up 0.583∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
[0.097] [0.097] [0.105] [0.097]
C. Spending (mun)
Population 0.001∗∗ -0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection -3.708∗ -1.867∗∗∗
[2.162] [0.718]
Mayor num. terms -0.753 -0.323
[0.730] [0.236]
Num. parties (TC el.) -3.772∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗
[1.418] [0.370]
D.Align. central gov. 3.300∗ -0.973∗∗
[1.678] [0.417]
Obs. 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
R Sq. 0.160 0.024 0.160 0.024 0.183 - 0.218 0.062
F-stat 22.271 9.216 22.271 9.122 19.950 6.682 13.765 10.651
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 32.33 - 36.15 - 23.15 - 22.64 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. All regressions include fixed effects, time dummies and controls. Standard
errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Effect of campaign spending of Socialist Party (PS)
V. share PS V. share PS V. share PS V. share PS
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending PS 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
[0.026] [0.026] [0.031] [0.031]
ESA PS 0.737∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗
[0.105] [0.105] [0.117] [0.110]
C. Spending (mun) 0.088∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.010] [0.036] [0.009]
Population 0.001 -0.000∗∗
[0.001] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection 0.284 0.613
[2.163] [0.921]
Mayor num. terms -0.325 -0.474∗
[0.865] [0.262]
Num. parties (TC el.) -4.458∗∗∗ -0.963∗∗
[1.524] [0.454]
D.Align. central gov. -0.397 -1.024∗∗
[1.425] [0.507]
Obs. 890 890 890 890 890 890 890 890
R Sq. 0.240 0.101 0.240 0.101 0.250 0.110 0.268 0.130
F-stat 27.039 14.099 27.039 13.111 24.385 10.175 12.696 7.822
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 52.31 - 49.29 - 30.55 - 29.64 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal
level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Effect of campaign spending of Social Democrat Party (PSD)
V. share PSD V. share PSD V. share PSD V. share PSD
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending PSD 0.375∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.225∗ 0.188∗
[0.095] [0.104] [0.134] [0.110]
ESA PSD 0.643∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗ 0.483∗∗
[0.120] [0.120] [0.198] [0.191]
C. Spending (mun) 0.110∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ 0.069 -0.112∗∗∗
[0.052] [0.030] [0.052] [0.032] [0.046] [0.029] [0.045] [0.024]
Population -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection 2.718 0.964
[2.735] [1.233]
Mayor num. terms -2.055∗∗ 0.671∗
[0.934] [0.375]
Num. parties (TC el.) 1.528 -2.541∗∗∗
[1.703] [0.648]
D.Align. central gov. 2.412 0.681
[1.786] [0.714]
Obs. 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568
R Sq. 0.228 - 0.228 - 0.312 0.257 0.330 0.353
F-stat 21.454 11.261 21.454 9.393 31.802 28.068 14.895 17.806
p-value 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 .
F-test excl. 32.57 - 28.85 - 5.43 - 6.42 -
p-value 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.021 - 0.012 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal
level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Effect of campaign spending of People’s Party (CDS)
V. share CDS V. share CDS V. share CDS V. share CDS
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending CDS -0.050 -0.050 0.012 -0.055
[0.198] [0.166] [0.165] [0.211]
ESA CDS 0.436∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.470∗∗ 0.404∗∗
[0.171] [0.171] [0.181] [0.157]
C. Spending (mun) -0.043 -0.015 -0.043 -0.015 -0.035 -0.005 -0.034 -0.008
[0.047] [0.010] [0.047] [0.009] [0.048] [0.010] [0.042] [0.011]
Population -0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection -4.391∗ -0.848
[2.236] [2.885]
Mayor num. terms -0.578 -0.380
[0.824] [0.606]
Num. parties (TC el.) -4.288 -3.031∗
[3.385] [1.735]
D.Align. central gov. 0.339 -0.675
[1.372] [0.860]
Obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
R Sq. 0.107 - 0.107 - 0.113 0.030 0.243 0.069
F-stat 3.656 1.276 3.656 1.309 1.959 0.968 4.220 1.762
p-value 0.029 0.283 0.029 0.276 0.105 . 0.000 .
F-test excl. 6.02 - 6.47 - 6.75 - 6.57 -
p-value 0.016 - 0.013 - 0.011 - 0.012 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal
level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Effect of campaign spending of Communist Party (PCP)
V. share PCP V. share PCP V. share PCP V. share PCP
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C. Spending PCP 0.142 0.142 0.181∗ 0.157
[0.122] [0.111] [0.101] [0.106]
ESA PCP 0.301∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗
[0.106] [0.106] [0.133] [0.137]
C. Spending (mun) 0.028 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.028 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.022∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.008] [0.020] [0.008] [0.020] [0.009] [0.019] [0.008]
Population 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Mayor run. reelection 1.094 -2.028∗∗∗
[1.658] [0.675]
Mayor num. terms -0.886∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
[0.438] [0.212]
Num. parties (TC el.) -0.930 -0.073
[0.890] [0.355]
D.Align. central gov. 1.225 -0.387
[0.918] [0.392]
Obs. 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 604
R Sq. 0.097 0.003 0.097 0.003 0.105 -0.031 0.119 0.056
F-stat 7.981 6.554 7.981 6.611 4.936 6.347 4.030 4.331
p-value 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test excl. 7.04 - 8.09 - 7.39 - 6.74 -
p-value 0.008 - 0.005 - 0.007 - 0.010 -
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clust. Std. Errors No Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No Yes Yes
Notes: Campaign spending variables are measured in thousand euros (at 2010 prices), vote shares are between 0-100 and the
winning margin is measured in percentage points. Standard errors, in square brackets, are robust and clustered at municipal
level. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Chapter 2
B.1 Experimental Design and Implementation
Figure B.1: Timeline of Experiment Implementation
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Table B.1: Survey Contents
Baseline Treatment Follow-up
• Sociodemographics, political
orientation and interest in pol-
itics, past voting experience;
• Expected voting behaviour*;
• Feelings towards current gov-
ernment performance.
• Expected voting behaviour*;
• Treatment/Control informa-
tion;
• Updated voting behaviour and
updated feelings towards curr.
gov. performance.
• Realised voting behaviour*.
*Voting Behaviour includes: turnout, voting direction (candidate) and reasons, for both voters and non-voters.
Table B.2: Subjects of news, by type of survey.
Survey No. 1st Article 2nd Article
N
eg
/P
os
1/7 Public Finance Pensions
2/8 Public Finance Youth Employment
3/9 Public Finance Road Safety
4/10 National Health Service Youth Employment
5/11 National Health Service Education
6/12 National Health Service Road Safety
C 13 Portuguese Dog Breed
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Table B.3: Percentage of respondents by survey type and treatment/control groups.
Group Survey No. % % %
T. Neg
1 5.83
16.3
32.94
2 5.50
3 5.00
4 5.67
16.65 5.11
6 5.83
T. Pos
7 5.67
17.3
33.28
8 5.83
9 5.89
10 4.83
15.811 5.22
12 5.38
Control 13 33.78
Bruno Carvalho 175
Appendices
B.2 Treatment: Survey Samples
Survey 6: Negative Information
Figure B.2: First Article, Health Care
Figure B.3: Second Article, Road Safety
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Survey 12: Positive Information
Figure B.4: First Article, Health Care
Figure B.5: Second Article, Road Safety
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B.3 Government Performance measures
Figure B.6: General Government performance baseline (perfgov_b)
Figure B.7: Policy area-specific performance
Figure B.8: General Government performance after treatment (perfgov_t)
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B.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.4: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Characteristics
ISCAL 1 800 0,73 0,44 0 1
Undergraduate 1 797 0,97 0,16 0 1
Female 1 797 0,59 0,49 0 1
Age 1 784 21,32 5,97 16 54
Under legal age to vote until last elections (2016) 1 785 0,47 0,5 0 1
Household size 1 728 3,59 1,15 1 11
HH income per capita (equiv.) 1 710 1352,72 1631,49 111,8 17677,7
Respondent contributes to HH: wages 1 794 0,21 0,41 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: pensions 1 794 0,02 0,14 0 1
Respondent contributes to HH: subsidies/scholarship 1 794 0,1 0,29 0 1
Respondent does not contibute to HH 1 794 0,68 0,47 0 1
No religion 1 778 0,37 0,48 0 1
Catholic 1 778 0,55 0,5 0 1
At least one parent is unemployed 1 800 0,16 0,37 0 1
At least one parent attained high education 1 748 0,46 0,5 0 1
At least one parent is civil servant 1 761 0,27 0,44 0 1
Panel B: Turnout determinants and knowledge
Displaced student 1 793 0,29 0,45 0 1
Person in power makes difference 1 786 0,54 0,5 0 1
One vote makes difference 1 789 0,6 0,49 0 1
Understanding politics is complicated 1 780 0,17 0,38 0 1
Knows about term limits 477 0,7 0,46 0 1
Knows about D’Hondt method 477 0,16 0,37 0 1
Panel C: Interest and experience in politics
Self-reported interest in politics (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 789 2,6 0,78 1 4
Belongs to a political party as militant 1 775 0,06 0,24 0 1
Actively supported a candidate in this local election 1 794 0,06 0,23 0 1
Does not belong to any civil organisation 1 775 0,73 0,45 0 1
Run for role appointed by suffrage in the past 1 777 0,4 0,49 0 1
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Last local elections (2013): voted 1 791 0,16 0,37 0 1
Last local elections (2013): no age 1 791 0,77 0,42 0 1
Last parliamentary elections (2015): voted 1 786 0,36 0,48 0 1
Last parliamentary elections (2015): no age 1 786 0,52 0,5 0 1
Last presidential elections (2016): voted 1 785 0,39 0,49 0 1
Last presidential elections (2016): no age 1 785 0,47 0,5 0 1
General interest in this election (1: No interest, 4: very interested) 1 794 2,51 0,88 1 4
Participation in the project increased interest (self-reported) 1 783 0,21 0,4 0 1
Participation in the project boosted search for information (self-reported) 1 786 0,19 0,4 0 1
Panel D: Political preferences and opinion (general)
Knows which part of the political spectrum identifies with 1 772 0,72 0,45 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from own ideas 1 717 0,61 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from family and friend contexts 1 717 0,4 0,49 0 1
Position in the spectrum results from opinion about politicians 1 717 0,22 0,41 0 1
Within the same party politicians share ideology no matter central or local
roles
1 758 0,49 0,5 0 1
Panel E: Political preferences and opinion (towards current government)
General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive) 1 769 0,15 0,4 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): agriculture, forest and sea 1 731 -0,28 0,61 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): home affairs 1 714 -0,04 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): culture 1 726 0,26 0,59 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): defense 1 711 -0,09 0,58 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): education 1 722 0,09 0,69 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): economy 1 727 0,32 0,68 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): public finance 1 719 0,23 0,67 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): health 1 721 -0,17 0,62 -1 1
Gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive): labor and social security 1 722 0,09 0,63 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov. 1 761 0,33 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov. 549 0,42 0,49 0 1
General gov. performance (-1: negative, 1: positive), after treatment 1 731 0,16 0,4 -1 1
Considers using the vote to send a message to gov., after treatment 1 755 0,34 0,47 0 1
Considers sending a positive message to gov., after treatment 589 0,45 0,5 0 1
Considers changing vote, after treatment 1 745 0,05 0,21 0 1
Used the vote to send a message to gov., follow-up 1 724 0,33 0,47 0 1
Sent a positive message to gov., follow-up 557 0,41 0,49 0 1
Panel F: Voting behaviour in Local Elections 2017
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Knows about election 1 788 0,95 0,21 0 1
Intends to vote 1 793 0,77 0,42 0 1
Does not intend to vote 1 793 0,18 0,38 0 1
No age to vote 1 793 0,05 0,22 0 1
Does not know on whom to vote for 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Plans to vote for PS (gov. party) 1 332 0,23 0,42 0 1
Choice reason: candidate’s ideas match mine 876 0,43 0,49 0 1
Choice reason: only candidate I know well 876 0,14 0,34 0 1
Choice reason: Do not want to vote in other candidates 876 0,09 0,29 0 1
Choice reason: my family would vote for that candidate 876 0,13 0,34 0 1
Choice reason: candidate from the party I usually vote for 653 0,51 0,5 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not identify with electoral programs 312 0,21 0,41 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not care 312 0,25 0,43 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I was far from my polling booth 312 0,36 0,48 0 1
Why plan not to vote (2017): I do not understand electoral system 312 0,08 0,27 0 1
Voted (follow-up) 1 798 0,64 0,48 0 1
Did not vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,3 0,46 0 1
No age to vote (follow-up) 1 798 0,05 0,22 0 1
Voted/would vote in PS (gov. party) 1 453 0,33 0,47 0 1
When decided that would vote?: always knew would vote 1 151 0,85 0,36 0 1
When decided that would vote?: a week before the election 1 151 0,08 0,27 0 1
When decided that would vote?: on the election day 1 151 0,07 0,25 0 1
Did you consider voting in a different candidate? 1 143 0,27 0,44 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: candidate 1 097 0,51 0,5 0 1
In your decision, which was the most important: party 1 097 0,4 0,49 0 1
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Figure B.9: Geographical Dispersion
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Figure B.10: Political Spectrum (self-reported)
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Table B.5: Relation between general gov. performance and in specific intervention areas
(baseline)
General government performance (baseline)
All ISCAL PS (2015) Opposition (2015)
Agriculture, forest and sea 0.039*** 0.039** 0.047 0.045
(2.90) (2.57) (1.16) (1.15)
Home affairs 0.069*** 0.066*** -0.021 0.054
(4.69) (3.99) (-0.44) (1.33)
Culture 0.021 0.024 0.061 0.044
(1.46) (1.51) (1.23) (1.14)
Defense 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.043 0.028
(3.02) (2.85) (0.82) (0.64)
Education 0.046*** 0.036** -0.072 0.051
(3.60) (2.52) (-1.63) (1.41)
Economy 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.175*** 0.256***
(9.08) (7.38) (3.01) (5.23)
Public finance 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.071 0.127***
(6.68) (5.47) (1.26) (2.63)
Health 0.028** 0.013 -0.014 0.060
(1.97) (0.83) (-0.32) (1.52)
Labor and social security 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.096** 0.050
(5.12) (4.83) (2.01) (1.24)
Obs. 1621 1213 128 203
Adj. R Sq. 0.360 0.342 0.192 0.500
F-stat. 102.328 70.986 4.361 23.480
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception prior treatment, a 5-level
scale coded between -1 and 1. Dependent variables are performance perceptions in specific policy
areas prior treatment, a 3 level scale coded between -1 and 1. Baseline government performance
perception is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level,
t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.5 Additional regressions
Table B.6: Impact of treatment on Specific Government Performance
Post-Treatment Specific Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.129***
(11.16) (10.92) (8.96) (8.30) (8.27) (9.01) (9.07)
T. NEG -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.123***
(-9.29) (-8.76) (-7.95) (-8.31) (-8.45) (-7.67) (-7.64)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(4.75) (4.68) (4.56) (3.77) (3.73) (3.80)
ISCAL 0.021 0.026* 0.026* 0.016 0.014
(1.60) (1.96) (1.85) (1.09) (0.93)
Female 0.033** 0.040** 0.039** 0.036** 0.035**
(2.30) (2.21) (2.13) (2.20) (2.14)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.40) (0.34)
First election 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(3.22) (3.40) (3.45) (3.24) (3.12)
HH size 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.22) (0.67) (0.78) (0.70) (0.71)
HH income p.c. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.82) (-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.37) (-0.37)
Catholic -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.013 -0.012
(-0.38) (-0.33) (-0.13) (-0.90) (-0.81)
Parents unemployed -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.028 -0.028
(-0.78) (-1.23) (-1.19) (-1.58) (-1.61)
Displaced 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.010
(0.69) (0.65) (0.64) (0.49) (0.52)
Low underst. of elec. process 0.032** 0.036* 0.036* 0.031* 0.030*
(2.50) (1.87) (1.88) (1.98) (1.90)
Politics complicated: yes -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.022 -0.021
(-0.82) (-0.56) (-0.67) (-1.20) (-1.19)
Interest in politics -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012
(-0.65) (-0.90) (-0.81) (-1.14) (-1.25)
Position from family and friend 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.019 -0.019
(0.00) (-0.27) (-0.14) (-1.28) (-1.28)
PS spectum -0.010
(-0.64)
Support spectrum 0.019
(1.55)
Vote PS 0.026*
(1.68)
Vote support 0.026*
(1.98)
Obs. 1737 1711 1508 1132 1132 1145 1145
Adj. R Sq. 0.152 0.164 0.160 0.178 0.179 0.190 0.190
F-stat. 182.104 138.063 42.500 29.053 29.795 36.705 35.079
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception associated to the policy areas covered in treatment, a 5-level scale
coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG. and T.POS. are dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents were subject to negative/positive
treatment. Baseline government performance perception is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class
level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. Significance
level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Impact of treatment on general government performance
Post-Treatment General Government Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
T. POS. 0.028 0.033** 0.031** 0.017 0.018 0.035* 0.036*
(1.53) (2.17) (2.00) (0.90) (1.01) (1.88) (1.92)
T. NEG. -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.108*** -0.108***
(-4.30) (-5.59) (-5.45) (-5.45) (-5.61) (-4.84) (-4.78)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.668*** 0.662*** 0.676*** 0.649*** 0.658*** 0.658***
(28.87) (26.75) (22.50) (20.82) (25.20) (25.16)
ISCAL 0.018 0.012 0.008 0.001 -0.003
(1.25) (0.68) (0.45) (0.06) (-0.15)
Female 0.006 -0.001 -0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.45) (-0.05) (-0.48) (0.37) (0.25)
Age 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003 0.003
(2.32) (2.36) (2.31) (1.64) (1.54)
First election 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.012
(0.85) (0.45) (0.54) (0.71) (0.58)
HH size 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.27) (0.26) (0.51) (0.04) (0.07)
HH income p.c. -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000**
(-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.58) (-2.43) (-2.34)
Catholic -0.021 -0.031* -0.020 -0.019 -0.016
(-1.30) (-1.73) (-1.19) (-1.00) (-0.83)
Parents unemployed -0.034* -0.036* -0.036 -0.068*** -0.070***
(-1.68) (-1.69) (-1.66) (-3.19) (-3.22)
Displaced 0.033* 0.036* 0.034* 0.021 0.023
(1.87) (1.98) (1.96) (1.08) (1.16)
Low underst. of elec. process 0.039* 0.037 0.036 0.019 0.017
(1.87) (1.38) (1.36) (0.77) (0.67)
Politics complicated: yes -0.044** -0.045* -0.049* -0.030 -0.030
(-2.22) (-1.76) (-1.89) (-1.37) (-1.35)
Interest in politics -0.023* -0.018 -0.018 -0.025* -0.027*
(-1.81) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.83) (-1.97)
Position from family and friend -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.030 -0.030
(-1.04) (-0.92) (-0.84) (-1.52) (-1.50)
Centre 0.026
(1.19)
Left + Centre 0.079***
(4.42)
Intent Vote PS 0.061***
(3.54)
Intent Vote support 0.058***
(3.66)
Obs. 1731 1708 1513 1145 1145 1153 1153
Adj. R Sq. 0.020 0.485 0.488 0.524 0.532 0.525 0.525
F-stat. 16.786 367.202 126.584 144.385 153.743 104.678 103.975
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception, a 4-level scale coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG. and T.POS. are
dummy variables equal to 1 whenever respondents were subject to negative/positive treatment. Plans to vote PS is a dummy variable
equal to one when respondent reports an intention to vote for the Socialist Party, before the election. Baseline government performance
perception is 5-level scale coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics reported in parenthesis. Controls
include socio-demographic and measures of engagement/interest in politics. Significance level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.8: First stage regression of 2SLS of voting for PS on treatment groups
Post-Treatment General Government Performance (2SLS)
IV: T. Pos. & T. Neg. IV: Survey Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T. POS. 0.044** 0.041**
(2.00) (2.00)
T. NEG -0.097*** -0.98***
(-4.06) (-4.29)
T. NEG. 1 -0.027 -0.023
(-0.86) (-0.67)
T. NEG. 2 -0.051 -0.076*
(-1.2) (-1.89)
T. NEG. 3 -0.101** -0.113**
(-2.06) (-2.28)
T. NEG. 4 -0.153*** -0.162***
(-3.81) (-4.02)
T. NEG. 5 -0.15*** -0.124**
(-3.22) (-2.51)
T. NEG. 6 -0.109 -0.1**
(-2.58) (-2.36)
T. POS. 7 0.048 0.021
(1.18) (0.5)
T. POS. 8 0.037*** 0.03
(1.25) (0.95)
T. POS. 9 0.115 0.132***
(3.4) (3.6)
T. POS. 10 -0.024 -0.001
(-0.44) (-0.01)
T. POS. 11 0.052 0.05
(1.45) (1.49)
T. POS. 12 0.033 0.022
(0.75) (0.43)
Plans to vote for PS 0.049** 0.053** 0.050** 0.052**
(2.42) (2.38) (2.51) (2.35)
Baseline gov. perf. 0.685*** 0.668*** 0.683*** 0.664***
(22.93) (21.19) (22.70) (20.89)
Participant controls No Yes No Yes
F-test Excl. 20.34 16.96 9.02 7.82
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 1166 1051 1166 1051
R Sq. - 0.366 - 0.378
Notes: The outcome variable is the government performance perception, a 4-level scale
coded between -1 and 1. T.NEG. and T.POS. are dummy variables equal to 1 whenever
respondents were subject to negative/positive treatment. T. NEG. 1-6 and T.NEG. 7-12
are defined analogously, for the individual survey types. Plans to vote PS is a dummy
variable equal to one when respondent reports an intention to vote for the Socialist
Party, before the election. Baseline government performance perception is 5-level scale
coded between -1 and 1. Standard errors are clustered at class level, t-statistics reported
in parenthesis. All regressions include municipal fixed effects. Controls include socio-
demographic, measures of engagement in politics and municipal dummies. Significance
levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Appendix C
Chapter 3
C.1 Data
Figure C.1: Decomposition of Investment expenditure per capita (national average)
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Figure C.2: Local Output Measures vs. GDP - changes
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Figure C.3: Correlation between changes in the mean wage and spending variables
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Figure C.4: Correlation between changes in the number of workers and spending variables
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel A: Local Finance - Revenue (in millions)
Total Revenue 6 649 23.51 45.94 0.5 854.7
Current Revenue 6 649 16.04 35.1 0.5 572
Current Transfers 6 649 5.57 5.3 0.5 82.4
Direct Taxes 6 649 6.52 21.13 0 361.1
Indirect Taxes 6 651 0.66 2.63 -0.1 60
Sales (Goods/Services) 6 649 1.79 4.32 0 82.5
Property Income 6 649 0.55 1.37 0 31.9
Fees/Fines 6 649 0.69 2.91 0 83.5
Capital Revenue 6 651 7.46 12.85 0 352.4
Capital Transfers 6 651 4.98 4.98 0 125.3
Sales (Durable goods) 6 376 0.57 3.89 0 164.6
Other Capital Revenue 6 651 1.91 7 0 282.6
Continued on next page
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel B: Local Finance - Expenditures (in millions)
Total Expenditure 6 649 23.42 45.94 0.4 843.8
Current Expenditure 6 651 13.57 28.65 0 494.7
Payroll 6 651 6.5 15.95 0 310.4
Purchases (goods/services) 6 651 4.66 8.19 0 129.9
Current Transfers 6 651 1.48 3.27 0 68.3
Financial Expenditure 6 651 0.44 1.04 0 30.3
Other Current Expenditure 6 651 0.51 1.79 0 31.8
Capital Expenditure 6 649 9.85 18.44 0.3 437.5
Investment Expenditure 6 651 6.64 12.92 0 320.6
Other Capital Expenditure 6 649 3.2 8.41 -80.4 373.7
Panel C: Local Finance - Investment Expenditure Breakdown (in millions)
Land 6 600 0.32 1.39 0 71.1
Housing 6 600 0.65 4.6 0 160.1
Other Buildings 6 600 1.59 2.99 0 61.4
Miscellaneous Constructions 6 600 3.33 5.24 0 135.6
Transportation Material 6 651 0.14 0.3 0 9.3
Machinery/Equipments 6 651 0.46 0.96 0 26.8
Other Investment Expenditures 6 651 0.16 0.67 0 23.8
Panel D: Macroeconomic Fundamentals
Unemployment Rate 6 673 7.75 3.53 3.9 16.2
National Budget Deficit 6 673 -6831.67 2980.37 -14239.8 -2686.9
GDP Growth (Real) 6 673 1.31 2.27 -4 4.8
Private Consumption (% of GDP) 6 673 64.57 1.15 62.6 66.3
Public Consumption (% of GDP) 6 673 19.02 1.31 16.9 21.4
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) 6 673 23.1 3.84 14.8 28
Panel E: Demographics and Economic Municipal Variables
Population density 6 669 3.05 8.73 0 79.1
Share of population 65+ 6 669 21.38 6.68 6.7 45
Number of Firms 6 370 920.11 1933.41 10 29710
Average Wage 6 370 829.35 168.57 477.3 2301.4
Number of Workers 6 370 9312.44 25844.16 79 419690
Continued on next page
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Panel F: Political Variables
Local Election (=1) 6 673 0.25 0.43 0 1
General Election (=1) 6 673 0.29 0.45 0 1
Majority: Town Council (=1) 6 639 0.85 0.36 0 1
Majority: Municipal Assembly (=1) 6 636 0.64 0.48 0 1
Majority: Town Council and Mun. Assembly (=1) 6 639 0.63 0.48 0 1
Right-wing Mayor (=1) 6 639 0.44 0.5 0 1
Incumbent running for reelection (=1) 6 651 0.69 0.46 0 1
Number of terms Mayor has been in power (=1) 6 639 2.58 1.7 1 10
Same Winning Party (=1) 6 626 0.73 0.44 0 1
Monetary values in constant prices (2010), shares in a scale of 0-100.
C.2 Identification
Table C.2: Differences in means of spending variables: election vs non-election years.
Levels Changes
Election No Election diff. Election No-election diff.
Investment Expenditure1 297.35e 259.45e 37.9e∗∗∗ 18.64% 8.29% 12.8%∗∗∗
Current Expenditure1 484.71e 442.40e 42.31e∗∗ 9.34% 5.97% 3.37%∗∗∗
Obs. 1937 6082 - 1937 6082 -
Notes: Spending variables in per capita terms. Test of difference in means, comparing spending in election and non
election years, where the significance reported tests H0: diff<0. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure C.5: Campaign Spending of main candidates in Portuguese Elections
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
%
 o
f G
DP
2005 2006 2009 2011 2013
Election Years
(as a percentage of GDP)
Campaign Spending of top 5 contenders in Portuguese elections
Local Presidential European General
Table C.3: Campaigning costs and revenues in local elections.
Party
Costs Revenues
Total Cost Party Contribution Public Funding Private Donations Total Revenue
2005 Election
BE 1 672 981.84e 120 993.79e 1 525 677.74e 28 254.84e 1 674 926.37e
PS 24 026 933.57e 762 676.36e 17 824 684.08e 5 210 029.92e 23 797 390.36e
PCP 4 698 723.27e 293 015.94e 4 254 649.89e 104 428.64e 4 652 094.46e
CDS 3 041 430.92e 700 662.48e 2 356 188.59e 107 482.26e 3 164 333.33e
PSD 28 856 980.80e 7 886 843.62e 13 398 510.41e 4 699 869.10e 25 985 223.13e
Coalitions’ Total 1 342 915.80e 2 214 982.55e 0.00e 842 885.64e 3 057 868.19e
Total 63 639 966.21e 11 979 174.74e 39 359 710.70e 10 992 950.39e 62 331 835.83e
2009 Election
BE 1 329 778.77e 1 246 370.53e 1 137 090.01e 310 768.37e 2 694 228.91e
PS 24 230 903.15e 7 569 295.68e 18 809 219.14e 2 746 030.77e 29 124 545.58e
Continued on next page
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Table C.3: Campaigning costs and revenues in local elections.
Party
Costs Revenues
Total Cost Party Contribution Public Funding Private Donations Total Revenue
PCP 4 805 495.73e 4 705 290.97e 4 420 731.46e 92 125.87e 9 218 148.30e
CDS 1 789 444.85e 1 767 099.10e 1 539 279.84e 22 345.74e 3 328 724.69e
PSD 11 863 141.38e 1 698 618.34e 9 367 376.79e 797 146.26e 11 863 141.39e
Coalitions’ Total 5 737 071.70e 875 429.43e 4 537 367.54e 324 274.72e 5 737 071.69e
Total 49 755 835.57e 17 862 104.05e 39 811 064.78e 4 292 691.72e 61 965 860.55e
2013 Election
BE 1 161 830.92e 230 081.02e 883 650.18e 52 409.06e 1 166 140.27e
PS 19 199 997.20e 417 098.59e 16 808 357.21e 1 403 091.36e 18 628 547.16e
PCP 4 269 663.83e 2 236 064.66e 4 064 301.99e 60 321.36e 6 360 688.00e
CDS 1 495 742.75e 1 188 779.48e 1 193 235.89e 98 939.26e 2 480 954.63e
PSD 7 138 145.67e 1 385 979.62e 4 867 601.80e 863 751.59e 7 117 333.00e
Coalitions’ Total 6 458 889.77e 1 986 305.34e 4 018 579.32e 562 357.50e 6 567 242.15e
Total 39 724 270.14e 7 444 308.71e 31 835 726.39e 3 040 870.12e 42 320 905.22e
Notes: Values in constant prices (2010), the data was obtained from the parties’ reports on campaign spending and revenue, submitted
and audited by the Portuguese Constitutional Court.
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C.3 Baseline estimates of Fiscal Multiplier
Table C.4: Wage Bill Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 0.00** 0.09***
[0.00] [0.02]
Current Expenditure 0.00 0.12***
[0.00] [0.04]
Investment Expenditure (1st lag) 0.00** -0.14** 0.01**
[0.00] [0.07] [0.01]
Investment Expenditure (2nd lag) 0.00 -0.17*** 0.02**
[0.00] [0.06] [0.01]
Current Expenditure (1st lag) 0.00** -0.61** 0.08**
[0.00] [0.26] [0.03]
Current Expenditure (2nd lag) 0.00 -0.29 0.04
[0.00] [0.22] [0.03]
Wage bill (1st lag) -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.14 -0.17*** 0.22 -0.19***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.19] [0.04] [0.14] [0.04]
Wage bill (2nd lag) -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.15 -0.04
[0.05] [0.05] [0.21] [0.05] [0.12] [0.05]
D. local election 30.94*** 22.89***
[4.66] [5.18]
Obs. 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.02 0.02 0.05 - 0.29 -
F-stat 4.12 3.73 11.89 6.18 5.49 6.34
p-value 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
F-test excl. - - 42.14 - 18.72 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year
change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year private-sector wage bill (Current Ex-
penditure is defined analogously). The Wage bill is the percentage change on the per-capita municipal expenditure in
private-sector wages of full-time employees (at least 140 paid hours/month). All estimated equations are population
weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeco-
nomic and political controls. Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors,
reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by
two-stage least-squares, using D.local election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election
years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01Bruno Carvalho 197
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Table C.5: Wage Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 0.02*** 0.10
[0.01] [0.07]
Current Expenditure 0.02 0.15
[0.01] [0.11]
Investment Expenditure (1st lag) 0.03*** -0.32*** 0.05**
[0.01] [0.03] [0.02]
Investment Expenditure (2nd lag) 0.00 -0.21*** 0.02
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Current Expenditure (1st lag) 0.02** -0.61*** 0.10
[0.01] [0.23] [0.07]
Current Expenditure (2nd lag) 0.01 -0.29 0.05
[0.01] [0.19] [0.04]
Wage (1st lag) -0.26*** -0.26*** 0.04 -0.27*** 0.02 -0.27***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04]
Wage (2nd lag) -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.03 -0.18*** 0.02 -0.18***
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
D.local election 3.89*** 2.53***
[0.51] [0.44]
Obs. 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.08 0.08 0.13 - 0.28 -
F-stat 18.74 13.28 47.45 15.30 7.32 13.02
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-test excl. - - 56.35 - 32.03 -
p-value - - 0.0000 - 0.0000 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year
change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year mean private-sector wage of full-time
employees (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Wage is the percentage change on the mean municipal private-
sector wage of full-time employees (at least 140 paid hours/month). All estimated equations are population weighted
and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and
political controls. Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard errors, reported
in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-
stage least-squares, using D.local election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local election years.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.6: Workers’ Multipliers
OLS IV
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment Expenditure 0.01 1.50**
[0.01] [0.64]
Current Expenditure 0.01 1.71**
[0.01] [0.83]
Investment Expenditure (1st lag) 0.01 -0.15* 0.23
[0.01] [0.08] [0.15]
Investment Expenditure (2nd lag) 0.01* -0.24*** 0.37*
[0.01] [0.07] [0.20]
Current Expenditure (1st lag) 0.01* -0.59** 1.01
[0.01] [0.26] [0.63]
Current Expenditure (2nd lag) 0.01* -0.27 0.48
[0.01] [0.21] [0.42]
Workers (1st lag) -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.03 -0.21*** 0.02* -0.21***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.02] [0.07] [0.01] [0.06]
Workers (2nd lag) 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
[0.07] [0.07] [0.02] [0.08] [0.01] [0.07]
D.local election 1.30*** 1.14***
[0.35] [0.42]
Obs. 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172 7172
R Sq. 0.03 0.03 0.07 - 0.27 -
F-stat 2.68 2.48 7.09 2.44 3.64 3.01
p-value 0.0205 0.0305 0.0000 0.0330 0.0029 0.0107
F-test excl. - - 13.41 - 6.99 -
p-value - - 0.0003 - 0.0084 -
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year
change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year total number of full-time private-sector
workers in the municipality (Current expenditure is defined analogously). Workers is the percentage change on the total
number of full-time (at least 140 paid hours/month) private-sector workers in the municipality. All estimated equations
are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a set of microeconomic,
macroeconomic and political controls. Two lags of the spending and the outcome variable are also included. Standard
errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is
done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to one in all local
election years. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.4 State dependent multipliers
C.4.1 Municipal size-related heterogeneity
Table C.7: Wage bill Multipliers, by population level.
pop. ≤ Q1 Q1 < pop. ≤ Q2 Q2 < pop. ≤ Q3 pop. > Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure 0.03* 0.00 0.05* 0.14***
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.05]
Current Expenditure 0.07** 0.00 0.06* 0.25***
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.08]
Obs. 1845 1845 1768 1768 1756 1756 1803 1803
F-stat 5.59 6.13 4.80 4.84 3.49 4.64 2.80 2.67
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0040 0.0004 0.0166 0.0211
F-test excl. 5.57 15.86 12.35 3.03 11.54 43.63 32.25 39.41
p-value 0.0187 0.0001 0.0005 0.0825 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The estimation procedure and the definition of all
variables used are analogous to the one implemented in Table 3.2, except for the fact that regressions are not population
weighted. Population quartiles were determined for the whole sample and are such that Q1=8119, Q2=16097 and
Q3=37438. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.8: Wage Multipliers, by population level.
pop. ≤ Q1 Q1 < pop. ≤ Q2 Q2 < pop. ≤ Q3 pop. > Q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.08
[0.12] [0.07] [0.10] [0.08]
Current Expenditure -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.14
[0.21] [0.06] [0.13] [0.13]
Obs. 1845 1845 1768 1768 1756 1756 1803 1803
F-stat 15.45 15.34 6.79 6.70 8.73 8.50 7.41 6.89
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-test excl. 4.65 11.43 24.91 3.42 14.18 32.87 36.49 41.80
p-value 0.0315 0.0008 0.0000 0.0648 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The estimation procedure and the definition of all
variables used are analogous to the one implemented in Table 3.4, except for the fact that regressions are not population
weighted. Population quartiles were determined for the whole sample and are such that Q1=8119, Q2=16097 and
Q3=37438. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.9: Wage bill Multipliers, in cities and coastal municipalities.
Cities Coastal
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure 0.14*** 0.09***
[0.04] [0.03]
Current Expenditure 0.16*** 0.26***
[0.06] [0.10]
Investment Expenditure (1st lag) -0.30*** 0.04*** -0.31*** 0.03***
[0.06] [0.01] [0.06] [0.01]
Investment Expenditure (2nd lag) -0.21*** 0.03*** -0.18*** 0.02***
[0.04] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01]
Current Expenditure (1st lag) -0.67** 0.11** -0.27*** 0.09**
[0.27] [0.05] [0.09] [0.04]
Current Expenditure (2nd lag) -0.34 0.05 0.02 0.02
[0.27] [0.04] [0.05] [0.01]
Wage bill (1st lag) 0.31** -0.24*** 0.34** -0.25*** -0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.09**
[0.13] [0.07] [0.15] [0.06] [0.30] [0.05] [0.09] [0.05]
Wage bill (2nd lag) 0.27 -0.06 0.41** -0.09 0.25 -0.13** 0.10 -0.14***
[0.16] [0.07] [0.17] [0.09] [0.33] [0.05] [0.08] [0.04]
D.local election 23.09*** 20.63*** 28.91*** 9.56***
[3.33] [6.52] [4.56] [3.41]
Obs. 2736 2736 2736 2736 1531 1531 1531 1531
R Sq. 0.123 - 0.329 - 0.142 - 0.065 -
F-stat 19.02 4.13 2.77 4.96 16.13 3.70 5.06 3.85
p-value 0.0000 0.0010 0.0175 0.0002 0.0000 0.0028 0.0002 0.0021
F-test excl. - 45.93 - 9.54 - 38.00 - 7.44
p-value - 0.0000 - 0.0021 - 0.0000 - 0.0067
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The sample is restricted, in left panel, to municipalities that have cities (according
to the 2001 definition, which establishes 144 cities in a total of 121 municipalities) and in the right panel, to municipalities that have a border with
the ocean (59 municipalities). Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by
the previous’ year mean private-sector wage (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Wage is the percentage change on the mean municipal
private-sector wage. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a
set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to
one in all local election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.10: Workers’ Multipliers in Coastal Municipalities and Cities.
Cities Coastal
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure 6.46** 2.25***
[2.77] [0.84]
Current Expenditure 2.16 9.28***
[1.39] [3.54]
Investment Expenditure (1st lag) -0.27*** 1.73** -0.36*** 0.88**
[0.08] [0.86] [0.13] [0.37]
Investment Expenditure (2nd lag) -0.22*** 1.32* -0.25*** 0.66***
[0.05] [0.69] [0.07] [0.25]
Current Expenditure (1st lag) -0.68** 1.46 -0.07 0.83
[0.27] [1.08] [0.10] [0.93]
Current Expenditure (2nd lag) -0.34 0.74 0.22*** -1.47
[0.28] [0.75] [0.08] [0.93]
Workers (1st lag) 0.01 -0.28** 0.01 -0.27** -0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.04
[0.01] [0.12] [0.02] [0.11] [0.04] [0.09] [0.01] [0.07]
Workers (2nd lag) 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.07 -0.19 0.01 -0.11*
[0.00] [0.11] [0.02] [0.13] [0.06] [0.12] [0.00] [0.06]
D.local election 0.32*** 0.97* 0.91*** 0.21***
[0.08] [0.53] [0.24] [0.06]
Obs. 2736 2736 2736 2736 1531 1531 1531 1531
R Sq. 0.092 - 0.335 - 0.198 - 0.056 -
F-stat 7.10 2.01 2.33 1.84 5.81 1.85 3.75 1.60
p-value 0.0000 0.0748 0.0411 0.1030 0.0000 0.1032 0.0026 0.1593
F-test excl. - 14.86 - 3.18 - 13.23 - 11.22
p-value - 0.0001 - 0.0752 - 0.0003 - 0.0009
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The sample is restricted, in left panel, to municipalities that have cities
(according to the 2001 definition, which establishes 144 cities in a total of 121 municipalities) and in the right panel, to municipalities
that have a border with the ocean (59 municipalities). Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local Invest-
ment Spending per capita, divided by the previous’ year total number of full-time private-sector workers in the municipality (Current
Expenditure is defined analogously). Workers is the percentage change on the total number of full-time private-sector workers in the
municipality. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and
a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local_election as an instrumental variable,
which is equal to one in all local election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.11: Wage Multipliers in Coastal Municipalities and Cities.
Cities Coastal
1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St. 1st St. 2nd St.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Expenditure 0.14* 0.12
[0.08] [0.09]
Current Expenditure 0.20 0.25
[0.12] [0.23]
Investment Expenditure (1st lag) -0.31*** 0.08*** -0.27*** 0.05**
[0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
Investment Expenditure (2nd lag) -0.17*** 0.03* -0.16*** 0.01
[0.03] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Current Expenditure (1st lag) -0.63*** 0.14 -0.41*** 0.16
[0.24] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10]
Current Expenditure (2nd lag) -0.31 0.07 -0.11** 0.09**
[0.22] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04]
Wage (1st lag) 0.06* -0.30*** 0.02 -0.29*** 0.02 -0.22*** 0.02 -0.23***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.02] [0.05]
Wage (2nd lag) -0.01 -0.22*** 0.03 -0.22*** -0.01 -0.20*** -0.02 -0.20***
[0.03] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.02] [0.06]
D.local election 3.90*** 2.68*** 4.41*** 1.82***
[0.53] [0.56] [0.69] [0.55]
Obs. 2736 2736 2736 2736 1531 1531 1531 1531
R Sq. 0.199 - 0.307 - 0.209 - 0.203 -
F-stat 2.56 8.09 2.44 7.67 4.49 5.16 5.56 5.96
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
F-test excl. - 51.22 - 21.77 - 38.44 - 10.27
p-value - 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0000 - 0.0015
Notes: Annual data at municipal level, between 1986 and 2014. The sample is restricted, in left panel, to municipalities that have cities (according
to the 2001 definition, which establishes 144 cities in a total of 121 municipalities) and in the right panel, to municipalities that have a border with
the ocean (59 municipalities). Investment Expenditure is defined as the year-on-year change in local Investment Spending per capita, divided by
the previous’ year mean private-sector wage (Current Expenditure is defined analogously). Wage is the percentage change on the mean municipal
private-sector wage. All estimated equations are population weighted and include municipality fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends and a
set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and political controls. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the NUTSIII×year level. Estimation is done by two-stage least-squares, using D.local election as an instrumental variable, which is equal to
one in all local election years. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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